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A note on equalized proper equilibria

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Abstract

This short note is devoted to a remark on a refinement of proper equilibria: it considers the possibility of relaxing the assumptions made in Garcia Jurado and Prada Sanchez (1990), where equalized proper equilibria are defined. We do not insist on the requirement that players should put exactly the same probability on all strategies which are best reply equivalent for them: in this way we obtain what we call quasi-equalized proper equilibria. It is shown that this refinement is an intermediate one between proper and equalized proper equilibria.

Zusammenfassung

In der Arbeit wird das Konzept des properen Nash-Gleichgewichts verfeinert: Möglichkeiten der Abschwächung von Annahmen, die in Garcia Jurado und Prada Sanchez (1990) gemacht wurden — wo egalisierte propere Gleichgewichte definiert wurden — werden untersucht. Die Voraussetzung, daß die Spieler alle Bayesäquivalenten (“best reply equivalent”) Strategien gleich gewichten, lassen wir fallen. Dies führt zum Konzept des quasi-egalisierten properen Gleichgewichts. Es wird gezeigt, daß diese Verfeinerung zwischen properem und egalisiertem properen Gleichgewicht einzuordnen ist.

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References

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Mignanego, F., Patrone, F. A note on equalized proper equilibria. OR Spektrum 17, 231–233 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01720981

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01720981

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