Abstract
Rubinstein (1982) considered the problem of dividing a given surplus between two players sequentially, and then proposed a model in which the two players alternately make and respond to each other's offers through time. He further characterized the perfect equilibrium outcomes, which depend on the players’ time preferences and order of moves. Using both equal and unequal bargaining cost conditions and an unlimited number of rounds, two experiments were designed to compare the perfect equilibrium model to alternative models based on norms of fairness. We report analyses of final agreements, first offers, and number of bargaining rounds, which provide limited support to the perfect equilibrium model, and then conclude by recommending a shift in focus from model testing to specification of the conditions favoring one model over another.
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Rapoport, A., Weg, E. & Felsenthal, D.S. Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining. Theor Decis 28, 47–71 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139238
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139238