Summary
Social dilemmas (sometimes referred to as “problems of collective action”, “tragedy of the commons”, or “public goods problems”) are situations with strategically interdependent actors such that individually rational behavior leads to an outcome that is less desirable for each actor than had they cooperated. In this chapter, we provide an overview of models of social dilemmas and cooperation in social dilemmas that use game-theoretic tools. We first review examples of social dilemmas and formal modeling of such dilemmas. We distinguish between dilemmas that involve two actors and those that can involve more than two actors. We also discuss why the conceptualization of “social dilemma” is “theory dependent”. Second, we review mechanisms that can induce cooperation in social dilemmas. Cooperation of rational actors in a social dilemma requires that the dilemma is “embedded” in a more complex game. We discuss models for different types of embeddedness. The chapter likewise includes a sketch of models of cooperation based on social preferences and of simulation studies as an alternative to game-theoretic analysis.
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References
Arrow, K. (1974) The Limits of Organization. New York: Norton.
Axelrod, R. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Balliet, D., L. B. Mulder and P. a. M. VAN Lange (2011) “Reward, Punishment, and Cooperation: A Meta-Analysis.” Psychological Bulletin 137: 594–615.
Bendor, J. and D. Mookherjee (1987) “Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action.” American Political Science Review 81: 129–154.
Berg, j., J. Dickhaut and K. McCabe (1995) “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History.” Games and Economic Behavior 10: 122–142.
Binmore, K. (1998) Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume 2: Just Playing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Blau, P. M. ([1964] 1996) Exchange and Power in Social Life. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Bolton, G. E. and A. Ockenfels (2000) “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition.” American Economic Review 90: 166–193.
Buskens, V. (2002) Social Networks and Trust. Boston, MA: Kluwer.
Buskens, V. AND W. Raub (2002) “Embedded Trust: Control and Learning.” Advances in Group Processes 19: 167–202.
Buskens, V. AND W. Raub (2013) “Rational Choice Research on Social Dilemmas: Embeddedness Effects on Trust.” Pp. 113–150 in: R. Wittek, T. A. B. Snijders AND V. Nee (Ed.) Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Camerer, C. F. (2003) Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction. New York: Russell Sage.
Camerer, c. F. AND K. Weigelt (1988) “Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model.” Econometrica 56: 1–36.
Coleman, J. S. (1964) “Collective Decisions.” Sociological Inquiry 34: 166–181.
Coleman, J. S. (1987) “Psychological Structure and Social Structure in Economic Models.” Pp. 181–185 in: R. M. Hogarth AND M. W. Reder (Ed.) Rational Choice. The Contrast between Economics and Psychology. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Coleman, J. S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Darley, J. M AND B. Latane (1968) “Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8: 377–383.
Dasgupta, P. (1988) “Trust as a Commodity.” Pp. 49–72 in: D. Gambetta (Ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Oxford: Blackwell.
Diekmann, A. (1985) “Volunteer’s Dilemma.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 29: 605–610.
Diekmann, A. (2004) “The Power of Reciprocity.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48: 487505.
Diekmann, A. AND S. Lindenberg (2001) “Cooperation: Sociological Aspects.” Pp. 27512756 in: N. J. Smelser AND P. B. Baltes (Ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences. Volume f. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Durkheim, E. ([1893] 1973) De la Division du Travail Social. Paris: PUF.
Epstein, J. M. (2006) Generative Social Science: Studies in Agent-Based Computational Modeling. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Falk, A. AND J. J. Heckman (2009) “Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences.” Science 326: 535–538.
Fehr, E. AND S. Gachter (2000) “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments.” American Economic Review 90: 980–994.
Fehr, E. AND H. Gintis (2007) “Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations.” Annual Review of Sociology 33: 43–64.
Fehr, E. AND K. M. Schmidt (1999) “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 817–868.
Fehr, E. AND K. M. Schmidt (2006) “The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories.” Pp. 615–691 in: S.-C. Kolm AND J. M. Ythier (Ed.) Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Friedman, J. W. (1971) “A Non-Cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames.” Review of Economic Studies 38: 1–12.
Friedman, J. W. (1990) Game Theory with Applications to Economics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gachter, S. AND C. Thani (2011) “Micromotives, Microstructure, and Macrobehavior.” Journal of Mathematical Sociology 35: 26–65.
Gambetta, D. (1993) The Sicilian Mafia. The Business of Private Protection. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gilbert, N. (2010) Computational Social Science. London: Sage.
Gouldner, A. W. (1960) “The Norm of Reciprocity.” American Sociological Review 25: 161–178.
Granovetter, M. S. (1985) “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology 91: 481–510.
Green, E. J. AND R. H. Porter (1984) “Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information.” Econometrica 52: 87–100.
Greif, A. (2006) Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Guth, W., R. Schmittberger AND B. Schwarze (1982) “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3: 367–388.
Hardin, G. (1968) “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162: 1243–1248.
Hardin, R. (1982) “Exchange Theory on Strategic Bases.” Social Science Information 21: 251–272.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1977) Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and, Social Situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harsanyi, J. C. AND R. Selten (1988) A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hegselmann, R. (1994) “Solidaritat in einer egoistischen Welt - eine Simulation.” Pp. 349–390 in: J. Nida-Rumelin (Ed.) Praktische Rationalitat - Grundlagen wad ethische Anwendungen des Rational-Choice Paradigmas. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Hobbes, T. ([1651] 1991) Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
KAHNEMAN, D., J. L. Knetsoh AND R. Thaler (1986) “Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market.” American, Economic Review 76: 728–741.
Klein, D. B. (1997) Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Kollook, P. (1998) “Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation.” Annual Review of Sociology 24: 183–214.
Kreps, D. M. (1990a) “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory.” Pp. 90–143 in: J. Alt AND K. Shepsle (Ed.) Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kreps, D. M. (1990b) Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research.” Pp. 111–194 in: J. H. Kagel AND A. E. Roth (Ed.) The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Levitt, S. D. AND J. A. List (2007) “What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preference Reveal About the Real World?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21: 153174.
Lindenberg, S. (1992) “The Method of Decreasing Abstraction.” Pp. 3–20 in: J. S. Coleman AND T. J. Fararo (Ed.) Rational Choice Theory. Advocacy and Critique. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Lindenberg, S. (2001) “Social Rationality versus Rational Egoism.” Pp. 635–668 in: J. Turner (Ed.) Handbook of Sociological Theory. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.
Macaulay, S. (1963) “Non-Contractual Relations in Business.” American Sociological Review 28: 55–66.
Macy, M. W. (1991) “Learning to Cooperate: Stochastic and Tacit Collusion in Social Exchange.” American Journal of Sociology 97: 808–843.
Macy, M. W. AND A. Flaohe (2002) “Learning Dynamics in Social Dilemmas.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 99: 7229–7236.
Milgrom, P., D. C. North AND B. R. Weingast (1990) “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchants.” Economics and Politics 2: 1–23.
Nowak, M. a. (2006) “Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation.” Science 314: 15601563.
Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ortmann, A., J. Fitzgerald and C. Boeing (2000) “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History: A Re-Examination.” Experimental Economics 3: 81–100.
Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parsons, T. (1937) The Structure of Social Action. New York: Free Press.
Rapoport, A. (1974) “Prisoner’s Dilemma - Recollections and Observations.” Pp. 18–34 in: A. Rapoport (Ed.) Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Rasmusen, E. (2007) Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory. (4th edition) Oxford: Blackwell.
Raub, W. (1988) “Problematic Social Situations and the ‘Large-Number Dilemma’.” Journal of Mathematical Sociology 13: 311–357.
Raub, W. (2004) “Hostage Posting as a Mechanism of Trust: Binding, Compensation, and Signaling.” Rationality and Society 16: 319–366.
Raub, W., V. Buskens and M. A. L. M. van Assen (2011) “Micro-Macro Links and Microfoundations in Sociology.” Journal of Mathematical Sociology 35: 1–25.
Raub, W. and T. Voss (1986) “Die Sozialstruktur der Kooperation rationaler Egoisten. Zur ‘utilitaristischen’ Erklärung sozialer Ordnung.” Zeitschrift für Soziologie 15: 309–323.
Van de Rijt, A. and M. W. Macy (2009) “The Problem of Social Order: Egoism or Autonomy?” Advances in Group Processes 26: 25–51.
Rosenthal, R. W. (1981) “Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-Store Paradox.” Journal of Economic Theory 25: 92–100.
Sally, D. (1995) “Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992.” Rationality and Society 7: 58–92.
Schelling, T. C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict. London: Oxford University Press.
Schelling, T. C. (1978) Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton.
Schramm, M. and M. Taube (2003) “Evolution and Institutional Foundation of the Hawala Financial System.” International Review of Financial Analysis 12: 405–20.
Sen, A. (1974) “Choice, Orderings and Morality.” Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Oxford: Blackwell.
Snijders, C. (1996) Trust and Commitments. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
Snijders, C. and G. Keren (1999) “Determinants of Trust.” Pp. 355–385 in: D. V. Bude- SCU, I. Erev and R. Zwick (Ed.) Games and Human Behavior. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Snijders, C. and G. Keren (2001) “Do You Trust? Whom Do You Trust? When Do You Trust?” Advances in Group Processes 18: 129–160.
Squazzoni, F. (2012) Agent-Based Computational Sociology. Chichester: Wiley.
Stigler, G. J. (1964) “A Theory of Oligopoly.” Journal of Political Economy 72: 44–61.
Taylor, M. ([1976] 1987) The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rev. ed. of Anarchy and Cooperation. London: Wiley.
Ullmann-Margalit, E. (1977) The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Clarendon.
Vogt, S. and J. Weesie (2004) “Social Support among Heterogeneous Partners.” Analyse & Kritik 26: 398–422.
Voss, T. (1982) “Rational Actors and Social Institutions: The Case of the Organic Emergence of Norms.” Pp. 76–100 in: W. Raub (Ed.) Theoretical Models and Empirical Analyses. Contributions to the Explanation of Individual Actions and Collective Phenomena. Utrecht: ESP.
Walster, E., W. G. Walster and E. Berscheid (1978) Equity. Theory and Research. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
Weber, M. ([1921] 1976) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tubingen: Mohr.
Weber, M. (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Free Press.
Weesie, J. (1988) Mathematical Models for Competition, Cooperation, and Social Networks. Utrecht: Diss. Utrecht University.
Weesie, J. and W. Raub (1996) “Private Ordering: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Hostage Games.” Journal of Mathematical Sociology 21: 201–240.
Weesie, J., V. Büskens AND W. Raub (1998) “The Management of Trust Relations via Institutional and Structural Embeddedness.” Pp. 113–138 in: P. Doreian AND T. Fararo (Ed.) The Problem of Solidarity: Theories and Models. Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach.
WeibüLL, J. (1995) Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Williamson, O. E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press. Wittek, R., T. A. B. Snijders AND V. Nee (Ed.) (2013) Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Arrow, K. (1974) The Limits of Organization. New York: Norton.
Axelrod, R. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Balliet, D., L. B. Mulder and P. a. M. VAN Lange (2011) “Reward, Punishment, and Cooperation: A Meta-Analysis.” Psychological Bulletin 137: 594–615.
Bendor, J. and D. Mookherjee (1987) “Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action.” American Political Science Review 81: 129–154.
Berg, j., J. Dickhaut and K. McCabe (1995) “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History.” Games and Economic Behavior 10: 122–142.
Binmore, K. (1998) Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume 2: Just Playing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Blau, P. M. ([1964] 1996) Exchange and Power in Social Life. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Bolton, G. E. and A. Ockenfels (2000) “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition.” American Economic Review 90: 166–193.
Buskens, V. (2002) Social Networks and Trust. Boston, MA: Kluwer.
Buskens, V. AND W. Raub (2002) “Embedded Trust: Control and Learning.” Advances in Group Processes 19: 167–202.
Buskens, V. AND W. Raub (2013) “Rational Choice Research on Social Dilemmas: Embeddedness Effects on Trust.” Pp. 113–150 in: R. Wittek, T. A. B. Snijders AND V. Nee (Ed.) Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Camerer, C. F. (2003) Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction. New York: Russell Sage.
Camerer, c. F. AND K. Weigelt (1988) “Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model.” Econometrica 56: 1–36.
Coleman, J. S. (1964) “Collective Decisions.” Sociological Inquiry 34: 166–181.
Coleman, J. S. (1987) “Psychological Structure and Social Structure in Economic Models.” Pp. 181–185 in: R. M. Hogarth AND M. W. Reder (Ed.) Rational Choice. The Contrast between Economics and Psychology. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Coleman, J. S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Darley, J. M AND B. Latane (1968) “Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8: 377–383.
Dasgupta, P. (1988) “Trust as a Commodity.” Pp. 49–72 in: D. Gambetta (Ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Oxford: Blackwell.
Diekmann, A. (1985) “Volunteer’s Dilemma.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 29: 605–610.
Diekmann, A. (2004) “The Power of Reciprocity.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48: 487505.
Diekmann, A. AND S. Lindenberg (2001) “Cooperation: Sociological Aspects.” Pp. 27512756 in: N. J. Smelser AND P. B. Baltes (Ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences. Volume f. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Durkheim, E. ([1893] 1973) De la Division du Travail Social. Paris: PUF.
Epstein, J. M. (2006) Generative Social Science: Studies in Agent-Based Computational Modeling. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Falk, A. AND J. J. Heckman (2009) “Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences.” Science 326: 535–538.
Fehr, E. AND S. Gachter (2000) “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments.” American Economic Review 90: 980–994.
Fehr, E. AND H. Gintis (2007) “Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations.” Annual Review of Sociology 33: 43–64.
Fehr, E. AND K. M. Schmidt (1999) “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 817–868.
Fehr, E. AND K. M. Schmidt (2006) “The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories.” Pp. 615–691 in: S.-C. Kolm AND J. M. Ythier (Ed.) Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Friedman, J. W. (1971) “A Non-Cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames.” Review of Economic Studies 38: 1–12.
Friedman, J. W. (1990) Game Theory with Applications to Economics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gachter, S. AND C. Thani (2011) “Micromotives, Microstructure, and Macrobehavior.” Journal of Mathematical Sociology 35: 26–65.
Gambetta, D. (1993) The Sicilian Mafia. The Business of Private Protection. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gilbert, N. (2010) Computational Social Science. London: Sage.
Gouldner, A. W. (1960) “The Norm of Reciprocity.” American Sociological Review 25: 161–178.
Granovetter, M. S. (1985) “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology 91: 481–510.
Green, E. J. AND R. H. Porter (1984) “Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information.” Econometrica 52: 87–100.
Greif, A. (2006) Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Guth, W., R. Schmittberger AND B. Schwarze (1982) “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3: 367–388.
Hardin, G. (1968) “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162: 1243–1248.
Hardin, R. (1982) “Exchange Theory on Strategic Bases.” Social Science Information 21: 251–272.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1977) Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and, Social Situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harsanyi, J. C. AND R. Selten (1988) A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hegselmann, R. (1994) “Solidaritat in einer egoistischen Welt - eine Simulation.” Pp. 349–390 in: J. Nida-Rumelin (Ed.) Praktische Rationalitat - Grundlagen wad ethische Anwendungen des Rational-Choice Paradigmas. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Hobbes, T. ([1651] 1991) Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
KAHNEMAN, D., J. L. Knetsoh AND R. Thaler (1986) “Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market.” American, Economic Review 76: 728–741.
Klein, D. B. (1997) Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Kollook, P. (1998) “Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation.” Annual Review of Sociology 24: 183–214.
Kreps, D. M. (1990a) “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory.” Pp. 90–143 in: J. Alt AND K. Shepsle (Ed.) Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kreps, D. M. (1990b) Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research.” Pp. 111–194 in: J. H. Kagel AND A. E. Roth (Ed.) The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Levitt, S. D. AND J. A. List (2007) “What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preference Reveal About the Real World?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21: 153174.
Lindenberg, S. (1992) “The Method of Decreasing Abstraction.” Pp. 3–20 in: J. S. Coleman AND T. J. Fararo (Ed.) Rational Choice Theory. Advocacy and Critique. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Lindenberg, S. (2001) “Social Rationality versus Rational Egoism.” Pp. 635–668 in: J. Turner (Ed.) Handbook of Sociological Theory. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.
Macaulay, S. (1963) “Non-Contractual Relations in Business.” American Sociological Review 28: 55–66.
Macy, M. W. (1991) “Learning to Cooperate: Stochastic and Tacit Collusion in Social Exchange.” American Journal of Sociology 97: 808–843.
Macy, M. W. AND A. Flaohe (2002) “Learning Dynamics in Social Dilemmas.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 99: 7229–7236.
Milgrom, P., D. C. North AND B. R. Weingast (1990) “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchants.” Economics and Politics 2: 1–23.
Nowak, M. a. (2006) “Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation.” Science 314: 15601563.
Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ortmann, A., J. Fitzgerald and C. Boeing (2000) “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History: A Re-Examination.” Experimental Economics 3: 81–100.
Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parsons, T. (1937) The Structure of Social Action. New York: Free Press.
Rapoport, A. (1974) “Prisoner’s Dilemma - Recollections and Observations.” Pp. 18–34 in: A. Rapoport (Ed.) Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Rasmusen, E. (2007) Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory. (4th edition) Oxford: Blackwell.
Raub, W. (1988) “Problematic Social Situations and the ‘Large-Number Dilemma’.” Journal of Mathematical Sociology 13: 311–357.
Raub, W. (2004) “Hostage Posting as a Mechanism of Trust: Binding, Compensation, and Signaling.” Rationality and Society 16: 319–366.
Raub, W., V. Buskens and M. A. L. M. van Assen (2011) “Micro-Macro Links and Microfoundations in Sociology.” Journal of Mathematical Sociology 35: 1–25.
Raub, W. and T. Voss (1986) “Die Sozialstruktur der Kooperation rationaler Egoisten. Zur ‘utilitaristischen’ Erklärung sozialer Ordnung.” Zeitschrift für Soziologie 15: 309–323.
Van de Rijt, A. and M. W. Macy (2009) “The Problem of Social Order: Egoism or Autonomy?” Advances in Group Processes 26: 25–51.
Rosenthal, R. W. (1981) “Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-Store Paradox.” Journal of Economic Theory 25: 92–100.
Sally, D. (1995) “Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992.” Rationality and Society 7: 58–92.
Schelling, T. C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict. London: Oxford University Press.
Schelling, T. C. (1978) Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton.
Schramm, M. and M. Taube (2003) “Evolution and Institutional Foundation of the Hawala Financial System.” International Review of Financial Analysis 12: 405–20.
Sen, A. (1974) “Choice, Orderings and Morality.” Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Oxford: Blackwell.
Snijders, C. (1996) Trust and Commitments. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
Snijders, C. and G. Keren (1999) “Determinants of Trust.” Pp. 355–385 in: D. V. Bude- SCU, I. Erev and R. Zwick (Ed.) Games and Human Behavior. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Snijders, C. and G. Keren (2001) “Do You Trust? Whom Do You Trust? When Do You Trust?” Advances in Group Processes 18: 129–160.
Squazzoni, F. (2012) Agent-Based Computational Sociology. Chichester: Wiley.
Stigler, G. J. (1964) “A Theory of Oligopoly.” Journal of Political Economy 72: 44–61.
Taylor, M. ([1976] 1987) The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rev. ed. of Anarchy and Cooperation. London: Wiley.
Ullmann-Margalit, E. (1977) The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Clarendon.
Vogt, S. and J. Weesie (2004) “Social Support among Heterogeneous Partners.” Analyse & Kritik 26: 398–422.
Voss, T. (1982) “Rational Actors and Social Institutions: The Case of the Organic Emergence of Norms.” Pp. 76–100 in: W. Raub (Ed.) Theoretical Models and Empirical Analyses. Contributions to the Explanation of Individual Actions and Collective Phenomena. Utrecht: ESP.
Walster, E., W. G. Walster and E. Berscheid (1978) Equity. Theory and Research. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
Weber, M. ([1921] 1976) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tubingen: Mohr.
Weber, M. (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Free Press.
Weesie, J. (1988) Mathematical Models for Competition, Cooperation, and Social Networks. Utrecht: Diss. Utrecht University.
Weesie, J. and W. Raub (1996) “Private Ordering: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Hostage Games.” Journal of Mathematical Sociology 21: 201–240.
Weesie, J., V. Büskens AND W. Raub (1998) “The Management of Trust Relations via Institutional and Structural Embeddedness.” Pp. 113–138 in: P. Doreian AND T. Fararo (Ed.) The Problem of Solidarity: Theories and Models. Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach.
WeibüLL, J. (1995) Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Williamson, O. E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press. Wittek, R., T. A. B. Snijders AND V. Nee (Ed.) (2013) Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
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Raub, W., Buskens, V., Corten, R. (2015). Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. In: Braun, N., Saam, N. (eds) Handbuch Modellbildung und Simulation in den Sozialwissenschaften. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-01164-2_21
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