Abstract
In this paper, the model which will be analysed is characterized by a labour market with (a) profitable vacancies, (b) unemployment, (c) excess labour supply, (d) limited mobility and divisibility of labour, and (e) competition on-the-job. The analysed setting is typical for a small-business economy. The analysis suggests that unemployment will be greater than equilibrium unemployment if present employees and potential entrants consider job assignments for this market under strategic perspectives.
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Holler, M.J. Supply-side strategic unemployment in small business. Small Bus Econ 5, 221–228 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01531919
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01531919