Abstract
A symmetric solution is presented for any von Neumann-Morgenstern n-person game when the only coalitions that are not completely defeated contain n− 1 or n players.
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Kuhn, H. W., and A. W. Tucker (editors): Contributions to the theory of games, vol. II. Ann. Math. Studies, 28. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1953.
Lucas, W. F. (editor): Report of the Fifth Conference on Game Theory, dittoed report. Department of Mathematics and Econometric Research Program. Princeton: Princeton University 1965.
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- -Symmetric solutions of some general n-person games. A RAND Corporation reproduction (P-2169, March 1961) of a manuscript dated August, 1946.
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Portions of this research were supported by a National Science Foundation grant at the University of Michigan and by a Fulbright grant at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara.
Mathematics Research Center, The University of Wisconsin, Madison.
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Lucas, W.F. n-Person games with only 1, n− 1, and n-person coalitions. Z. Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie verw Gebiete 6, 287–292 (1966). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00537827
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00537827