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Distributional implications of equal sacrifice rules

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Abstract

A conclusive story can be made out of equal absolute and equal proportional sacrifice rules if only income after some poll tax of equal total revenue is taken as basis for distributional comparisons.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Tübingen, Melanchtonstrasse 30, D-7400, Tübingen, Federal Republic of Germany

    W. Buchholz

  2. Lehrstuhl VWL II, Universität Dortmund, Postfach 500 500, D-4600, Dortmund, Federal Republic of Germany

    W. F. Richter

  3. University of Graz, Brandhofgasse 18, A-8010, Graz, Austria

    J. Schwaiger

Authors
  1. W. Buchholz
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  2. W. F. Richter
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  3. J. Schwaiger
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Buchholz, W., Richter, W.F. & Schwaiger, J. Distributional implications of equal sacrifice rules. Soc Choice Welfare 5, 223–226 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00735762

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00735762

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