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A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

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Abstract.

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1.  Academic Priority Ltd., Rashi 31, 52015 Ramat-Gan, Israel (e-mail: nir@nirdagan.com; http://www.nirdagan.com), , , , , , IL

    Nir Dagan

  2.  Department of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011, USA (e-mail address: oscar@volij.co.il; http://volij.co.il), , , , , , US

    Oscar Volij

  3.  Department of Economics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91905, Israel (e-mail: mseyal@mscc.huji.ac.il. Web site: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~eyalw/), , , , , , IL

    Eyal Winter

Authors
  1. Nir Dagan
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  2. Oscar Volij
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  3. Eyal Winter
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Received: 4 September 2000/Accepted: 6 September 2001

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Dagan, N., Volij, O. & Winter, E. A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. Soc Choice Welfare 19, 811–823 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200159

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200159

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