Summary
In a prior study we combined game theory and inclusive fitness models to examine whether the guarded altruism that can evolve among non-relatives (tit for tat, TFT) might also evolve among close relatives, supplanting unconditional altruism. In most cases, TFT replaced unconditional altruism in family-structured models. Even when TFT is selected at a single locus, however, by withholding altruism from non-reciprocating relatives it may qualify as an ‘outlaw’ from the standpoint of modifier genes at other loci. Here we examine this possibility with a series of haploid, two-locus models in which a modifier gene transforms TFT into unconditional altruism. The modifier allele spreads to fixation whenever Hamilton's Rule is satisfied, resulting in an unconditional altruist replacing the TFT strategy. As such, TFT may be regarded as an outlaw vulnerable to suppression by alleles at other loci.
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Dugatkin, L.A., Wilson, D.S., Farrand, L. et al. Altruism, tit for tat and ‘outlaw’ genes. Evol Ecol 8, 431–437 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01238193
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01238193