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A differential game model of labor-management negotiation during a strike

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Abstract

A simple model is proposed for collective bargaining during a strike. It is assumed that the rates of change of offer and demand depend on their current difference, and that both labor and management desire to minimize strike duration, but that the former wishes to maximize the final demand whereas the latter wishes to minimize the final offer. The resultant nonzero game is discussed, both for a noncooperative and a cooperative situation.

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References

  1. Leitmann, G.,Collective Bargaining: A Differential Game, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1973.

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Additional Bibliography

  1. Case, J.,Application of the Theory of Differential Games to Economic Problems, Differential Games and Related Topics, Edited by H. W. Kuhn and G. P. Szegö, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, Holland, 1971.

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  2. Dussaix, A. M., andHaurie, A.,Un Model Dynamique de Négociation sous Forme d'un Jeu Semi-Différentiel, Rapport de Recherche No. 5, École de Hautes Études Commerciales de Montreal, Montreal, Canada, 1971.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, California

    G. Leitmann (Professor of Engineering Science)

  2. Department of Mathematics, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island

    P. T. Liu (Assistant Professor)

Authors
  1. G. Leitmann
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  2. P. T. Liu
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Additional information

This paper, based on research supported by NSF under Grant No. GP-24205, was presented at the 5th IFIP Conference on Optimization Techniques, Rome, Italy, 1973.

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Leitmann, G., Liu, P.T. A differential game model of labor-management negotiation during a strike. J Optim Theory Appl 13, 427–435 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00934939

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00934939

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