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Rationality as weighted averaging

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Abstract

Weighted averaging is a method for aggregating the totality of information, both regimented and unregimented, possessed by an individual or group of individuals. The application of such a method may be warranted by a theorem of the calculus of probability, simple conditionalization, or Jeffrey's formula for probability kinematics, all of which average in terms of the prior probability of evidence statements. Weighted averaging may, however, be applied as a method of rational aggregation of the probabilities of diverse perspectives or persons in cases in which the weights cannot be articulated as the prior probabilities of statements of evidence. The method is justified by Wagner's Theorem exhibiting that any method satisfying the conditions of the Irrelevance of Alternatives and Zero Unanimity must, when applied to three or more alternatives, be weighted averaging.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Philosophy, University of Arizona, 85721, Tucson, AZ, USA

    Keith Lehrer

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  1. Keith Lehrer
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Additional information

I am indebted to Carl Wagner for comments and discussion on this paper, but he is not, of course, responsible for any errors contained herein.

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Lehrer, K. Rationality as weighted averaging. Synthese 57, 283–295 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064700

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064700

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