Abstract
This paper studies an optimal investment–consumption problem for competitive agents with exponential or power utilities and a common finite time horizon. Each agent regards the average of habit formation and wealth from all peers as benchmarks to evaluate the performance of her decision. We formulate the n-agent game problems and the corresponding mean field game problems under the two utilities. One mean field equilibrium is derived in a closed form in each problem. In each problem with n agents, an approximate Nash equilibrium is then constructed using the obtained mean field equilibrium when n is sufficiently large. The explicit convergence order in each problem can also be obtained. In addition, we provide some numerical illustrations of our results.
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Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge the support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 12271290 and 11871036). The authors also thank the members of the group of Actuarial Science and Mathematical Finance at the Department of Mathematical Sciences, Tsinghua University for their feedbacks and useful conversations. We are also particularly grateful to the two anonymous referees and the Editor whose suggestions greatly improve the manuscript’s quality.
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Appendices
Some estimations for the fixed point system (3.42)
In this section, we make some prior estimations on \(\left( {\overline{X}}_{T},{\hat{Z}}\right) \) in the system (3.42).
Proposition A.1
For any given \({\hat{Z}}\in {\mathcal {C}}_{T,+}\), there exists a unique solution \({\overline{X}}^{{\hat{Z}}}_{T}\) to the following equation
where \(C_{2}\) is defined in (3.43). Moreover, we have the following estimation:
where \(C_{1}\) and \(C_{2}\) are two positive constants only depending on \(\left\{ o_{k}\right\} _{k=1}^{K}, z_{0}, \delta \) and T.
Proof
As the LHS of (A.1) is strictly increasing with respect to \({\overline{X}}_{T}\) and the RHS of (A.1) is strictly decreasing with respect to \({\overline{X}}_{T}\), the equation (A.1) has at most one solution.
When \({\overline{X}}_{T}=0\), we get \(LHS<RHS\); When \({\overline{X}}_{T}\) tends to infinity, we get \(LHS>RHS\). Hence, for any given \({\hat{Z}}\in {\mathcal {C}}_{T,+}\), there exists a unique solution \({\overline{X}}^{{\hat{Z}}}_{T}\) to (A.1).
It is obviously to see that \({\overline{X}}^{{\hat{Z}}}_{T}\le C_{2}\). Note that
we have from (A.1)
where \(D_{k}:=z_{0}^{\frac{\theta _{k}p_{k}}{p_{k}-1}}e^{-a_{k}T}\int _{0}^{T}\exp \left[ (\frac{\theta _{k}p_{k}\delta }{1-p_{k}}+a_{k})s\right] ds\). Then it is straightforward to get \({\overline{X}}_{T}>C_{1}\), where \(C_{1}\) is the root of the following equation
which completes the proof. \(\square \)
Proposition A.2
If there exists a solution \(\left( {\overline{X}}_{T},{\hat{Z}}\right) \) of (3.42), it holds that
where \(M(\cdot )\) is a positive increasing function only depending on \(\left( x_{0},z_{0}, \delta ,T\right) \) and \(\left\{ o_{k}\right\} _{k=1}^{K}\).
Proof
It is enough to find a function \(M(\cdot )\) and prove \({\hat{Z}}_{t}\le M(t)\) for all \(t\in [0,T]\).
We have from (3.42)
where
For the first inequality, we have just used
And for the second inequality, we have just used \({\overline{X}}_{T}\le C_{2}\).
Integrating (A.6), we obtain
\(\square \)
Combining (A.1) with Proposition A.2, we get a new lower bound for \({\overline{X}}_{T}\):
where the first inequality follows from
and the second inequality follows from \({\hat{Z}}_{t}\le M(T)\) for any \(t\in [0,T]\).
Additional explanation to Assumption 5
Let \(i\in \left\{ 1,\ldots ,n\right\} \) and \(x_{0}\in {\mathbb {R}}\) be given. Assume that \(\Pi ^{i}:[0,T]\rightarrow {\mathbb {R}}\) is a continuous function and \(C^{i}:[0,T]\times {\mathbb {R}}\rightarrow {\mathbb {R}}\) is of an affine form:
for some continuous functions \(p^{i},q^{i}:[0,T]\rightarrow {\mathbb {R}}\). Then, solving the following closed-loop system for \(\left( X^{*,1},\ldots ,X^{*,n},X^{i}\right) \):
where \(\left( \Pi ^{*,i},C^{*,i}\right) _{i=1}^{n}\) is given by (4.5), we obtain that for \(t\in [0,T]\),
where
It is obvious that there exists a constant M independent of j and n, such that for all \(j\in \left\{ 1,\ldots ,n\right\} \),
Note that
where \(h^{i}:[0,T]\rightarrow {\mathbb {R}}\) is continuous and has a uniform bound M, to abuse the notation, which is independent of i and n, i.e., \(\sup _{t\in [0,T]}|h^{i}(t)|\le M\) for all \(i\in \left\{ 1,\ldots ,n\right\} \).
In this section, we only show
where M is a constant independent of n, as the other condition in Assumption 5 is much easier to verify.
Without loss of generality, we assume \(\alpha (i)=1\). Then,
By Itô’s formula, we get
where
Therefore, we have
for some bounded functions \(G,H^{j}:[0,T]\times [0,T]\rightarrow {\mathbb {R}}\). It is worth noting that \(H^{j}\) has a uniform bound, which is still denoted by M.
Hence,
Then, it is straightforward to get
where M is a constant independent of n. The estimation on term \({\mathbb {E}}\left[ \left| U_{1}\left( X^{i}_{T}-\theta _{1}{\overline{X}}_{T}^{*,n}\right) \right| ^{2}\right] \) is similar and we omit it here.
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Liang, Z., Zhang, K. A mean field game approach to relative investment–consumption games with habit formation. Math Finan Econ (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11579-024-00360-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11579-024-00360-4
Keywords
- Optimal investment and consumption
- Relative performance
- Habit formation
- Mean field game
- Approximate Nash equilibrium