Equal before the law?

Abstract

This article reviews empirically the relationship between politicians and decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute businesspeople who are suspected of fraud and of complicity in the supply of arms to Iraq, within the context of (a) conventional ideas about impartiality of the administration of law; and (b) the politics of bureaucratic survival. It discusses some key difficulties in ascertaining “what happened” and relative culpability in serious fraud trials, and the personal interest-inspired factors that can influence testimony. It concludes that in the UK, there is relative autonomy in decision-making in serious fraud cases, but that in “politically sensitive areas” such as the supply of arms to Iraq, there has been overt interference on purported “public interest” grounds with the information made available to the defence and even to the prosecution itself. It notes that without access to the grounds for decisionsnot to prosecute, their “purely legal” justification is difficult to challenge, and this is of most social significance where members of social elites are concerned. It concludes by addressing some difficulties in producing procedural models which provide genuine accountability for white-collar prosecutions and non-prosecutions in different countries.