Abstract
Goodman'snew riddle of induction can be characterized by the following questions: What is the difference between ‘grue’ and ‘green’?; Why is the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue not lawlike?; Why is this hypothesis not confirmed by its positive instances?; and, Why is the predicate ‘grue’ not projectible? I argue in favor of epistemological answers to Goodman's questions. The notions of ‘lawlikeness’, ‘confirmation’, and ‘projectibility’ have to be relativized to (actual and counterfactual) epistemic situations that are determined by the available background information. In order to defend this thesis, I discuss an example that is less strange than the grue example. From the general conclusions of this discussion, it follows that ‘grue’ is not projectible in the actual epistemic situation, but it is projectible in certain counterfactual epistemic situations.
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Rheinwald, R. An epistemic solution to Goodman's new riddle of induction. Synthese 95, 55–76 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064667
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064667