Abstract
Empirical evidence is collected and discussed regarding the influence of public bureaucrats on government sector outcome in their capacity as consumer-voters. It is necessary to isolate the specific effect of working in the public sector (compared to other occupations) on voting participation and on the probability to support an increase in the public budget. For a balanced evaluation of public bureaucrats' power, other forms of their influencing the government sector outcome need to be taken into account.
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Professor of Economics and Lecturer in Economics, respectively, University of Zürich. We are grateful to Gebhard Kirchgaessner, Friedrich Schneider and Hannelore Weck for helpful comments.
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Frey, B.S., Pommerehne, W.W. How powerful are public bureaucrats as voters?. Public Choice 38, 253–262 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00144851
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00144851