Conclusion
This analysis of the Dahl and Brams measures of voting power indicates that the Brams measure is a more valid measure of power in voting bodies. Nevertheless, in cases in which abstention or absences are formal orde facto voting alternatives, the Brams index becomes invalid because it does not account for the full range of an actor's choices. Moreover, the utility of the Brams index is limited by the problem of analyzing the power orderings it generates.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Cf. Henry A. Kissinger,Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), Chapter IV; Henry A. Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” in H. A. Kissinger,American Foreign Policy: Three Essays, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969); and Stanley Hoffman, “Terror in Theory and Practice,” in Stanley Hoffman,The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1965).
Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,”op. cit.
See footnote 1.
Max Weber,Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 53.
Dahl's analysis is included in Roderick Bell, David V. Edwards, and R. Harrison Wanger (eds.)Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research (New York: Free Press, 1969). Dahl derived his analysis of senatorial power from “Influence Ranking in the U.S. Senate,” an unpublished paper co-authored by Dahl, James G. March, and David Nasatir. This paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September, 1956. We would like to thank Professor March for providing us with a copy of the paper.
This model was proposed to overcome the criticisms of Dahl's analysis made in a seminar on power at New York University. See Steven J. Brams, “Reconstructing Coalition-Formation Processes and Influence Structures from Roll-Call Votes” (New York University, 1972), privately circulated.
Dahl,op. cit., p. 202. The notion of a “symbolic transaction” is developed in Steven J. Brams and Michael K. O'Leary, “An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies,”American Political Science Review, 64 (June, 1970), pp. 449–470, especially footnote 34.
Cf. William H. Riker and Peter Ordeshook,Introduction to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, (1972). Dahl does not explain how he deals with his problem. Cf. Dahl,op. cit., p. 212.
Ibid., Cf.
Ibid., Cf.
Brams,op cit.: Steven J. Brams, “Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems,”American Political Science Review, 62 (June 1968), pp. 461–475; and “The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System,” in James N. Rosenau (ed.),International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 583–599.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
We would like to thank Professor Steven J. Brams for his valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Kushner, H.W., Urken, A.B. Measuring power in voting bodies. Public Choice 15, 77–85 (1973). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718843
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718843