Abstract
International trade theory has traditionally examined protection from a normative perspective: What are its consequences and when is it justified from the point of view of national welfare? Beginning in the 1980s increasing attention has been paid to analyzing protection from a positive perspective: What actually determines it? These two approaches are obviously complementary — both are necessary. This chapter addresses the latter. Other surveys are provided by Nelson (1988), Magee (1994) and Rodrik (1995).
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© 2013 Wilfred J. Ethier
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Ethier, W.J. (2013). The Political Economy of Protection. In: Bernhofen, D., Falvey, R., Greenaway, D., Kreickemeier, U. (eds) Palgrave Handbook of International Trade. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-30531-1_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-30531-1_10
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