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Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: A model with verifiable types

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Abstract

Games with lack of information on one side are considered where the uncertainty of the uniformed player concerns the (verifiable) identity of his opponent. Two solution concepts are compared: the correlated equilibrium and the noisy channel equilibrium. The analysis shows in particular that correlated equilibria behave differently in the model with verifiable types and in the one with unverifiable types.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Aspirant au Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique, CORE, 34 Voie du Roman Pays, 1348, Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium

    F. Forges

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  1. F. Forges
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Additional information

I wish to acknowledge profitable conversations withF. Lefèvre and J. F. Mertens. I am particularly indebted to J. F. Mertens for pointing out a mistake and helping me to correct it. I also want to thank the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique which supported this research.

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Forges, F. Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: A model with verifiable types. Int J Game Theory 15, 65–82 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770976

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770976

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