Conclusion
The beginnings of foundational legal research require reflective access to the cultural dynamics which drive the social construction of legal reality. Such access is blocked by our naive immersion within commonsensical and policy-orientated attunements towards our experience of law.
Since this very blockage is veiled by its own operation, a suspension of these standpoints is required. This allows us to begin to comprehend the way common sense institutes an ungrounded and superficial obviousness through a self-concealing and naively “realistic” interpretative schema. From here the positive character of foundational legal studies can itself emerge as the systematic interrogation of legal experience in relation to its what, how and forwhom structure. Foundational theorising is then redirected towards a more respectful and less exploitative relationship with the linguistic roots of our consciousness of law.
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I would like to thank Peter Goodrich for the useful comments made on the first draft of this article.
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Salter, M.G. On the beginnings of foundational legal research into legal discourse. Liverpool Law Rev 9, 23–43 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01207248
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01207248