Abstract
There are bargaining situations in which the parties cannot arrive at an agreement through negotiations but rather must make one irreversible claim which may or may not be fulfilled. In this paper we discuss a model for such a “one-shot bargaining”.
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Anbar, D., Kalai, E. A one-shot bargaining problem. Int J Game Theory 7, 13–18 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01763116
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01763116