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Acyclic and continuous social choice in T 1 connected spaces

Including its application to economic environments

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Abstract

In this paper, we prove some versions of the Arrovian impossibility theorem in T 1 connected alternatives spaces, with the collective rationality condition weakened from transitivity to acyclicity, the Pareto condition replaced by some weaker conditions, and a continuity condition of social preferences imposed. Moreover these impossibility theorems are applied to a distributive problem of private goods in economic environments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Economics, Toyama University, 3190 Gofuku, 930, Toyama, Japan

    Ryo-ichi Nagahisa

  2. Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, 23185, Williamsburg, VA, USA

    Ryo-ichi Nagahisa

Authors
  1. Ryo-ichi Nagahisa
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Additional information

This is a revised version of my Working Paper No. 111. I would like to thank two anonymous referees of the journal for their insightful comments. This paper was reported at the Western Meeting of Japan Association of Economics and Econometrics, held at Tezukayama University June 1990, and at Second Annual Southeastern Economic Theory Meetings, held at Florida University October 1990. I am grateful to Professors Tetsuya Kishimoto, Makoto Okamura, Koichi Suga, and Donald Campbell for their insightful comments. This paper is supported in part by the Tokyo Center for Economic Research.

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Nagahisa, Ri. Acyclic and continuous social choice in T 1 connected spaces. Soc Choice Welfare 8, 319–332 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183043

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183043

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