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Candidate behavior under mixed motives

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Abstract

This paper presents a spatial election model in which candidates have mixed motives: They care both about winning and about the content of their platforms. The predictions of the model are broadly consistent with what we observe empirically: some elections with convergent candidate positions, and some with divergent positions; the prevalence of elections in which the expected vote shares are not equal; candidates' positions reacting in part to those of their opponents; and candidates seeking a balance between what they believe and what they need to advocate to get elected.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. West Virginia University, 26506-6025, Morgantown, WV, USA

    D. W. Mitchell

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  1. D. W. Mitchell
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Mitchell, D.W. Candidate behavior under mixed motives. Soc Choice Welfare 4, 153–160 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00450996

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00450996

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