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Voting Power Indices

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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

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Abstract

This entry introduces Shapley-Shubik index, Banzhaf index, Deegan-Packel index and Public Good Index. It discusses the properties of these measures of a priori voting power focusing on monotonicity. Applications are listed.

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References

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Further Reading

  • Felsenthal D, Machover M (1998) The measurement of voting power. Theory and practice, problems and paradoxes. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

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  • Holler MJ, Owen G (eds) (2001) Power indices and coalition formation. Kluwer, Boston/Dordrecht/London

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  • Holler MJ, Nurmi H (eds) (2013) Power, voting and voting power: 30 years after. Springer, Heidelberg

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Hamburg and Center of Conflict Resolution (CCR), Hamburg, Germany

    Manfred J. Holler

Authors
  1. Manfred J. Holler
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Correspondence to Manfred J. Holler .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Dept DiGSPES, Univ del Piemonte Orientale Dept DiGSPES, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Holler, M.J. (2016). Voting Power Indices. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_503-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_503-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

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