Abstract
This paper investigates efficiency and equitability issues given a cost sharing method ϕ in an economy with a public commodity. We study the concept of a ϕ-cost share equilibrium and examine the set of all equilibrium allocations. Finally, we devise a mechanism to implement ϕ-cost share equilibria as strong equilibria of an associated non-cooperative game.
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This paper was written while Shlomo Weber was visiting the University of Bonn. Financial support from theSonderforschungsbereich 303 is gratefully acknowledged. We also would like to thank Dieter Bös for valuable comments.
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Weber, S., Wiesmeth, H. On the theory of cost sharing. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 52, 71–82 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227503
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227503