Abstract
In the context of a simple general equilibrium model, in which there is a profit-maximizing monopolist, we show that in general the introduction of rent-seeking does not restore the first best pricing rule for the undistorted industry. This result is in direct contrast to that obtained when one assumes that the monopolist follows a full cost pricing rule with a constant markup ratio. Furthermore, it still holds even if the full cost pricing rule is profit-maximizing. We also investigate the conditions under which the first best pricing rule is reinstated for the undistorted industry.
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The authors are grateful to Mahmudul Anam and Eliakim Katz for constructive comments on an earlier version and to Barry Smith for helpful conversations. However, the usual caveat applies.
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Latham, R., Perivancic, F. Monopoly, rent-seeking, and second best theory. Public Choice 70, 225–237 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124484
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124484