Abstract
In this paper I offer a coherentist justification of induction along the lines of a Sellarsian coherence theory. On this coherence theory, a proposition (or a hypothesis) is justified if we can answer all objections raised against it in our social practice of demanding justification and responding to such demands. On the basis of this theory of justification, I argue that we are justified in accepting the uniformity of nature partly because we have no alternative but to accept it for rationally pursuing our epistemic goal. In addition, my coherentist view explains which inductive inferences it is rational to accept. Furthermore, my coherentist view also explains why we can hardly determine a particular numerical value x such that we can draw the conclusion ‘it is rational to accept that p’ from the premise ‘the numerical probability of p is greater than or equal to x’.
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Notes
I also agree with Norton that the Bayesian approach to induction is inadequate. The first reason is that the probabilistic solution to the problem of induction falls in the category of formal theories. As Norton (2003, p. 649) points out, “The probability calculus and Bayes’ theorem provide a (formal) template into which degrees of belief are inserted.” In addition, as Howson (2000) argues, Bayesian conditionalization functions like a kind of consistent reasoning (or consistency constraint) which allows us to infer suitable inductive conclusions only when we have suitable inductive premises, but it does not justify those premises. For these reasons, the alleged probabilistic solution does not provide a complete solution to the problem of induction. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the probabilistic solution relies on UP, rather than justifying it. Another reason is that, as I argue in Sect. 4, the numerical probability of a proposition is just one factor relevant to deciding whether it is rational to accept it. But it is beyond the scope of this paper to show that the Bayesian approach to induction has no chance of success.
In this regard, it is worth noticing that a belief which nobody can successfully defend should not be taken to have a positive justificatory status in our social practice of justification. If we give up this condition, then we will be led to an epistemic disaster in which anyone can stubbornly stick to her own belief, even if there is no reason or evidence whatsoever for the belief. Thus, we may regard this as a minimum justification condition for our social practice of justification. But it is also important to observe that this minimum justification condition does not require that each member of our epistemic community be able to defend her belief alone in order for her to be justified in holding it. This is mainly because one can defer to some appropriate authority in the matter of justification by engaging in the social division of epistemic labor. What then are the requirements on a subject to be justified? On my view, one is (intersubjectively) justified in believing that p roughly under the following conditions: this belief has a positive justificatory status in our social practice of justification, and one can meet the demand for justification on one’s own or one can defer to some appropriate authority in this matter.
As pointed out in Sect. 1, I agree with Norton that we cannot assess inductive inferences only in terms of whether they conform to some formal schemas. However, Norton does not provide an account of the conditions by which we can determine which inductive inferences it is rational to accept. In addition, his theory does not address an important aspect of inductive inference, namely that when we accept the conclusion of an inductive inference, we accept it as a guarded claim rather than an unguarded claim. By contrast, if what I have argued so far are correct, the present paper goes beyond Norton’s proposal in addressing these and other important features of inductive inference.
In this regard, it is worth pointing out that my coherentist justification of induction is different from any practical vindication of induction. Clearly, it is quite different from Hans Reichenbach’s pragmatic vindication of induction (see Reichenbach 1938). In addition, it is also different from Sellars’s vindication of induction in some important respects. On Sellars’s view (1974), it is reasonable for us to accept the conclusion of (2) just in case we can issue a sort of promissory note which authorizes the existence of a good practical argument which has as its conclusion ‘it is reasonable to accept the conclusion of (2)’. For this reason, he thinks that “at the heart of the concept of probability is the concept of a form of practical reasoning” (1974, §24). By contrast, I justify induction in terms of a theory of epistemic justification, rather than practical reasoning. On my coherentist view, the Uniformity Principle is defended as having a default positive justificatory status in our social practice of (epistemic) justification. In addition, we are epistemically justified in accepting a lawful generalization just in case we can answer all objections raised against it in our social practice of justification, and we make a guarded claim of the form ‘probably, all instances of A are B’, because we lack conclusive reasons for establishing that there is a lawful relation between ‘x is A’ and ‘x is B’. This kind of coherentist justification has no direct bearing on practical reasoning. Let me elaborate on this point a bit further.
The most important thing to note is that epistemic justification is different from practical justification. As pointed out in Sect. 2, we are rational beings who can engage in theoretical and/or practical reasoning in order to determine what to believe and/or what to do. And when we try to determine what to believe by engaging in theoretical reasoning, we take a theoretical standpoint, which is concerned (primarily) with determining how things actually are in the world. By contrast, when we try to determine what to do by engaging in practical reasoning, we take a practical standpoint, which is concerned with realizing what is desired or desirable. Therefore, it is one thing to make an epistemic evaluation as to whether ‘p’ is true of the actual world; and it is quite another to make a practical evaluation as to whether doing an action A is the means for realizing what is desired or desirable.
How then do we make such an epistemic evaluation? As also pointed out in Sect. 2, we have no other way but to evaluate whether ‘p’ is true on the basis of our epistemic norms within our conceptual framework. Therefore, when we evaluate whether ‘p’ is true, what we are really doing is to determine whether it accords with our epistemic norms. If ‘p’ accords with all of our epistemic norms, we can take it to be epistemically justified; and if it is epistemically justified, we can thereby assert (or believe) that ‘p’ is true. Therefore, to evaluate whether ‘p’ is true is tantamount to evaluating whether ‘p’ is epistemically justified from the theoretical point of view, which is concerned with determining how things actually are in the world. By contrast, as mentioned before, when we try to determine what to do by engaging in practical reasoning, we take a practical point of view, which is concerned with realizing what is desired or desirable. Along these lines, we may argue that practical reasoning has no direct bearing on our epistemic evaluation of whether ‘p’ is true or not. By saying so, however, I do not mean to deny that some practical norms or considerations might be relevant in our epistemic endeavors. In this regard, it is important to distinguish between our epistemic evaluation of whether or not ‘p’ is true and our activities concerned with gathering evidence relevant for determining whether ‘p’ is true or not. I admit that some practical norms or considerations might be involved in gathering evidence in a more effective or reliable way. Nevertheless, this is independent of whether we are epistemically justified in believing that ‘p’ is true (relative to the evidence available to us). Besides, on my view, the reasonableness of our epistemic goal is not justified by practical reasoning. Instead, as argued in Sect. 2, it is a minimum presumption for our epistemic discourse. In my previous paper (Lee 2011), I followed Sellars in defending inductive inference on the basis of practical reasoning. For the aforementioned reasons, however, now I think it is much better to defend inductive inference along the lines of a Sellarsian coherence theory of epistemic justification.
I would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments on an early version of this paper.
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Lee, B.D. A Coherentist Justification of Induction. Erkenn 87, 35–52 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00183-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00183-6