# *n*-Person Games with Only 1, n-1, and n-Person Coalitions\*

W. F. Lucas\*\*

Received March 25, 1966

Abstract. A symmetric solution is presented for any von Neumann-Morgenstern n-person game when the only coalitions that are not completely defeated contain n-1 or n players.

#### 1. Introduction

The main mathematical problem in the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of n-person games in characteristic function form [5] is to show the existence and nature (or non-existence) of solution sets. This paper describes a solution of a symmetric nature for an arbitrary n-person game in which only coalitions with 1, n-1, and n players enters into the problem. Results for similar games in the theory of bargaining sets (see bibliography by Maschler in [2]) are given in [3], and results for such games in the solution theory for n-person games in partition function form will appear in a separate paper (see abstract by author in [2]).

In order to be complete a brief review of the basic definitions for a von Neumann-Morgenstern n-person game is given, where the games are assumed to be in 0,1 normal form. Let  $N=\{1,\ldots,n\}$  be a set of n players  $1,\ldots,n$ , where n>2. First, assume there exist a real valued characteristic function v defined on the set  $2^N$  of all subsets of N, that is, v assigns the real number v(M) to each coalition (subset) M of N, and assume that  $v(\emptyset)=0$ . There is no loss in generality with respect to solution theory (see p. 68 in [4]), if one further assumes that v is superadditive, that is,  $v(M_1 \cup M_2) \geq v(M_1) + v(M_2)$  whenever  $M_1 \cap M_2 = \emptyset$ . Second, define the set A consisting of all imputations  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$  which satisfy  $x_i \geq 0$  for all  $i \in N$ , and  $\sum_{i \in N} x_i = 1$ . Third, an imputation  $\mathbf{x}$  is said to dominate an imputation

y with respect to a nonempty coalition M, denoted by  $x \operatorname{dom}_M y$ , if

$$x_i > y_i$$
 for all  $i \in M$ .

and

$$\sum_{i\in M} x_i \leq v(M) .$$

An x satisfying this latter inequality is called *effective* for M. One further says x dominates y, denoted by x dom y, if there is a nonempty M such that x dom $_M y$ . For  $x \in A$  or  $B \subset A$ , let dom $_M x = \{y \in A \mid x \text{ dom}_M y\}$ , dom  $x = \{y \in A \mid x \text{ dom}_M y\}$ ,

<sup>\*</sup> Portions of this research were supported by a National Science Foundation grant at the University of Michigan and by a Fulbright grant at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Mathematics Research Center, The University of Wisconsin, Madison.

 $\operatorname{dom}_M B = \bigcup_{x \in B} \operatorname{dom}_M x$ , and  $\operatorname{dom} B = \bigcup_{x \in B} \operatorname{dom} x$ . Fourth, a subset K of A is called a solution if

$$K \cap \operatorname{dom} K = \emptyset$$

and

$$K \bigcup \operatorname{dom} K = A$$
.

This paper considers those games in which only coalitions with n-1 and n players can have nonzero values. Thus assume that

$$\begin{array}{ll} v(N)=1\,,\\ 0\leq v(N-i)\leq 1 & i=1,\ldots,n\,,\\ v(M)=0 & \text{for all } M\in N, \, |M|< n-1, \end{array}$$

where |M| denotes the number of players in M, and where i stands for either the player i or the coalition containing the one player i. So a game is determined by the n values v(N-i). To simplify the notation, let

$$d_i = 1 - v(N - i)$$
  $i = 1, ..., n$ .

Then  $0 \le d_i \le 1$  and the *n* numbers  $d_i$  also determine the game. The only type of domination by imputations is with respect to the coalitions of n-1 players, and  $x \operatorname{dom}_{N-i} y$  means  $x_i > y_i$  for

all 
$$j \in N - i$$
 and  $\sum_{j \in N - i} x_j \leq v(N - i)$ .

The former condition implies  $x_i < y_i$  and the latter condition is equivalent to  $x_i \le d_i$ .

# 2. A Solution

A solution for any game which satisfies (1) is

$$K = \bigcup_{r=0}^{\lfloor n/2 \rfloor} \bigcup_{\sigma_r} \{ x \in A \mid x_p \ge d_p, p = i(1), i(2), \dots, i(2r);$$

$$x_q \le d_q, q = i(2r+1), i(2r+2), \dots, i(n);$$

$$x_{i(s-1)} - d_{i(s-1)} = x_{i(s)} - d_{i(s)}, s = 2, 4, \dots, 2r \}$$

where [n/2] is the greatest integer in n/2 and each inner union is taken over the

$$\frac{n!}{(n-2r)!r!2^r}$$
 permutations  $\sigma_r = (i(1), i(2), \dots, i(n))$ 

of (1, 2, ..., n) which give distinct terms. In other words an imputation x is in the solution K if and only if all  $x_p - d_p$  that are positive are equal in pairs. For r = 0 one gets the term

$$C = \{ \boldsymbol{x} \in A \mid x_q \leq d_q, q = 1, 2, \ldots, n \}$$

which is the core, and for  $r = \lceil n/2 \rceil$  one gets the term

$$\begin{split} K_{[n/2]} = & \bigcup_{\sigma_{[n/2]}} \left\{ \boldsymbol{x} \in A \, \middle| \, x_p \geq d_p, \, p = i(1), i(2), \dots, i(2 \lceil n/2 \rceil); \right. \\ & x_{i(n)} \leq d_{i(n)} \quad \text{if } n \text{ is odd}; \\ & x_{i(s-1)} - d_{i(s-1)} = x_{i(s)} - d_{i(s)}, \\ & s = 2, 4, \dots, 2 \lceil n/2 \rceil \right\}. \end{split}$$

$$Z = \{x \in A \mid x_p \ge d_p, p = 1, 2, ..., n\}.$$

Then  $K_Z = K_{[n/2]} \cap Z$  is the solution on the "reduced" imputation simplex Z to the corresponding (n, k) simple majority games when k = n - 1 which was given by Bott in [1]. So the solution K is the natural generalization of Bott's solution when k = n - 1. K is also the natural generalization to the solution of an arbitrary 3-person game which is nondiscriminatory (when  $Z \neq \emptyset$ ) and which has "symmetric" line segments for bargaining curves. Note that if

$$\begin{split} &\sum_{j\in N} d_j < 1 \quad \text{then} \quad C = \emptyset \quad \text{and} \quad Z \neq \emptyset \;, \quad \text{if} \\ &\sum_{j\in N} d_j > 1 \quad \text{then} \quad C \neq \emptyset \quad \text{and} \quad Z = \emptyset \;, \quad \text{and if} \\ &\sum_{j\in N} d_j = 1 \quad \text{then} \quad C = Z = \boldsymbol{d} = (d_1, \ldots, d_n) \;. \end{split}$$

Geometrically one has a simple game in the interior part Z of A and n truncated pyramid games (see p. 81 of [4]) in the regions  $S_h = \{x \in A \mid x_h \leq d_h\}$  which extend off each of the faces of Z. A trace,  $x_h = \text{constant}$ , in  $S_h$  gives an (n-1)-person game of the type being considered and this trace of K is the corresponding solution for this new game. In Z the solution K is symmetric with respect to all permutations of the  $x_i - d_i$ , and in  $S_h$  the solution K is symmetric with respect to all permutations of  $x_i - d_i$  with  $i \neq h$ . Note that if  $Z \neq \emptyset$  then the dimension of K is smallest in the interior part Z of A and the dimension increases as one goes more toward the exterior parts, that is, as more  $x_i \leq d_i$ .

## 3. The Proof

To prove that K is a solution one must first prove that  $K \cap \text{dom } K = \emptyset$ . Since  $K \cap \text{dom } K = [(K - C) \cup C] \cap \text{dom } [(K - C) \cup C] \subset [(K - C) \cap \text{dom } (K - C)] \cup [(K - C) \cap \text{dom } C] \cup [C \cap \text{dom } K]$ , it is sufficient to prove that  $K \cap \text{dom } C = \emptyset$ ,  $C \cap \text{dom } K = \emptyset$ , and  $(K - C) \cap \text{dom } (K - C) = \emptyset$ .

If  $K \cap \text{dom } C = \emptyset$  fails to hold, then there exists  $\mathbf{a} \in C$  and  $\mathbf{b} \in K$  such that  $\mathbf{a} \text{dom}_{N-k} \mathbf{b}$  for some  $k \in N$ . Since  $\mathbf{a}$  is effective for N - k,  $\sum_{j \in N} a_j = \sum_{j \in N} b_j = 1$ , and  $a_i > b_i$  for all  $i \neq k$ ; one gets  $d_k \leq a_k < b_k$ , which implies  $\mathbf{b} \notin C$ . Since  $\mathbf{a} \in C$ , one also gets  $b_i < a_i \leq d_i$  for  $i \neq k$ . It follows that  $\mathbf{b}$  has exactly one coordinate with  $b_j > d_j$  (namely j = k), which implies  $\mathbf{b} \notin K - C$ . Thus  $\mathbf{b} \notin C \cup (K - C) = K$ , which is a contradiction.

If  $C \cap \text{dom } K = \emptyset$  were not true, than there exists  $\mathbf{a} \in K$  and  $\mathbf{b} \in C$  such that  $\mathbf{a} \text{dom}_{N-k} \mathbf{b}$ . As in the proceeding case one gets  $b_k > a_k \ge d_k$ . This implies that  $\mathbf{b} \notin C$ , which is a contradiction.

Next assume that  $(K - C) \cap \text{dom } (K - C) \neq \emptyset$ . Then there exists **a** and **b** in K - C such that **a**  $\text{dom}_{N-k}$  **b**, which implies

(2) 
$$a_i - d_i > b_i - d_i \text{ for all } i \in N - k.$$

However,  $\mathbf{b} \in K - C$  implies that all the  $b_i - d_i$  that are positive are equal in pairs, and since  $\mathbf{b} \notin C$  there is at least one such  $b_i - d_i > 0$ . Likewise the positive  $a_i - d_i$  are equal in pairs, and since  $\mathbf{a}$  is effective for N - k,  $d_k \leq a_k < b_k$  or

$$0 \leq a_k - d_k < b_k - d_k.$$

It follows that (if one lets k = i(1)) there exists distinct players

$$i(1), i(2), \dots, i(2r),$$

$$i(2r+1), \dots, i(n) \quad \text{with} \quad r > 0 \quad \text{so that}$$

$$a_{i(s)} - d_{i(s)} = a_{i(s+1)} - d_{i(s+1)},$$

$$b_{i(s-1)} - d_{i(s-1)} = b_{i(s)} - d_{i(s)}$$

$$(4)$$

for s = 2, 4, ..., 2r, where either

(a) 
$$i(2r+1)=i(1)$$

 $\mathbf{or}$ 

(b) 
$$b_{i(2r+1)} - d_{i(2r+1)} \leq 0$$
.

In case (a) the relations (2), (3), and (4) imply

$$\begin{aligned} a_{i\,(1)} - d_{i\,(1)} &\geq b_{i\,(2\,r-1)} - d_{i\,(2\,r-1)} \,, \\ a_{i\,(t+1)} - d_{i\,(t+1)} &> b_{i\,(t-1)} - d_{i\,(t-1)} & t = 2, 4, \dots, 2\,r - 2 \,, \\ a_{i\,(t)} - d_{i\,(t)} &> b_{i\,(t)} - d_{i\,(t)} & t = 2, 4, \dots, 2\,r \,, \\ a_{j} - d_{j} &> b_{j} - d_{j} & j = 2\,r + 1, 2\,r + 2, \dots, n \,. \end{aligned}$$

In case (b) the relations (2), (3), and (4) imply

$$\begin{aligned} a_{i\,(1)} - d_{i\,(1)} &\geq b_{i\,(2\,r+1)} - d_{i\,(2\,r+1)} \\ a_{i\,(t+1)} - d_{i\,(t+1)} &> b_{i\,(t-1)} - d_{i\,(t-1)} \\ a_{i\,(t)} - d_{i\,(t)} &> b_{i\,(t)} - d_{i\,(t)} \end{aligned} \qquad \begin{aligned} t &= 2, 4, \dots, 2\,r\,, \\ t &= 2, 4, \dots, 2\,r\,, \\ t &= 2, 4, \dots, 2\,r\,, \\ j &= 2\,r + 2, 2\,r + 3, \dots, n\,. \end{aligned}$$

Summing the equations above for either case (a) or (b) gives

$$\sum_{i \in N} (a_i - d_i) > \sum_{i \in N} (b_i - d_i) \quad \text{or} \quad \sum_{i \in N} a_i > \sum_{i \in N} b_i$$
,

which is a contradiction.

It follows that  $(K - C) \cap \text{dom } (K - C) = \emptyset$ , and this completes the proof that  $K \cap \text{dom } K = \emptyset$ .

Finally one has to prove that  $K \cup \text{dom } K = A$ . Assume that  $\mathbf{b} \in A - K$ . Since  $\mathbf{b} \notin C \subset K$ , there exists i such that  $b_i - d_i > 0$ . Also, there exists k such that  $0 < b_k - d_k \neq b_j - d_j$  for an odd number of  $j \neq k$ , because if all such positive  $b_j - d_j$  could be set equal in pairs, then  $\mathbf{b} \in K - C$ . So, by permuting the subscripts on the  $b_i$  and  $d_i$  if necessary, one can assume that

$$\begin{array}{ccc} b_{j}-d_{j} \geq b_{j+1}-d_{j+1} & j=1,2,\ldots,n-1 \ , \\ b_{k}-d_{k}>0 & \\ b_{k}-d_{k}>b_{k+1}-d_{k+1} & \\ b_{q}-d_{q} \geq 0>b_{q+1}-d_{q+1} & \end{array}$$

where k is odd and  $k \leq q$ . The following three cases will be considered.

(i) 
$$q \ge 3$$
 is odd,

(ii) 
$$q=1$$
,

(iii) 
$$q$$
 is even.

In case (i) let

$$\begin{split} (n-1)\,\varepsilon_1 &= (b_k - d_k) - \max{(b_{k+1} - d_{k+1}, 0)} > 0 \;, \\ \varepsilon_2 &= -(b_{q+1} - d_{q+1}) > 0 \;, \\ \varepsilon &= \min{(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2)} > 0 \;, \\ (q-1)\,\delta &= (b_1 - d_1) - \sum_{i=1}^{(q-1)/2} [(b_{2i} - d_{2i}) - (b_{2i+1} - d_{2i+1})] - (n-1)\,\varepsilon \geqq 0 \;. \end{split}$$

Next define a by

$$a_1 - d_1 = 0$$
,  
 $a_{2i} - d_{2i} = a_{2i+1} - d_{2i+1}$   
 $= b_{2i} - d_{2i} + \varepsilon + \delta$   $i = 1, 2, ..., (q - 1)/2$ ,  
 $a_j = b_j + \varepsilon$   $j = q + 1, q + 2, ..., n$ .

Then  $\boldsymbol{a}$  satisfies  $a_i \geq 0$  for all  $i \in N$  and  $\sum_{i \in N} (a_i - d_i) = \sum_{i \in N} (b_i - d_i)$  or  $\sum_{i \in N} a_i = \sum_{i \in N} b_i = 1$ , and so  $\boldsymbol{a} \in A$ . Also  $\boldsymbol{a} \in K$  since the positive  $a_i - d_i$  are equal in pairs.

Furthermore  $a \operatorname{dom}_{N-1} b$ , because  $a_i - d_i > b_i - d_i$  for all  $i \neq 1$ , and  $a_1 = d_1$  implies a is effective for N-1. Thus  $b \in \operatorname{dom} K$ . If one had to permute the subscripts of the  $b_i$  and  $d_i$  to get it in form (5), then the inverse permutation will give the corresponding a which is clearly still in K. This completes the proof for case (i).

Now consider case (ii) where q = 1.

Define a by

$$egin{align} a_1-d_1 &= 0 \;, \ a_2-d_2 &= b_2-d_2+arepsilon+\delta_2 \;, \ a_3-d_3 &= b_3-d_3+arepsilon+\delta_3 \;, \ a_j &= b_j+arepsilon & j=4,5,\ldots,n \;, \ \end{pmatrix}$$

where  $\varepsilon$  is the same as in case (i) and where  $\delta_2$  and  $\delta_3$  are defined by

$$\delta_2 + \delta_3 = (b_1 - d_1) - (n-1)\varepsilon \ge 0$$

and

$$a_2 - d_2 = a_3 - d_3$$
 if  $\delta_2 + \delta_3 \ge (b_2 - d_2) - (b_3 - d_3)$ 

or

$$\delta_2 = 0$$
 if  $\delta_2 + \delta_3 < (b_2 - d_2) - (b_3 - d_3)$ .

Again  ${m a}$  satisfies  $a_i \geq 0$  for all  $i \in N$  and  $\sum_{i \in N} (a_i - d_i) = \sum_{i \in N} (b_i - d_i)$ , and so  ${m a} \in A$ .

Also  $a \in K$  since  $a_2 - d_2$  and  $a_3 - d_3$  are either equal or nonpositive and all other  $a_i - d_i \leq 0$ . Clearly  $a \operatorname{dom}_{N-1} b$ , and thus  $b \in \operatorname{dom} K$ .

In case (iii) where q is even, let

$$\begin{split} n\,\varepsilon_1 &= (b_k - d_k) - (b_{k+1} - d_{k+1}) > 0 \;, \\ \varepsilon_2 &= -(b_{q+1} - d_{q+1}) > 0 \;, \\ \varepsilon &= \min\left(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2\right) > 0 \;, \\ 2\,\delta &= (b_1 - d_1) - (b_q - d_q) - n\,\varepsilon - \sum_{i=1}^{(q-2)/2} [(b_{2i} - d_{2i}) - (b_{2i+1} - d_{2i+1})] \geqq 0 \;. \end{split}$$

Define a by

$$egin{align} a_1-d_1&=a_q-d_q=b_q-d_q+arepsilon+\delta>0\,,\ a_{2i}-d_{2i}=a_{2i+1}-d_{2i+1}\ &=b_{2i}-d_{2i}+arepsilon\, &i=1,2,\ldots,(q-2)/2\,,\ a_i=b_i+arepsilon\, &j=q+1,\,q+2,\ldots,n\,. \end{array}$$

Again one can show that  $a \in A$ ,  $a \in K$ , and  $a \operatorname{dom}_{N-1} b$ .

So  $b \in \text{dom } K$ , which proves case (iii). This completes the proof that  $K \cup \text{dom } K = A$ , and therefore K is a solution.

## References

- [1] Kuhn, H. W., and A. W. Tucker (editors): Contributions to the theory of games, vol. II. Ann. Math. Studies, 28. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1953.
- [2] Lucas, W. F. (editor): Report of the Fifth Conference on Game Theory, dittoed report. Department of Mathematics and Econometric Research Program. Princeton: Princeton University 1965.
- [3] MASCHLER, M.: n-Person games with only 1, n-1, and n-person permissible coalitions. J. math. Analysis and Appl. 6, 230 (1963).
- [4] TUCKER, A. W., and R. D. LUCE (editors): Contributions to the theory of games, vol. IV. Ann. Math. Studies, 40. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1959.
- [5] NEUMANN, J. von, and O. MORGENSTERN: Theory of games and economic behavior. Third edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1953.
- [6] Symmetric solutions of some general n-person games. A RAND Corporation reproduction (P-2169, March 1961) of a manuscript dated August, 1946.

Mathematics Research Center University of Wisconsin Madison, Wisconsin