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A leader-follower model and analysis for a two-stage network of oligopolies

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Abstract

This paper is concerned with the existence, uniqueness and computation of leader-follower equilibrium solutions for an industry involved with two major stages of production. We assume that there exists one set of firms performing the first stage of production, which produces a semi-finished product. This semi-finished product is converted to a final good by a second set of firms performing the second stage of production. Furthermore, also competing in the final product market is a third set of firms, which are vertically integrated through the two stages of production and which are assumed to lead the second set of firms by explicitly considering the reaction or response of these latter firms to their own outputs. We model such an industry as a two-stage network of oligopolies, and define equilibrium solutions based on assumed market structures. Our analysis examines the existence and uniqueness of such equilibrium solutions, characterizes the nature of the production strategies of the various firms at an equilibrium, and prescribes algorithms to compute such solutions. This provides the machinery required to perform sensitivity analyses for studying the effects of various mergers or integrations on individual firm profits, and on the industry outputs and prices at equilibrium. The presentation is self-contained, and does not necessarily require any significant prior preparation in economic theory on the part of the reader.

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This paper is based on work done for the Minerals and Mining Resources Research Institute, under the sponsorship of the Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior.

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Leleno, J.M., Sherali, H.D. A leader-follower model and analysis for a two-stage network of oligopolies. Ann Oper Res 34, 37–72 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02098172

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