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Television ad-skipping, consumption complementarities and the consumer demand for advertising

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Abstract

Endogenous consumption of advertising is common. Consumers choose to change channels to avoid TV ads, click away from paid online video ads, or discard direct mail without reading advertised details. As technological advances give firms improved abilities to target individual consumers through various media, it is becoming increasingly important for models to reflect the endogenous nature of ad consumption and to consider the implications that ad choice has for firms’ targeting strategies. With this motivation, we develop an empirical model of consumer demand for advertising in which demand for ads is jointly determined with demand for the advertised products. Building on Becker and Murphy (The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(4), 941–964 1993)’s ideas, the model treats advertising as a good over which consumers have utility and obtains demands as the outcome of a joint utility maximization problem. Leveraging new data that links household-level TV ad-viewing with product purchases, we provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the model: ad-skipping is found to be lower when a household has purchased more of the advertised brand, and purchases are higher when more ads have been watched recently, suggesting that advertising and product consumption are jointly determined. Fitting a structural model of joint demand to the data, we evaluate consumer welfare and advertiser profitability in advertising targeting counterfactuals motivated by an “addressable” future of TV. We find that targeting on the predicted ad-skip probability is an attractive strategy, as it indirectly selects consumers that value the product. Reflecting the positive view of advertising in the model, we also find that net consumer welfare may increase in several targeting scenarios. This occurs because under improved targeting, firms shift advertising to those who are likely to value it. At the same time, consumers that do not value the ads end up skipping them, mitigating possible welfare losses. Both forces are relevant to assessing advertising effects in a world with improved targeting and ad-skipping technology.

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Notes

  1. Past frameworks for handling the micro-foundations of advertising include the informative model that posits that advertising affects demand by communicating information about products to consumers (Nelson 1970, 1974; Butters 1977; Grossman-and-Shapiro 1984), and the so-called persuasive model, in which advertising is incorporated into the utility from product consumption and viewed as a means of creating brand loyalty (please see Bagwell 2007 for a comprehensive review of the literature). The informative view is not a good description of ad consumption in our study. The product category we study is a fast moving consumer packaged good that has been on the market for years with no new brand entry during the time period of our data. Like Ackerberg (2001), we find that advertising continues to affect the purchase behavior of experienced consumers in the data even after significant product trial, suggesting its primary role is not to convey information about existence, attributes or match values. In the persuasive stream, advertising is usually treated as a taste shifter in utility, and there is usually no specific theoretical justification for its inclusion in the utility function.

  2. Evidence in the literature suggests a link between those who respond to advertising and risk in such markets. Using randomized trials on direct-mail advertising, Ausubel (1999) documents that customer pools resulting from credit card offers with inferior terms (e.g., a higher introductory interest rate, a shorter duration for the introductory offer) have worse observable credit-risk characteristics and are more likely to default than those drawn in by solicitations offering superior terms.

  3. Medical researchers address non-compliance in clinical trials by “double blinding.” When non-complying patients do not know they are in the treated or control groups, there is no reason to believe that non-compliers are more averse to treatment than compliers. Unfortunately, this strategy only works in relatively non-invasive contexts where patients are not able to infer their treatment status from their experienced health outcomes. For similar reasons, the double blinding strategy is not feasible in advertising situations because a consumer always sees an ad before deciding to skip it or to see it fully. Thus, ad consumption per se cannot be randomized.

  4. For more reading, see Wilbur et al. (2013) who discusses the effect ad-skipping can have on audience composition and how networks might think about incorporating audience externalities into the pricing of ad spots.

  5. For an example of such data, see http://www.finnpanel.fi/en/tv.php (not necessarily the same as the country in our sample.) Examples of the types of devices used here include the UNITAM meter by Nielsen Media Research (Unitam 2009) and the RapidMeter by Kantar (2012). For a video demonstrating how Nielsen’s system works, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jYrVijea0UM.

  6. If a consumer finds an advertisement immediately after switching channels, that advertisement is also coded as partially watched. The inclusion of such ‘accidental’ consumption is unlikely to be correlated with the consumer’s purchase patterns, especially taking into account the time controls we include in the analysis.

  7. TV ads also cannot be targeted to an individual − all individuals watching the same show see the same ad.

  8. TVision Insights uses a Microsoft Kinect device to identify who is in the room and whose face and eyes are directed towards the TV screen. A handful of other companies have created mobile apps that passively monitor surrounding noise and can recognize shows and ads through audio tags called “watermarks” that are contained in TV content. This technology can be used to determine if an individual is in the same room as the TV, but it does not resolve the question of whether the individual is paying attention.

  9. “Eye-tracking” data (e.g., Teixeira et al., 2010) like that collected by TVision holds promise in improving measurement of advertising attention, but we have not seen these data collected at scale in field-settings and matched to purchases. To give a sense of scale, TVision devices are currently installed in 2,000 homes in the US as part of an opt-in study, while Nielsen devices are installed in 42,000 homes in the US.

  10. The distribution of household ad-skip rates we observe is similar to the distribution reported in Wilbur (2016, Figure 8).

  11. Typically, reported skip-rates of TV ads are lower than skip-rates of online ads. This difference may arise because the effort required to skip an ad online (ignoring a banner ad or clicking to skip a YouTube ad) is generally less than the effort required to skip a TV commercial (changing the channel and monitoring when to return to the program). Some advertising executives we spoke to stated that it could be because TV technology typically requires active avoidance: the passive default option for an online consumer is to ignore the ad, while the action that involves some effort on his part is to click on it. In television advertising, this is reversed: the passive default option for the consumer is to view the ad, while the action that involves some effort on his part is to change the channel.

  12. Variables considered include the brand of the ad, show genre, network in which the ad airs, product category, location of the commercial break within the show and the slot within the break, day of week and hour of show.

  13. What could be the psychological underpinnings of such complementarity with product purchases? While we cannot provide data-based support for more micro-explanations, we conjecture one reason consumers may watch more ads of products purchased recently may derive from “licensing,” wherein users watch ads of others consuming the product as a way to justify to themselves their own consumption (Shafir et al., 1993). Behavioral researchers such as Prelec and Lowenstein (1998) have pointed out that such behaviors are likely when consumption of the product evokes a sense of guilt (e.g., expensive luxury items, junk food, indulgent goods). Another explanation is that watching ads of products purchased recently may provide utility to users from re-living the felt-utility from enjoyable past consumption of the product. Past literature (e.g., Lowenstein and Elster 1992) has pointed out that reliving and contemplating past experiences is a source of significant utility for human beings. Mere repeated exposure may also predict a causal relationship between purchase histories and subsequent advertising consumption. The reason is that both purchasing and consuming a product usually imply exposure to that same product. Repeated exposures, including the ones occurring during consumption, may lead to a higher liking of the product as well as of content related to the product, including its advertisements. For example, the results from Bornstein and D’Agostino (1994) suggest that repeated exposure may increase a consumer’s processing fluency towards product-related material, which she may misattribute to the merits of the ad copy or of the product itself. Finally, a body of literature has documented the fact that decision-makers display selective attention (Cherry 1953; Deutsch and Deutsch 1963; Wolford and Morrison 1980; Tacikowski and Nowicka 2010, among others), often directing it towards aspects that are relevant to the self. While we are unaware of work specifically linking purchase histories to subsequent attention selection, it is possible that this mechanism leads consumers to focus more on advertisements about products they have bought in the past. In particular, an advertisement featuring a previously bought product may merit the attention of the viewer, leading her to be less likely to think about immediate alternatives, such as skipping the advertisement by switching the channel.

  14. We considered cumulative quantity measures ranging from quantity purchased in the preceding day, \(\tilde {Q}_{ijt,1}\), to quantity purchased over the preceding four weeks, \(\tilde {Q}_{ijt,28}\). We found a positive and significant (α = 0.05) relationship between ad consumption and cumulative quantity for [\(\tilde {Q}_{ijt,11},\tilde {Q}_{ijt,15}].\) Outside of this range the relationship between cumulative quantity and ad consumption was consistently positive, but not statistically significant.

  15. This viewpoint has parallels in the applied econometric literature. For example, Angrist and Krueger (1991) estimate the effect of schooling on earnings using quarter of birth as an instrument for years of education. The typical expectation is that those of higher ability will find schooling easier and will obtain more schooling to signal their ability. Thus, a priori we may expect that OLS estimates of earnings on years of schooling are upward biased because of omitted unobserved ability that is positively correlated with earnings and schooling. Alternatively, it may be possible that there is no signaling, or that some individuals with higher earning potential drop out of school earlier to pursue their own endeavors. On instrumenting for years of schooling, Angrist and Kreuger find the IV coefficient to be positive and slightly larger than the OLS estimate in several specifications, indicating if anything that OLS is slightly biased downward.

  16. Recall that we will control for seasonality in our regressions using a week fixed effects, so what is relevant is whether there is a systematic relationship between advertising and chain level prices after controlling for such seasonality. We explore this by regressing the weekly price series pooled across all brands and chains on a set of chain, brand, and week FEs. Similarly, we regress weekly ad exposures pooled across brands on a set of brand and week FEs. Finally, we calculate the correlation between the residuals from these two regressions for each chain and brand. For all brands, we fail to reject the null that there is systematic correlation in the level of ad exposures and the prices faced by consumers at the chains in the sample. After controlling for seasonality, there does not seem to be evidence of coordination between retail prices and more intensive advertising on TV.

  17. In Appendix H, we show that our results are not sensitive to local changes to how we define an ad as “skipped”. Our results remain unaffected if we define an ad as “skipped” if the fraction viewed is < 1, 0.95, 0.9, 0.8 or 0.75. Similarly, the descriptive results from our main specification in Column 1 of Table 4 do not change qualitatively if we instead employ the binary skip or watch indicator as the dependent variable.

  18. Equation (4) is quasilinear because by dividing through by \(e^{\gamma _{0}+\mu \epsilon _{0t}^{G}}\), a monotone transformation of \(U^{G}\left (.\right )\), we can write \(U\left (\left .x_{0t}...x_{Jt}\right |\boldsymbol {A}_{t-1}\right )=x_{0t}+U\left (\left .x_{1t}...x_{Jt}\right |\boldsymbol {A}_{t-1}\right )\).

  19. τ is not identified separately from the intercept and is absorbed into α 0.

  20. These results are meant to illustrate the importance of considering demand-side complementarities and the value of endogenizing the decision to consume advertising in assessing these targeting scenarios. A caveat is we do not accommodate competitive price and advertising response in reaction to the improved price and advertising targeting by the focal advertiser. Thus, the simulations do not speak to equilibrium outcomes in a market with improved addressability and targeting. Doing this would require specifying a supply-side model of price and advertising competition, which is beyond the scope of the current analysis.

  21. For example, suppose we observe b j t exposures by advertiser j on day t = 1,.., 106 in Fall 2011 in the data. In our counterfactuals, we hold b j t fixed for each t and vary how the b j t exposures are allocated across different sets of consumers. Thus, the ad-side control variable for the firm in all our counterfactuals is a set of indicators \(\left \{ \tilde {b}_{ijt};i=1,..,N\right \} \) such that \(\tilde {b}_{ijt}=1\) if consumer i gets allocated ads on day t, and 0 otherwise, and such that \({\sum }_{i=1}^{N}\tilde {b}_{ijt}=b_{jt}\,\forall t\).

  22. We also analyzed the case in which firms engage exclusively in targeted pricing. We find that this policy dominates targeting based on ad-viewing behavior for all firms. This does not imply that firms should focus their efforts on targeted pricing, however, because such policies require a great deal of knowledge about each household’s demand curve. In contrast, our focal targeting policy only requires data on households’ ad-viewing behaviors.

  23. For simplicity, we do not account for the fact that some sophisticated consumers could change their ad viewing behavior in order to influence future prices in the price discrimination scenario.

  24. For the remainder of the regressions reported here, we restrict our analyses to only include the households who made at least one purchase and were exposed to at least one ad.

  25. We reject the null hypothesis that the observed purchase quantities for households in the bottom quartile and middle two quartiles of the ad consumption distribution are drawn from the same distribution (p ≈ 0); we also reject the null for the comparison between the middle two quartiles and the upper quartile of the ad consumption distribution (p ≈ 0).

  26. This field was included in the first version of the dataset released by WCAI, but not in the final version of the data released by WCAI. We use it only to assess informally our timing assumptions.

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Acknowledgments

We thank Magid Abraham, Kyle Bagwell, Lanier Benkard, Preyas Desai, J-P. Dubé, Gautam Gowrisankaran, Günter Hitsch, Kirthi Kalyanam, Carl Mela, Sanjog Misra, Martin Pietz, Rahul Telang, Mo Xiao, Song Yao, David Zvilichovsky; seminar participants at Chicago-Booth, Duke-Fuqua, Erasmus, Northwestern-Kellogg, Insead, Stanford-GSB, Temple-Fox, UC Berkeley-Haas, UCLA-Anderson, Michigan-Ross, Univ. of Arizona, and Univ. of Washington-Foster; participants at the 2017 Economics of Advertising and Marketing (Tbilisi), 2015 SICS (Berkeley), 2015 NBER-IO (Stanford), the 2014 QME (USC), Marketing Science (Atlanta), TADC (LBS), and Economics of ICT (Mannheim) conferences; and especially Peter Rossi, Joel Waldfogel, Ken Wilbur and the QME editorial team for useful comments. We thank the Wharton Customer Analytics Initiative and an anonymous sponsoring firm for generously making the data available for academic research. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Correspondence to Anna E. Tuchman.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Ad skipping and observable demographics

Deng and Mela (2017) report that household demographics are not a strong predictor of the observed variation in ad skipping behavior in their TiVo data.

In this appendix, we analyze how ad exposure and ad skipping are correlated with observed household demographics in our data. As shown in Table 14, we find that larger households tend to be exposed to more ads, but all else equal, household size does not correlate with skip rates. Homeowners, people over 50 and those with higher levels of income and education tend to see fewer exposures and have higher skip rates. The fact that wealthier, more educated people are more likely to skip an ad is consistent with the interpretation of the cost of an advertisement as the opportunity cost of one’s time. Like Deng and Mela, we find that observed household demographics explain little of the variation in ad skipping.

Table 14 Regression of Household Ad Exposure and Ad Skip Rate on Observed Characteristics

Appendix B: Price series construction

The purchase data records the price paid and package volume of transactions at the barcode level. We only observe the prices of purchased products, but in order to estimate the model, we need to reconstruct the price series of the alternatives that were not purchased. Additionally, our model is at the brand level, so we need to transform barcode level prices into brand level prices. Our approach is to reconstruct a barcode-chain-week level price series using all observed transactions and weight by purchase volume to create a brand-chain-week price per unit. As we do not model chain choice, the final step in the price series construction is to create a household-brand-week level price series by creating a weighted average of the chain-brand-week price series using the frequency of a household’s chain visits as the weights. The steps below describe the process used to construct the price series.

  1. 1.

    Although we only observe purchase and TV advertising data for 6,552 households, we observe purchase data for 22,670 households. The entire purchase database is used in the construction of the price series.

  2. 2.

    We observe at least one purchase of 58 different brands in the transaction data. In order to make the model more tractable, we restrict the analysis to the set of brands that have the largest purchase market shares. We focus on the brands that collectively cover 90% of the market. The “other” or smaller brands category has the largest purchase market share (61.72%). These brands generally do not advertise, and because we cannot be sure whether the ads we do observe in the data correspond to the same brands that were purchases in this category, we do not include the “other” brands in the analysis. This leaves us with 12 brands. The remaining brand with the largest market share is brand 195 with 8.49% of all purchases observed in the database.

  3. 3.

    We keep transactions for barcodes that make up at least 5% of brand sales. Brand 839 does not have any barcodes that have at least 5% of sales, so this brand is dropped from the analysis.

  4. 4.

    We keep transactions for chains that have at least 1,000 purchases of the barcodes identified in step 3.

  5. 5.

    A barcode-chain-week level price series is constructed by taking the median/mode observed price of the transactions in that week. If there are not any observed purchases in a week, we fill in the median/mode observed price from the previous week. If no transactions are observed to date, we fill in the median/mode observed price in the week of the first observed transaction.

  6. 6.

    Because barcodes correspond to different package volumes, we create a barcode-chain-week level price per unit by dividing weekly prices by package volume.

  7. 7.

    A brand-chain-week level price series is constructed by weighting the barcode level price per unit by the total volume of that barcode bought at that chain over the sample.

  8. 8.

    Finally, we create a brand-household-week price series by averaging the brand-chain-week level price series across chains and weighting by household i’s count of purchases at chain s over the sample period.

  9. 9.

    Using this chain weighting procedure, some households do not have a price series for all 11 brands because sometimes a household has never been to a chain where a given brand is sold. For example, household 135,075 only ever purchases at chain 1. Brand 195 is not sold at chain 1.

    The idea behind weighting the chain price series by frequency of chain visits is intended to reflect a household’s best belief about a brand’s current price. In the instances where a household never visits a chain where a brand is sold, we assume that household’s beliefs about the price of that brand will be equal to the maximum price for that brand across all chains that week.

Appendix C: Within chain price variation over time

Figures 1718 and 19 in this appendix document the extensive price variation over time at the brand-level within chains.

Fig. 17
figure 17

Time Series Plots of Chain-Level Prices - (A)

Fig. 18
figure 18

Time Series Plots of Chain-Level Prices - Contd

Fig. 19
figure 19

Time Series Plots of Chain-Level Prices - Contd

Appendix D: First stage IV regressions

This appendix presents the first stage IV regressions for both the specifications using chain level price series and those using household price series as instruments (Tables 15 and 16). In all specifications the coefficient on own-price is negative and highly significant.

Table 15 Regressions of Quantity on Price Instruments − Chains 8 and 9 Price Series
Table 16 Regressions of Quantity on Price Instruments − Household Price Series

Appendix E: Evidence that advertising shifts quantities purchased

This appendix reports on several specifications and data cuts to document that advertising has a positive effect on product demand.

First cut: Cross-sectional analysis relating advertising and product demand

We start by checking whether households who view more advertisements also purchase more on average. At a minimum, support for a model with complementarities requires seeing a positive covariation between quantities and ads in the data. We explore the joint distribution of total quantity purchase and total category ad consumption at the household level for different levels of ad consumption. To do this, we split the sample of households into three buckets − the lowest quartile, the middle two quartiles, and the upper quartile of the distribution of total ad consumption over the panel duration.Footnote 24 These buckets correspond to households who viewed between 0 and 65 ads, between 65 and 448 ads, and 448+ ads, respectively. Then, we estimate the density of purchase quantities for each of these groups. Table 17 summarizes the estimated kernel distributions. The quartiles of the purchase quantity distribution are larger for households in higher ad quartiles. Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject the null hypotheses that these samples come from the same distribution.Footnote 25

Table 17 Conditional Distribution of Purchase Quantity by Ad Consumption Quartile

Panel analysis

Based on this cross-sectional analysis, we cannot conclude that advertising per se induces the shift out in the purchase density. We can use the panel variation to test if within-household variation over time in purchase quantity for a brand is related to cumulative past advertising consumption by that household of that brand.

We define cumulative past advertising consumption as the sum of the percentage watched of the advertisements to which the consumer was previously exposed. We construct this variable for the preceding 1, 2, 3, and 4 weeks, and regress household i’s day t purchase quantity of brand j on household i’s cumulative past advertising consumption of ads for brand j. Each observation in the regression is a household-brand-day. This regression is estimated unconditional on purchase, meaning that we include days with no-purchase in the analysis setting quantity equal to 0. We also control for the price per unit of brand j. Because we only observe prices when a purchase is made, we reconstruct the price series for the 11 most frequently purchased brands in the data and restrict all our analyses to these brands. Appendix B describes in detail how we constructed the price series for these brands.

Advertising is endogenous in this regression. Unfortunately, we do not have an instrument that moves ad consumption independently, which can be excluded from the propensity to buy more units. Given the lack of co-ordination of national TV advertising with local determinants of purchases that we described in Section 3, we believe the main source of endogeneity concerns is from unobserved heterogeneity and seasonality. The heterogeneity concern reflects the confound that consumers who like a brand also watch more of its ads, and the seasonality concern the confound that consumers may buy more and watch more ads during holiday seasons.

Given we have panel data over a long time horizon, we can include very rich controls for both, that address to a large extent these concerns. We include household-brand fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, our coefficients are estimated off within household-brand variation over time rather than across household variation and across brand variation. We also include week fixed effects in order to address the concern that there may be unobserved, time-varying shocks driving both purchases and ad consumption that remain even after including household-brand fixed effects. In particular, we estimate the following specification,

$$ q_{ijt}=\beta_{0ij}+\beta_{0t}+\beta_{1}A_{ijt}+\beta_{2}p_{ijt}+\epsilon_{ijt} $$
(38)

where q i j t is daily purchase quantity in equivalent units and A i j t is a cumulative ad-duration variable (defined more precisely in Table 18). Table 18 presents the results. Consistent with our cross-sectional findings, the effect of cumulative past advertising consumption is positive and statistically significant across all time windows we consider. To interpret the magnitudes of the ad-effect, we also report in the last row the effect on daily quantity demanded of a 1 SD increase in the cumulative ad consumption variables over the past 1, 2, 3, and 4 weeks. Across specifications, we find that a 1 SD increase in ad consumption over the past 1-4 weeks increases the mean daily quantity demanded by 3.4 −4.5%. For instance, looking at the last 3 rows of Table 18, the mean daily quantity demanded is 7.93 equivalent units. A 1 SD increase in A i j t,7 − the ad consumption over the last one week − increases the mean daily quantity demanded by 3.38%.

Table 18 Regression of Daily Purchase Quantity on Cumulative Ad Consumption

Even though we have included a rich set of controls, concerns may remain about individual-specific correlated time-varying shocks to both product and ad consumption. One consideration is a form of “activity bias” − that the consumer is busy during some time periods, so is likely both to purchase less and skip ads, which manifests as spurious co-movement in joint consumption. For example, when a consumer goes out of town, we might observe zero purchases and zero ad consumption, which could create spurious correlation between purchase quantity and ad consumption. To assess this, we re-estimate the same model, restricting the data to days in which a household purchased at least one brand and is thus observed to be “active” in the data. We use our preferred specification in which past ad consumption is defined over the preceding two weeks (Column 2, Table 18). Again, we continue to estimate a positive relationship between purchase quantity and cumulative ad consumption (see Table 19).

Table 19 Activity Bias Robustness Check of Regression of Daily Purchase Quantity on Cumulative Ad Consumption

Appendix F: Are complementarities at the brand or category level?

In this appendix we explore whether the complementarities between ad consumption and product consumption occur at the brand or the category level. In column 2 of Table 20 we regress ad consumption for brand j on the quantity purchased of brand j and the quantity purchased of all other brands -j. Column 3 includes total product consumption across all brands as the independent variable. Cross-brand effects are estimated to be negative, though not statistically significant. Table 21 runs the reverse regressions of quantity purchased of brand j on cumulative own and cross advertising of all other brands. After controlling for own effects, the cross-effects are not significant. The last column uses cumulative advertising for all brands as the independent variable; this effect is marginally significant. These results suggest that complementarities between product and ad consumption operate at the brand level as opposed to the category level in these data.

Table 20 Regressions of Ad Consumption on Cumulative Quantity
Table 21 Regression of Daily Purchase Quantity on Cumulative Ad Consumption

Appendix G: Most ad-consumption occurs after 5:00 PM

The maintained assumption is that product purchase occurs earlier in the day compared to ad-exposures. The advertising dataset included a timestamp indicating the exact second of each exposure.Footnote 26 Looking at Fig. 20 below, we see that 70% of those ad exposures occurred after 5 PM. Unfortunately, we do not observe a time stamp in the purchase data to test the time of purchase of products, but it is not unreasonable to assume that many in-store purchases occur during the day.

Fig. 20
figure 20

Ad Exposures by Time of Day

Appendix H: Ad consumption model sensitivity estimates

In our model, we consider an ad to be skipped if it is not watched to completion. In this section we explore the sensitivity of our results to different definitions of skipping. Table 22 reports the results of a logit model in which we regress the binary decision of whether to watch an ad on cumulative purchase quantity in the previous two weeks. We consider alternative definitions of ad consumption where an ad is considered skipped if a) less than 100% of the ad is watched (the ad is not watched to completion), b) less than 95% of the ad is watched, and 3) less than 75% of the ad is watched. The regression is estimated at the household-brand-day level and household-brand random effects are included to control for heterogeneity across households. The magnitudes of the coefficients on product quantity are similar, showing that our results are not sensitive to our specific definition of ad skipping.

Table 22 Logit Regression of Ad Watched Dummy on Cumulative Purchase Quantity

Appendix I: Simulation procedure

Here, we discuss in more detail how we implement the simulations in Section 5.1 to measure “long-run” elasticities in the model. For each household we simulate purchase and advertising consumption outcomes over the last 3 months in the data at the observed levels of prices and advertising exposures. We compare the model-predicted results to the results of a second simulation in which we allocate additional exposures to each household. The steps below outline the simulation procedure.

  1. 1.

    Restrict the sample to the set of households who viewed at least one ad for brand j.

  2. 2.

    Allocate the additional ad exposures for brand j to the first household, spreading the additional exposures evenly across days in which the household viewed an ad for brand j.

  3. 3.

    Conditional on the initial observed stock of product consumption, take error draws for the ad-skip model and predict ad consumption decisions for each of the s exposures for all brands on day t.

  4. 4.

    If an ad is skipped, draw the percentage of the ad watched independently from the observed distribution of ad durations in the data. If an ad is not skipped, set the percentage equal to 1.

  5. 5.

    Update the advertising stock \(\overrightarrow {A}\) using the simulated ad percentages in t.

  6. 6.

    Conditional on the observed prices in the data and the advertising stock \(\overrightarrow {A}\), take error draws for the product purchase model and predict product consumption for all brands on day t.

  7. 7.

    Update the consumption stock \(\overrightarrow {Q}\) using the simulated purchase quantities in t. Set t = t + 1. Return to step 3.

  8. 8.

    Repeat the forward simulation procedure in steps 3 - 7 for R = 100 paths of error shocks and average the statistics of interest (total purchased quantity, ad consumption, and consumer surplus) over all simulations. Repeat this procedure for all households.

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Tuchman, A.E., Nair, H.S. & Gardete, P.M. Television ad-skipping, consumption complementarities and the consumer demand for advertising. Quant Mark Econ 16, 111–174 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11129-017-9192-y

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