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Gibbardian libertarian claims revisited

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Abstract

Two resolution schemes for the impossibility theorems on the Gibbard-Kelly claims of libertarian rights, which are rather contrasting with each other, are proposed and their implications discussed. The first scheme asserts that there exists a collective choice rule satisfying the Pareto principle and the Gibbard-Kelly libertarian claims if there exists at least one socially unconcerned individual. The second scheme asserts existence of an eligible collective choice rule if there exists at least one liberal individual.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, 186, Kunitachi, Tokyo, Japan

    K. Suzumura

  2. Department of Economics, Asia University, 180, Musashino, Tokyo, Japan

    K. Suga

Authors
  1. K. Suzumura
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  2. K. Suga
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Suzumura, K., Suga, K. Gibbardian libertarian claims revisited. Soc Choice Welfare 3, 61–73 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433525

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433525

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