Abstract
This paper is designed to combine the game-theoretic investigation of the static or equilibrium properties of large strategic market games together with the investigation of some very simple dynamics, which nevertheless are sufficient to show differences between two related games, one with only trade and one in which both borrowing from an outside bank and trade take place. The role of banking reserves emerges as relevant and sensitive to the transient state dynamics.
Several 100,000 player games are simulated and the behavior is compared with the analytical prediction for the games with a continuum of agents.
The dynamics considered here is so simple that it does not show adaptive learning. A natural extension calls for updating via a learning program such as a genetic algorithm.
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Miller, H.H., Shubik, M. Some dynamics of a strategic market game with a large number of agents. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 60, 1–28 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01228023
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01228023