Abstract
The alternating offers strategic bargaining approach (Rubinstein, 1982) suggest a unique perfect equilibrium. In this equilibrium the bargaining ends immediately and the outcome is Pareto optimal. In this paper we consider a bargaining game in which players move simultaneously. Since we allow players only to lower their demands over time we denote this game as a concession game. We demonstrate that in this game there is a perfect equilibrium in which the bargaining lasts long enough so that the pie shrinks to zero. We show that we can generalize this game to a multi-player concession game in a straightforward manner and so avoiding the difficulties of generalizing the alternating offers game to the multi-player case.
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Fershtman, C. Simultaneous moves multi-person continuous time concession game. Theor Decis 26, 81–90 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134057
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134057