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Game-theoretic models of an oligopoly market with nonlinear agent cost functions

  • Control in Social Economic Systems
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Abstract

We construct oligopoly models for nonlinear cost functions of agents under reflexive information. We obtain conditions for Nash equilibria under symmetric and asymmetric agent information in Cournot and Stackelberg reaction models (in case of one or several leaders).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Korolev Samara National Research University, Samara, Russia

    M. I. Geras’kin

  2. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

    A. G. Chkhartishvili

Authors
  1. M. I. Geras’kin
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  2. A. G. Chkhartishvili
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Correspondence to M. I. Geras’kin.

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Original Russian Text © M.I. Geras’kin, A.G. Chkhartishvili, 2017, published in Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 2017, No. 9, pp. 106–130.

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Geras’kin, M.I., Chkhartishvili, A.G. Game-theoretic models of an oligopoly market with nonlinear agent cost functions. Autom Remote Control 78, 1631–1650 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117917090089

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