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Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions

  • Large Scale Systems Control
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Abstract

This paper analyzes reserve price efficiency in auctions, which is defined as the relative value of the expected revenue increase induced by the optimal reserve price. We give a formal definition of competition (competitive pressure) in auctions and prove that reserve price efficiency is a decreasing function of competition level. And finally, some examples of auction properties affecting monotonically competition level are provided.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Yandex LLC, Moscow, Russia

    V. A. Topinskiy

  2. Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interactions at New Economic School, Moscow, Russia

    V. A. Topinskiy

Authors
  1. V. A. Topinskiy
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Correspondence to V. A. Topinskiy.

Additional information

Original Russian Text © V.A. Topinskiy, 2014, published in Upravlenie Bol’shimi Sistemami, 2014, No. 50, pp. 110–142.

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Topinskiy, V.A. Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions. Autom Remote Control 78, 180–196 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117917010155

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117917010155

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