Abstract
This paper investigates the trade policy of the EC, based on Art. 115, Treaty of Rome. It is shown that politicians and bureaucrats take advantage of the significant discretion the procedure allows. Political and bureaucratic self-interest are the underlying motives for national trade barriers against non-member countries based on Art. 115. The empirical results support this hypothesis.
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Thanks go to Brigitte Bacher, Rainer Bierwagen, Peter Moser, Bernd Starke, Joerg Stephan, Heinrich Ursprung, Roland Vaubel, Jutta Walz and Hannelore Weck-Hannemann for their kind assistance. Financial support from the German National Science Foundation is greatfully acknowledged.
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Schuknecht, L. The political economy of EC protectionism: National protectionism based on Article 115, Treaty of Rome. Public Choice 72, 37–50 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135545
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135545