Abstract
Many contemporary political and economic problems have attributes of social dilemmas. These dilemmas are simply characterized as settings in which individuals have a dominant strategy to not cooperate in collective action. However, this choice results in a Pareto-inferior outcome. Likewise, a dominated strategy exists that results in a Pareto-superior outcome. Where cooperation is absent, this problem has been described as ann-person prisoner's dilemma. This paper discusses the environmental problem of acid rain as such a social dilemma. Relying on a series of laboratory experimental settings, the argument is that many social dilemmas can be resolved through the construction of institutional mechanisms allowing for the coordination of the participant's joint strategies. Policy analysts in particular can profit from focusing on institutional solutions to social dilemmas.
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Support for the research reported in this paper was obtained from a summer research grant provided by the Dean of the Division of the Social Sciences, Rice University. This paper also benefited from contributions by Robert M. Thrall, Randy Calvert, Alphons van de Kragt and Mark Ishimatsu. All of the above are absolved of errors stemming from good advice that was ignored.
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Wilson, R.K. Constraints on social dilemmas: An institutional approach. Ann Oper Res 2, 183–200 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01874738
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01874738