Abstract
Self-control has been described as the ability to master motivation that is contrary to one’s better judgement; that is, an ability that prevents such motivation from resulting in behaviour that is contrary to one’s overall better judgement (Mele, Irrationality: An essay on Akrasia, self-deception and self-control, p. 54, 1987). Recent discussions in philosophy have centred on the question of whether synchronic self-control, in which one exercises self-control whilst one is currently experiencing opposing motivation, is actional or non-actional. The actional theorist maintains that such exercises are actions, whilst the non-actional theorist claims that synchronic self-control consists in the having of unmotivated thoughts which occur at times when agents experience recalcitrant motivations and which serve to attenuate the strength of those motivations. In this paper I discuss a class of cases which has been largely ignored in these discussions, cases which I argue are common synchronic self-control problems, but in which a lack of motivation is the characteristic symptom. I argue that such cases present problems for actional accounts and add some support to the non-actional approach.
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Notes
Accordingly, when I refer to ‘self-control’ or ‘willpower’ in this paper, I shall be referring to the synchronous sort, unless otherwise indicated. I shall discuss the relationship between willpower and self-control later in the paper.
Kennett and Smith here presuppose the ‘desire-belief’ model of intentional action. For most of what follows, I shall also accept this model, though the arguments I make do not depend on it (see footnotes 12 and 13 below).
The plausibility of Mele’s solution relies on the possibility that the motivational force one has for some end (e.g. remaining on the sofa) does not transmit across the means-end relation to the necessary means (e.g. refraining from uttering the self-command), as Mele acknowledges (1997, p. 123). That is, if one desires e 1 more than one desires e 2, and m 1 is a necessary means to e 1, whilst m 2 is a necessary means to e 2, then it can be the case that one desires m 2 more than one desires m 1. Some may doubt the feasibility of this but I shall ignore this concern.
When they are discussed they tend to be as explanations of a failure of self-control, not as a synchronic self-control problem themselves. More on this below.
The difference between a person who fails to act appropriately due to distraction by a strong passion and one who fails to so act due to diminished motivation is suggested by the etymology of some of the words used to describe diminished motivation: ‘apathy’ roughly means ‘lack of feeling’; ‘listlessness’ means ‘lack of desire’; ‘accidie’ means ‘lack of care’.
Mele himself does not rule out externalism in his 2003 (chap. 5).
See e.g. Beck (1976); this is not to deny (or affirm) that one can also actionally overcome depression. Some have claimed that contemporary psychotherapy supports actional self-control. Sripada, for instance, claims that “…it is the hallmark of certain forms of psychotherapy that a person should deliberately challenge thoughts associated with problematic emotions and desires” (2010, p. 794). For my part, I do not believe that it is clear that psychotherapists are talking specifically about synchronic actional self-control as opposed to diachronic self-control or even the nonactional doings Kennett and Smith discuss, but I shall not pursue this point.
Sripada acknowledges parallels with Holton’s account in Sect. 1.5 of his paper.
I shall focus on Holton’s willpower account for convenience.
I should point out that the strength model of willpower as propounded by Baumeister and others, and supported by Holton, is not uncontroversial in the empirical literature. Among the dissenters to this view are Dweck and Walton (2010) who argue that empirical data suggests increased willpower results not from some independent energy resource but from subject’s beliefs about their own efficacy.
Another option for actional theorists perhaps is to suppose that an exercise of self-control could issue from different sort of volitional spring of action than a faculty of willpower. Perhaps intentions on their own are enough; or perhaps we have acts of will. However, the problem I have been discussing extends to such accounts since the problem concerns an impairment in one’s actional abilities themselves, whether or not those abilities consist in intentions, acts of will, willpower or anything else, and, as I have argued, it is difficult to see how these same abilities can self-regulative any shortfall in their own performance.
In fact, as footnote 12 indicated, the conclusion is actually stronger than this. Since the exercises of synchronic self-control in question are non-actional, then the exercise of such ‘doings’ is not precluded by any sort of impairment in one’s actional abilities, and not merely motivational impairments.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this issue for me.
Non-actional theorists could deny synchronic self-control in such cases is effortful; after all, they do not deny diachronic self-control is actional (and thereby often effortful) and so it could be that any associations of self-control with effort come from our experience of exerting the latter sort of self-control.
Levy himself thinks such deployment is actional since he thinks deploying such a skill is a system II process, and that all system II processes are ego-depleting. His point is that successfully directing one’s thoughts in the way mentioned—i.e. exerting self-control—is much less ego depleting than effortfully resisting temptation. Thus, the ability to effortfully resist temptation, depending as it does on plentiful ego resources (i.e. strong willpower), doesn’t seem to be the mechanism for self-control.
References
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Connor, T.D. Self-control, willpower and the problem of diminished motivation. Philos Stud 168, 783–796 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0162-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0162-2