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On the tournament equilibrium set

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Abstract

An example is provided showing that Schwartz's tournament equilibrium set is not identical to the minimal covering set of Dutta.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 7SJ9 Sansanwal/Marg., 110016, New Dehli, India

    B. Dutta

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  1. B. Dutta
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Dutta, B. On the tournament equilibrium set. Soc Choice Welfare 7, 381–383 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01376285

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01376285

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