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Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory

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Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation

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Abstract

Non-cooperative game theory has contributed several major ideas to the study of negotiation. In the two-person context, the line of research based on simultaneous offers with incomplete information focused on the strategy of making demands, showing the importance of each side’s perception of the other, and how these perceptions can lead to inefficiency. The Rubinstein Alternating Offers game emphasizes the role of time, and establishes a link to the Nash Bargaining Solution. More recent studies have turned to coalitional bargaining and its relation to the core.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA

    Kalyan Chatterjee

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  1. Kalyan Chatterjee
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Correspondence to Kalyan Chatterjee .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Wilfrid Laurier University Dept. Mathematics, Waterloo, ON, Canada

    D. Marc Kilgour

  2. University of Strathclyde Strathclyde Business School, Glasgow, UK

    Colin Eden

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Chatterjee, K. (2020). Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory. In: Kilgour, D.M., Eden, C. (eds) Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12051-1_9-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12051-1_9-1

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-12051-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-12051-1

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