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Paradoxes of moral reparation: Deontic foci vs. circumstances

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Conclusion

The distinction between deontic focus and deontic circumstance is obvious and essential to the understanding of our reasonings about obligations, permissions, rights, and wrongs. Here we have dealt with the basics. These basics must be developed into a full deontic logic. Fortunately, such a comprehensive deontic logic that includes identity, quantification over individuals, and quantification over properties has already been proposed, and applied to the interpretation of legal texts. It should be an excellent basis for Feldman's intriguing and promising idea of world utilitarianism.

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Castañeda, H.N. Paradoxes of moral reparation: Deontic foci vs. circumstances. Philosophical Studies 57, 1–21 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00355659

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