Conclusion
Though this essay has been concerned with the possibility of value-neutral inquiry in criminology, its central purpose has been much broader. It has been argued, controversially, that not only is it impossible to sustain the fact/value distinction in social science, but that such a finding does not commit us to a science that is merely ideologically contingent relativism. In this view, it is possible (and necessary) to conceive of a social scientific enterprise that can apprehend an objective material reality that exists independent of our consciousness of it without succumbing to the pretense of value-neutrality. Because the argument that has been made here is a quite unusual one, it cannot hope to claim finality for its findings. However, if it begins the process of provoking debate and discussion on these issues, it will have accomplished its purpose.
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I wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of two anonymous reviewers. Though I did not follow their advice in every instance, to the extent that this essay is a better product, it is due largely to them.
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Ayre, R. Objectivity versus political and moral commitment? For science and partisanship in criminology. Contemporary Crises 6, 133–154 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00729289
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00729289