Abstract
The defense budget poses many problems to the student of budgetary behavior and its ever-changing structure makes it difficult to identify patterns and trends in allocation. This study examines defense budget requests from the Eisenhower through the Reagan administrations. An analysis of changes in allocation to the 54 appropriation categories suggests that the defense budget responds to new doctrines and management introduced by each administration. Shifts in allocation among the services are greatest in the first two budgets of an administration and reversals of previous program priorities also occur early in each administration. After three or four budget requests, year-to-year continuity in allocation to “winners” and “losers” finally begins to emerge. Two other findings also shed light on the politics of defense budgeting. First, the degree of variation in allocation is least when the defense budget increase is large. Second, low presidential popularity leads to less variation. The identification of such trends should permit future budget requests to be evaluated in the context of the long-term evolution of defense politics.
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Domke, W.K. Waste, weapons, and resolve: Defense posture and politics in the defense budget. Policy Sci 16, 371–390 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135955
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135955