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Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 19, Issue 4, pp 811–823 | Cite as

A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

  • Nir Dagan
  • Oscar Volij
  • Eyal Winter

Abstract.

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

Keywords

Disagreement Point Bargaining Solution Rational Alternative Nash Bargaining Solution Irrelevant Alternative 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nir Dagan
    • 1
  • Oscar Volij
    • 2
  • Eyal Winter
    • 3
  1. 1. Academic Priority Ltd., Rashi 31, 52015 Ramat-Gan, Israel (e-mail: nir@nirdagan.com; http://www.nirdagan.com)IL
  2. 2. Department of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011, USA (e-mail address: oscar@volij.co.il; http://volij.co.il)US
  3. 3. Department of Economics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91905, Israel (e-mail: mseyal@mscc.huji.ac.il. Web site: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~eyalw/)IL

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