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Reflexive Games in the Linear Stackelberg Duopoly Models under Incoincident Reflexion Ranks

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Abstract

An oligopoly market with a Stackelberg leader (leaders) and the reflexive behavior of market participants (agents) is considered; for this market, the problem of determining equilibria in the case of incoincident reflexion ranks and different marginal and constant costs of agents is studied. A reflexive game model for a duopoly market is developed and formulas for calculating informational equilibria under incoincident reflexion ranks and different marginal and constant costs of agents are obtained. As is demonstrated below, the advanced (lagged) reflexion of one agent compared to the counteragent affects the intensity of competition in the oligopoly market, making non-uniform the payoff distribution between the agents in favor of the reflexive leader.

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  1. Samara National Research University, Samara, Russia

    M. I. Geraskin

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  1. M. I. Geraskin
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Correspondence to M. I. Geraskin.

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This paper was recommended for publication by D.A. Novikov, a member of the Editorial Board

Russian Text © The Author(s), 2020, published in Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 2020, No. 2, pp. 134–156.

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Geraskin, M.I. Reflexive Games in the Linear Stackelberg Duopoly Models under Incoincident Reflexion Ranks. Autom Remote Control 81, 302–319 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117920020095

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