The wellbeing economy in practice: sustainable and inclusive growth? Or a post-growth breakthrough?

Abstract

A wellbeing economy (WE) has gained a wide range of adherents in recent years, although the meanings they give to it vary. One point with conflicting understandings is whether a WE is a post-growth economy. Many environmentalists and other growth critics have long called for a move beyond the pursuit of economic growth as a societal priority and an embrace of an ethic of sufficiency. Some WE proponents highlight not only the WE’s post-growth character but also its ability to bring post-growth ideas into the political mainstream, pointing, for example, to the Wellbeing Economy Governments (WEGo), a partnership of governments with shared ambitions of creating a WE. Does increasing support for a WE represent the long-sought breakthrough for a post-growth, sufficiency-oriented environmental approach? If not, how can efforts to implement a WE be taken further in a post-growth direction? These questions are examined through case studies of countries participating in WEGo, using an analysis of government documents and other sources to determine whether they have adopted a post-growth orientation. Expanding on previous analysis of the three founding WEGo members, this article examines three more recent cases: Finland and Wales, which are both WEGo members, and Canada, which has participated in WEGo gatherings. It confirms previous findings that WEGo nations have taken only limited steps in a post-growth direction, with emerging WE practice amounting at most to a “weak post-growth approach.” However, while previous studies have emphasized conclusions applying broadly to all WEGos, this article identifies greater variation among WE cases. One case, Wales, stands out for moving further in a post-growth direction, including significant sufficiency-oriented policies such as limits on road building, although a commitment to economic growth remains evident. Building on the findings, the article concludes with some options that WEGo nations and others could take to strengthen the WE’s post-growth character.

Introduction

The idea of a wellbeing economy (WE) has recently made significant inroads into the political mainstream. It has attracted diverse adherents including social activists, environmentalists, health advocates, international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and a small but growing number of governments. These and other supporters have embraced a WE for various reasons and followed different intellectual routes to it, in their quests for an ecologically sustainable economic framework, poverty reduction and greater equality, and/or more emphasis on the social determinants of health, among other goals. A WE—and wellbeing, more generally—reflects a “positive and forward-looking” language (Fioramonti et al., 2022, p. 5) and, like some other concepts, wellbeing has the power to “evoke Good Things that no-one could possibly disagree with” (Cornwall, 2007, p. 472; see also Jalonen and Korhonen, 2021).¹ One problem, however, is that users of such appealing but ambiguous terms can fill them with their own meanings and appropriate them for various political agendas (Cornwall, 2007, p. 474). People who support a WE might be talking about quite different things, for instance, on the question of whether a WE is a post-growth economy.

In this article, unless otherwise specified, “growth” refers to economic growth as measured by GDP or similar indicators, while post-growth refers to a family of perspectives that seek to move beyond the pursuit of economic growth as a societal priority, especially in high-income nations.² (If readers prefer, they can think of these as post-increasing-GDP approaches.)³ With varying emphases, these perspectives attempt to outline alternatives to the ecologically and socially unsustainable expansion of industrial output, population, pollution, and resource depletion highlighted in the influential but controversial Limits to Growth report (Meadows et al., 1972). A particularly radical post-growth approach is degrowth (Kallis et al., 2020; Hickel, 2021), which seeks to substantially reduce energy and material use by scaling back unnecessary and destructive forms of production and consumption, and prioritize economic activity that meets core human needs and wellbeing for all (Hickel et al., 2022). Less radical is a-growth, which emphasizes agnosticism and indifference toward economic growth, i.e. implementing strong environmental and social policies, whatever their impact—positive or negative—on GDP (van den Bergh, 2011, 2023). Other post-growth work that challenges the prioritization of economic growth includes Daly’s (1996) elaboration of a steady-state economy with a constant population, constant stock of capital, and a rate of material throughput within the ecosystem’s regenerative and assimilative capacities; economic analyses of how societies can function without growth (Jackson, 2017; Lange, 2018; Victor, 2019); and doughnut economics, which aims to find the “sweet spot” between a social foundation that enables all people to meet core needs and an ecological ceiling that respects planetary boundaries (Raworth, 2017).

Many WE proponents emphasize its post-growth nature. The Wellbeing Economy Alliance (WEAll), the main advocacy group promoting the WE internationally, states that: “Rather than treating economic growth as an end in and of itself and pursuing it at all costs, a Wellbeing Economy puts our human and planetary needs at the centre of its activities …” (WEAll, 2024). Fioramonti et al. (2022, p. 5), who have connections to WEAll, write that in a WE “the goal is no longer growth, but balanced sufficiency, equity, and sustainability as drivers of wellbeing” (see also Mason and Büchs, 2023, pp. 7–8; Fioramonti, 2017; Fioramonti and Coscieme, 2023). To be clear, post-growth WE supporters welcome growth in wellbeing; however, expanding the economy is no longer an objective (Fioramonti, 2024, p. 6). WEAll also emphasizes a preventative approach to social and environmental problems that aims to tackle their root causes, including the pursuit of economic growth, and break the cycle of economic expansion to pay for the costs of past growth and other economic system failures (Chrysopoulou et al., 2021)—a potentially important component of a post-growth welfare state (Büchs, 2021, p. 326). Other groups have presented their own post-growth WE visions (WWF EU, 2020; EEB and Oxfam Germany, 2021; EU Wellbeing Economy Coalition, 2023), while a WE was one alternative discussed during the 2023 Beyond Growth Conference in Brussels (Hough-Stewart and Frieling, 2023).

A post-growth economic vision has key arguments in its favour while facing daunting obstacles. Like other post-growth thinkers, many WE proponents are critical of economic growth both on ecological and well-being grounds. In addition to identifying the pursuit of growth as a key driver of climate change, biodiversity loss, and other forms of ecological degradation (e.g. Chrysopoulou et al., 2021, p. 4), and more generally highlighting the impossibility of infinite growth of material and energy use on a finite planet, many WE supporters are deeply sceptical of “green” or “sustainable growth” premised on decoupling economic growth from negative environmental impacts (Coscieme et al., 2019; Fioramonti et al., 2022, p. 2; EU Wellbeing Economy Coalition, 2023, p. 36). This position is backed by considerable evidence showing insufficient decoupling to date to address urgent environmental challenges (e.g. Parrique et al., 2019; Haberl et al., 2020; Wiedmann et al., 2020), although contested by some (e.g. Hausfather, 2021). Post-growth WE proponents also point to evidence that GDP growth has reached the point of diminishing returns in terms of wellbeing or happiness in high-income nations (Coscieme et al., 2019, pp. 5–6). Despite the arguably urgent need to move beyond growth, the political sphere has been hostile to such ideas, favouring pro-growth environmental perspectives consistent with the political imperative of economic growth (Dryzek et al., 2003; Richters and Simoneit, 2019; Wiedmann et al., 2020)—i.e. the perceived need for growth to maintain economic and social stability, address employment concerns, and generate adequate revenues for state expenditure.

Some proponents of a post-growth WE see a breakthrough in this impasse as the WE has found increasing mainstream support among organizations such as the OECD (2019), the Council of the European Union (2019), and the World Health Organization (WHO, 2021).⁴ Arguably most significant has been the establishment, in 2018, of the Wellbeing Economy Governments (WEGo), initially consisting of New Zealand, Scotland, and Iceland. This partnership brings together “governments interested in sharing expertise and transferrable policy practices to advance their shared ambition of building Wellbeing Economies” (WEAll, 2023). Fioramonti et al. (2022, p. 2) write that WEGo’s creation represents “the first time that a variety of national governments,” with the OECD’s support, “openly unite on the basis of a post-growth agenda.” They thus highlight the WE’s potential to bring post-growth ideas into the mainstream—a task other concepts, such as regrowth, have so far failed to achieve.

However, research has shown that the WE’s post-growth character cannot be taken for granted—particularly once governments adopt and mainstream the concept. Our previous article, based on case studies of founding WEGo members, found that the policies and key documents illustrating WEGos’ political priorities did not, for the most part, reflect post-growth ambitions (Hayden and Dasilva, 2022). Limited steps in a post-growth direction were evident—notably, some downplaying of economic growth’s centrality as wellbeing was elevated to a core goal and some movement beyond GDP by introducing and using additional wellbeing measurements. However, economic growth was still a priority in all three countries, which remained dependent on growth to meet core economic and social goals. The emerging practice of a WE was thus characterized as a “weak post-growth approach.” Mason and Büchs (2023), in a comparative analysis of WEAll and WEGo narratives, similarly found disparities between WEAll’s more radical positions—on GDP as a wellbeing measure, pursuit of economic growth, and capitalism as a system—and WEGos’ limited reformist approach. They also identified barriers to more radical WE narratives, including opposition from vested interests, training of policymakers rooted in neo-classical economics, and short-termist and siloed policymaking.

In light of the watering down of the WE’s radicalism, McCartney et al. (2023) propose criteria to distinguish a “genuine” WE from “window dressing,” including treating social and environmental wellbeing goals as the end to which the economy is a means—and not the reverse. Meanwhile, even among WEAll members (i.e. civil-society organizations that have joined), the emphasis on moving beyond growth varies. A study of members’ WEAll applications identified four distinct, albeit overlapping and potentially complementary narratives, one of which emphasizes moving beyond GDP growth (Waddock, 2021). These findings reflect the fact that other concerns (e.g. equity, poverty reduction, participation) are sometimes more prominent in WE understandings. For example, the quest for better and more equitable health outcomes is one significant driver of interest in a WE or wellbeing society (WHO, 2021; Kickbusch et al., 2022). Indeed, WEAll itself does not always emphasize a post-growth message, as in this WE definition: “an economy that delivers on five universal needs for a good life,” i.e. connection, dignity, fairness, participation, and nature (Abrar, 2021, p. 160).

Before proceeding, some explanation of the term “sufficiency,” which is used in the analysis below, is needed. Post-growth perspectives often highlight an ethic of sufficiency, which at its core is based on the idea that “there can be enough and there can be too much” (Princen, 2005, p. 6). “Enough” involves both minimum and maximum thresholds (Spengler, 2016). This article’s use of the term sufficiency mainly involves the upper threshold—i.e., limiting consumption and production levels among affluent consumers and consumer societies—but also important is the need of those with very little for more consumption to attain sufficiency. Sufficiency can also be pursued at different levels relevant to this article. At the macro-economic level, it involves a critical perspective on GDP growth and a search for post-growth alternatives. In addition, sufficiency can involve efforts—both by individuals and, more importantly, through policy and other collective action—to limit specific forms of consumption, practices, or sectors considered socially or ecologically excessive (Hayden, 2014, 2020), or other manifestations of the modern emphasis on “faster,” “further,” and “more” (Sachs, 2001).

This article aims to answer the following questions: Does increasing support for a WE represent the breakthrough for a post-growth, sufficiency-oriented environmental approach that many environmentalists and other growth critics have long sought? By breakthrough, I mean not merely the use of post-growth concepts in mainstream political discourse but commitments or actions by mainstream actors such as WEGos to move beyond the pursuit of economic growth or otherwise implement post-growth ideas. If not yet a breakthrough, how can efforts to implement a WE be taken further in a post-growth direction? This article expands on and refines earlier analysis of these questions (Hayden and Dasilva, 2022) by examining three additional WEGo cases. Since the earlier analysis did not consider these three cases, there is a need to assess whether WE initiatives in these countries differ or are congruent with previous cases. Previous studies (Hayden and Dasilva, 2022; Mason and Büchs, 2023) examining WEGos’ orientation toward post-growth ideas have also emphasized conclusions applying broadly to all WEGos, although they did note some minor variation among countries. The cases examined here lend themselves to an appreciation of the variation among WEGo nations that has been under-analysed in previous work.

Methods

To examine whether a WE represents a breakthrough for post-growth ideas, I conducted case studies of countries participating in WEGo. To supplement and refine the previous analysis of the three founding WEGo members (New Zealand, Scotland, and Iceland), this article examines three more recent WEGo cases. Finland and Wales both joined WEGo in 2020, while Canada is often listed among WEGo members although it has not formally joined. In this article, the term “WEGo member” is reserved for the five countries that have joined the partnership, while the more general “WEGo case” or “WEGo nation” also includes Canada.

The case studies are based on analysis of documents, particularly those that can help illustrate whether and to what degree engagement with the WE concept has affected government policy priorities and, above all, the orientation toward economic growth. They also aim to provide some political-economic context for each country’s efforts, with greater detail on the two more substantial cases: Finland and Wales. As political systems and contexts differ in each country, so do the relevant documents. These include documents outlining government understandings of the WE; statements in national parliaments on governmental priorities and WE-related issues; speeches, interviews, and opinion pieces by government ministers and other public officials; government budgets, budget proposals, and fiscal plans; programmes of government; documents outlining new “beyond GDP” wellbeing measurement frameworks; and government reports, ministry web pages, and media releases on related topics. The analysis also draws on existing academic research; reports by international organizations, NGOs, and other grey literature; media articles—accessed through the NexisUni database and Google “News” searches—relevant to the WE experience in the three countries; and four related videos.

Analysis of these sources included identifying stated understandings of or approaches to a WE,⁵ along with the main WE-related policies, initiatives, and any related institutional changes in each country. Most importantly, it involved identifying whether the statements, policies, and other actions of the three governments illustrated a shift beyond the pursuit of economic growth or continued commitment to it. Analysis also included identifying more limited steps that do not in themselves represent a move beyond growth, but are consistent with or could contribute to it (e.g. introduction of “beyond-GDP” measurement frameworks, sufficiency-oriented policies, or exploration of policies frequently advocated by post-growth thinkers), as well as identifying obstacles to a post-growth orientation that were evident. Both deductive and inductive coding of documents were used.⁶

The analysis relies primarily on English-language documents, along with some French-language sources for Canada. A potential limitation concerns Finland. Other than a few reports in the Helsinki Times and international media, English-language media articles relevant to the Finnish case were lacking. Media articles are not the primary data source for this analysis but can be useful supplementary sources to help understand governmental priorities and the broader political-economic context for WE efforts while pointing to primary sources. Nevertheless, English-language translations of key documents (government programmes, fiscal plans, parliamentary statements outlining the government’s priorities, ministry documents, web pages, etc.) were widely available, providing an abundant indication of the Finnish government's perspective on the WE and its relationship to growth.

Assessing the impact and adequacy of policies discussed in the case studies is beyond the scope of this study. A number of potentially wellbeing-enhancing and environmentally beneficial policies are mentioned, but critics may find that such policies are insufficient or inappropriate to meet stated goals.

Case studies

Canada

Canada is a curious WEGo “member.” WEAll’s (2023) website stated that Canada joined WEGo in 2022, a claim various sources echoed (e.g. Ferber, 2023). For a Canadian WE researcher, this was puzzling since it was not possible to find any Canadian government⁷ statement or a Canadian media report announcing WEGo membership. Other WE proponents in Canada were similarly unaware of the country’s supposed WEGo membership (e.g. G15+, 2023a; Moores, 2023; McLaren, 2023), while an article in Canada’s “national newspaper” listed WEGo members without mentioning Canada (Rachman, 2023).

This situation is easily explained: Canada is not, at the time of writing, actually a WEGo member; indeed, WEAll no longer calls it a member on its website (see also Scottish Government, 2023; OECD, 2023a). That said, since 2020, the Canadian government has been informally engaged with WEGo—with Canadian representatives participating in some WEGo events—as it developed its own approach to wellbeing or “quality of life” (QOL), the term it favours.

A new quality of life framework

In some ways, Canada is a logical WEGo candidate. Canadian researchers and NGOs have made major contributions to the study and measurement of happiness and wellbeing and to the beyond-GDP movement (Hayden et al., 2022, pp. 31–34), which has been a key force behind the WE concept. Statistics Canada has long had considerable expertise and data relevant to one key step towards a WE: introducing alternatives to GDP to measure wellbeing and prosperity.⁸ Yet for many years the Canadian government lagged other OECD nations in launching a beyond-GDP initiative.

The situation began to change under Justin Trudeau’s centre-left Liberal government. In 2019, the prime minister mandated Mona Fortier, the minister of middle-class prosperity and associate minister of finance, to lead work to “better incorporate quality of life measurements into government decision-making and budgeting, drawing on lessons from other jurisdictions such as New Zealand and Scotland” (Trudeau, 2019).

The Department of Finance (2021a) subsequently released Toward a Quality of Life Strategy for Canada, which outlined the government’s proposed measurement framework. The dashboard includes 84 indicators grouped into five domains—prosperity, health, society, environment, and good governance—along with subjective wellbeing data on life satisfaction and a sense of meaning and purpose. There are also two “cross-cutting lenses”: “fairness and inclusion” to assess the distribution of outcomes among different population groups and “sustainability and resilience” to promote long-term thinking (Statistics Canada, 2023).

Visually, the framework is represented as a circle, with QOL at the centre, and the five domains—including prosperity—around the circle (Statistics Canada, 2023, p. 6). A public servant who helped develop the framework explained that no point on a circle is more important than others and no domain is prioritized over others (CSPS, 2023, 26:50). However, to avoid anyone getting the wrong idea that this beyond-GDP measurement framework implied less emphasis on economic growth, the Department of Finance (2021b, p. 410) stated that increasing Canada’s GDP remained “crucial.” Similarly, Statistics Canada (2023) made clear that “the Quality of Life Framework is about supporting inclusive and sustainable growth ….”

The still-evolving framework reflects some best practices for beyond-GDP measurement. However, one concern from a post-growth or ecological perspective is the limited data at present on Canada’s global environmental impacts outside its borders. There are no indicators for carbon,⁹ ecological, or material footprints, which account for impacts linked to Canadian consumption of goods wherever they are produced. The framework’s current iteration thus risks obscuring the ways that growth and QOL in Canada can come at the expense of impacts on other places and future generations.

The main step to date in bringing the QOL framework into decision-making has been its use since 2021 in budgeting. Proponents of spending initiatives within government must indicate which QOL domains and indicators the proposal is expected to affect positively (Department of Finance, 2023a, p. 6), and, for successful proposals, this information is reported in an annex to the budget alongside gender and diversity impact analysis (Department of Finance, 2021b, pp. 413–580, 2022a, 2023b, pp. 257–373).

This budgeting exercise’s significance could become clearer with more use over time and further research. The QOL framework, in principle, has the potential to improve evidence-based policymaking and erode policy siloes, as proponents of spending initiatives must consider numerous well-being and sustainability indicators covering more than their specific departmental mandates. However, since the framework’s introduction, there has been no noticeable shift (nor any claims by the government of a shift) in the Trudeau administration’s centre-left budget choices and broader policies, which do more than the previous Conservative government to address social inequalities and environmental challenges, but not enough to satisfy left-leaning and green critics (e.g. McLaren, 2023). That said, further research might reveal ways that policy choices have shifted at the margin.

Quiet about wellbeing, loud about growth

The QOL framework’s use in the 2021 federal budget led WEAll (2023) to optimistically call it Canada’s first “wellbeing budget.” However, the 2021 budget was never presented to Canadians as a wellbeing budget. (In 2023, the Quebec-based NGO G15+ (2023b) was still calling for Quebec and Canada’s to deliver their first wellbeing budgets.) Budget documents—which are one key indicator of a government’s priorities—at that time never mentioned the term “wellbeing budget” (or “quality of life” budget), besides a statement about New Zealand’s 2019 wellbeing budget buried deep in an annex (Department of Finance, 2021b, p. 410). While New Zealand highlighted its new approach in the title of “The Wellbeing Budget” and in Prime Minister Ardern’s (2019) “Wellbeing Budget speech,” Canada’s 2021 budget was conventionally titled “A Recovery Plan for Jobs, Growth, and Resilience.” In her budget speech (an event widely covered by the media), Canada’s finance minister did not mention wellbeing¹⁰ or QOL—nor suggest that this was a new type of budget—while referring to economic growth eleven times (Freeland, 2021). Similarly, the Department of Finance’s (2021c) press release accompanying the budget presented it as “a plan to drive economic growth,” without mentioning wellbeing or QOL.¹¹

A similar pattern—no mention of wellbeing or QOL and heavy emphasis on economic growth—is also evident in the finance minister’s speeches and press releases for the 2022 and 2023 budgets (Department of Finance, 2022b, 2023c; Freeland, 2022, 2023). As for the more-detailed budget documents, like the 2021 budget, neither the 2022 or 2023 edition mentions a “wellbeing budget” (or “quality of life” budget) or a “wellbeing economy” (Department of Finance, 2022c, 2023b).¹² A keen reader has to dig deep into the aforementioned annexes of the various budgets to find reference to the QOL Framework in a separate Gender, Diversity, and Quality of Life Statement.¹³ This contrasts again with New Zealand, whose wellbeing budgets begin with a “Wellbeing Outlook” for the nation that sets the context for budget priorities (e.g. NZ Government, 2022, pp. 7–13).

Likewise, the latest Speech from the Throne (Governor General, 2021),¹⁴ which outlines government priorities during a legislative session, does not mention the QOL Framework or refer to “quality of life,” but prominently emphasizes economic growth (p. 8, 11, 13, 14, 17).¹⁵ In short, although there is some behind-the-scenes use of the QOL framework within the federal bureaucracy,¹⁶ the key documents and statements that present the Canadian government’s priorities to the public put little or no up-front emphasis on wellbeing/QOL and a great deal on growth. Nor have there been any prominent statements by top Canadian government leaders (i.e. the prime minister or finance minister) about the limits of focusing on economic growth alone and the corresponding need for a wellbeing orientation comparable to remarks from WEGo member-state leaders (e.g. Ardern, 2019; Sturgeon, 2019; Jakobsdóttir, 2020).

A wide gap is also evident between the government’s “old-school” thinking that justifies social and environmental policies based on their contribution to the end goal of economic growth and a WE vision that sees the economy as a means toward the higher end of wellbeing (or QOL). For example,¹⁷ Finance Minister Freeland (2022) justified the government’s social policies related to housing, skills, and child care and investments in a green transition as “pillars of growth.” The minister presented this as an advanced economic approach—depicting social investments as “modern supply-side economics” that takes a “progressive, people-centred approach” to increasing supply and boosting GDP. However, it violates the first criterion of McCartney et al. (2023, p. 3) for recognizing a genuine WE: “Is the economy explicitly viewed by relevant actors as serving social, health, cultural, equity and nature outcomes, rather than the reverse?”¹⁸

Post-growth and sufficiency elements in Canada

While some Canadian voices call for a post-growth WE “oriented towards sufficiency, equity, and wellbeing” (Hancock, 2023), the Canadian government clearly has not embraced such a vision. Introducing a beyond-GDP measurement framework with QOL theoretically at the centre might suggest a downplaying of economic growth’s centrality, and a small step in a post-growth direction, but growth-centred priorities are dominant in key statements of political and economic priorities. Nevertheless, the Trudeau government has introduced a limited number of sufficiency-based policies federally. Examples include financial support to expand public transit thereby helping limit automobile use (Freeland, 2021); steps toward a right to repair (Department of Finance, 2023b, pp. 37–38; Centivany and Rosborough, 2023); and a tax on luxury cars, boats, and planes (Freeland, 2021). Canada’s ban on foreign ownership of housing also could be considered to have a sufficiency element.¹⁹ Substantially expanding on such sufficiency-oriented examples would be one option if Canada were to move toward a post-growth WE. For now, Canada largely serves as a contrast for others that have gone further in their engagement with and prioritization of the WE concept.

Finland

For seven consecutive years, Finland has made global headlines as the world’s happiest country (Helliwell et al., 2024). Low corruption, along with high levels of freedom, trust, and social support are among the factors cited as explanations (Topping, 2021; Dorling, 2023; OECD, 2023b, p. 34, 56). Another explanatory factor is an extensive Nordic welfare state (Martela et al. 2020), which provides considerable economic security and low-income inequality by global standards (OECD, 2023b, pp. 15–16, 38). Finland also ranks at or near the top on some indexes of sustainable development and environmental performance (Wolf et al., 2022; Sachs et al., 2023)—reflecting strong environmental policies and domestic environmental conditions. By some measures, it is one of the world’s most gender-equal societies (WEF, 2023).²⁰ Indeed, Finland ranked first, second, or third on more than 100 international social or economic performance indicators (Dorling, 2023).

Finland nevertheless faces challenges alongside its successes. Inequalities, while lower than in most countries, are too large for many Finns, including former Prime Minister Sanna Marin and her government (Finnish Government, 2019a, p. 14, 85; Topping, 2021). Social concerns include suicides and other “deaths of despair” above the OECD (2023b, pp. 45–46) average. Environmentally, Finland fares much more poorly on assessments of contributions to global ecological damage through a country’s consumption, with a large per-capita material footprint (OECD, 2023b, pp. 87–88) and a 156th place ranking of 165 countries on the Sustainable Development Index (SDI, 2020) devised by degrowth theorist Jason Hickel (2020). There are also concerns over the financial sustainability of the welfare state, as discussed below.

Efforts to create a wellbeing economy—or “economy of wellbeing,” the more commonly used term in Finland—can be seen as a way to build on the country’s successes, address evident challenges, and bring its welfare state into a new era.

Finland’s path toward a wellbeing economy

Finland’s idea of an economy of wellbeing emerged along its own path—prior to, and separate from, WEAll’s international advocacy. The concept was introduced in 2012 by SOSTE, the Finnish Federation for Social Affairs and Health, an umbrella organization for social affairs and health NGOs (Ahokas and Rouvinen-Wilenius, 2019; Alanko, 2022; MSAH, 2024, p. 9). The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (MSAH) later adopted the idea (e.g. Mattila, 2019) and became a key proponent of it, while Antti Rinne and Sanna Marin’s Social Democratic-led governments incorporated the economy of wellbeing into their programmes in 2019 (Finnish Government, 2019a, pp. 151–152, 2019b, pp. 153–154).

That same year, Finland made the economy of wellbeing a principal theme of its Council of the European Union presidency (MSAH, 2019a, b). In addition to WEGo membership, Finland’s international WE activities have included collaboration with the OECD on its economy of wellbeing working paper and related work (OECD, 2019, 2023c; MSAH, 2024). In 2022, Finland also convened an International High-Level Group on the Economy of Wellbeing to help integrate the concept into policy-making (MSAH, 2023a).

As in international debates, the WE’s precise meaning in Finland can be difficult to pin down, in part due to the vague and abstract nature of “wellbeing” (Jalonen and Korhonen, 2021); nevertheless some core ideas appear prominently in government documents. One succinct formulation—albeit open to many interpretations—is that the “economy of wellbeing is a decision-making approach which enables us to achieve a better balance between the social, economic and ecological dimensions of sustainable development” (MSAH, 2023b, see also e.g., MSAH, 2020a, 2022a, 2024). A second core idea is that the “economy of wellbeing puts people’s wellbeing at the heart of decision-making” (MSAH, 2023b, see variations in 2021a, 2024, p. 8)—or, with more ecological emphasis, “people’s and the planet’s wellbeing is at the heart of economic policy” (MSAH, 2021b; see also Korhonen et al., 2022, p. 2). Determining what these words mean in practice is still a work in progress. Finland’s Economy of Wellbeing Action Plan, launched in March 2023, highlighted the need for further work to develop a WE governance model, including ways to integrate wellbeing indicators into decision-making and assess policy initiatives’ wellbeing impacts (MSAH, 2023c, 2024; OECD, 2023c).

Although much work remains to shape a WE, one clear implication is the need for cross-silo or cross-sectoral cooperation (Mattila, 2019; Jalonen and Korhonen, 2021; Demos Helsinki, 2023; Koivisto, 2023, pp. 6–7), building on Finland’s existing efforts to achieve a more cross-sectoral governance approach²¹ (Finnish Government, 2019b, p. 11; OECD, 2023c). A greater role for participatory processes that give communities and municipalities an active role is another key theme (WHO, 2023, p. 8). So, too, is the goal of generating “wellbeing for all people” (MSAH, 2022a); a basic premise is “strengthening the equality and inclusion of everyone, including gender equality” (MSAH, 2024, p. 19).

Finland has, like other WEGo cases, recognized that GDP is not an adequate wellbeing indicator and must be complemented with other economic, ecological, and social indicators (Finnish Government, 2019b, p. 14; MSAH, 2023b). Unlike other WEGos, Finland had, at the time of writing, yet to establish a WE indicator framework—although it planned to do so (MSAH, 2023c; see also OECD, 2023b, p. 12; WHO, 2023, p. 6).

Even without a WE indicator set, the Marin government introduced various wellbeing-enhancing social policies and ambitious environmental goals. These included: a family leave reform, which provided more flexible options for parents, increased the number of parental leave days, and promoted gender balance by boosting the number of days reserved for fathers (Ministry of Finance, 2021a; Topping, 2021; Marin, 2022); significant education investments from early child to higher education; action to ensure minimum staffing levels for nurses to improve the quality of care for the elderly (Marin, 2022); a commitment to ending homelessness by continuing a Housing First approach (Topping, 2021); and a social security reform, discussed below. The Finnish Government (2019a, pp. 35–36) also committed to carbon neutrality by 2035—15 years ahead of the EU’s timeline—and to become carbon negative soon afterward while seeking to become “the world’s first fossil-free welfare society.”

Welfare state renewal and sustainable growth

Finland’s WE approach—as in Iceland (Birkjær et al., 2021, p. 34; Hayden and Dasilva, 2022, p. 10; Guðmundsdóttir, 2023, 16:00)—aims to take the Nordic welfare state to a higher level. The Marin government committed to “continue building the welfare state in ways that are socially, economically and ecologically sustainable” (Ministry of Finance, 2021a), based on the idea that “Our Nordic welfare society is a sustainable, fair and just model…” (Finnish Government, 2019a, p. 8). If the “fundamentals in our society are firmly in place” (Finnish Government, 2019a, p. 8), what does the WE add to the existing welfare state?

One possible answer is that a WE involves reforming the welfare state so that it can continue to provide needed services and economic security, enable social mobility, and limit inequality—and indeed do more to reduce inequalities (Marin, 2021; MSAH, 2021a)—in a context of new challenges, such as an aging population and slower projected economic growth (Finnish Government, 2019a, p. 152; WHO, 2023, p. 4). The WE in Finland has been linked to social security reform (Alanko, 2022), which aims to “make the system more reliable, comprehensive and easier to understand” (Finnish Government, 2019a, p. 166). Besides ensuring people receive needed support, one goal is to boost the employment rate—thereby boosting economic output and improving the sustainability of public finances that pay for the welfare state (Finnish Government, 2019a, p. 167). Reforms include reorganizing the delivery of healthcare and social welfare services through new “wellbeing services counties” (Ministry of Finance, 2022; MSAH, 2023d).

The Finnish WE approach includes the idea that social spending should not be seen as a cost but as an investment that generates wellbeing as well as “savings, efficiency, productivity, and economic growth” (Mattila, 2019). According to the SOSTE federation, wellbeing investments “in the long run reduce the need to increase social and health expenditure, increase the supply of labour and foster growth of productivity.” In this conceptualization, wellbeing can be understood as “capital for economic growth” and thus also “capital for future wellbeing” (Ahokas and Rouvinen-Wilenius, 2019).

Some civil-society voices in Finland advocate a WE that moves beyond growth as a core goal (Nuorivaara, 2021, pp. 39–40, 44). However, much more prominent—particularly within government—is the idea of a virtuous circle of wellbeing and economic growth, which are “closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing” (Mattila, 2019; see also Prime Minister’s Office, 2019; MSAH, 2020b, 2021a, 2022b). The idea that “people’s wellbeing fosters economic growth” was emphasized by Finland during its Council of the European Union presidency (MSAH, 2019a)—and echoed by the OECD (2019). According to a video the Finnish government produced at the time: “The economy of wellbeing. It’s based on the simple idea that our wellbeing makes our economy grow! And the other way around!” (Council of the European Union, 2019, 0:43). Among the arguments underlying this position is that people experiencing health and wellbeing are more productive workers, thus boosting economic growth (Nuorivaara, 2021, p. 29, 36). Looking ahead, “Strengthening the reciprocal relationship between wellbeing policy and economic growth” is one recommendation of Finland’s WE action plan (MSAH, 2024, p. 22).

As in fellow Nordic WEGo state, Iceland (Hayden and Dasilva, 2022), concern over the sustainability of public finances and related ability to fund welfare-state programmes, given the aforementioned challenges of population aging and low long-term growth projections, help drive Finland’s efforts to pursue and even accelerate economic growth (Finnish Government, 2019a; Marin, 2021; Ministry of Finance, 2021a, 2022, p. 10). Demographic changes fuel demand for spending on long-term care, health, and pensions, while reducing the working-age population to pay for it. The Ministry of Finance (2022, p. 23) stated bluntly: “in the longer term general government finances are not on a sustainable base.” The risk ahead is increased debt, which would necessitate spending cuts and/or tax increases (Finnish Government, 2019a, p. 15). In light of such concerns, Prime Minister Marin (2022) told Parliament, in a statement outlining governmental priorities for the year, that “now is the time to strengthen the conditions for sustainable economic growth,” which “plays an important role in strengthening public finances.”

As the previous quotation indicates, Finland’s WE conception emphasizes not just any type of economic growth, but “sustainable growth.” Besides financial sustainability, making the welfare state more environmentally sustainable “through new policies that protect not only people but also the planet” is one WE goal (WHO, 2023, p. 4; see also Birkjær et al. 2021, p. 31; Topping, 2021). The terms “sustainable growth” and “sustainable economic growth” appear prominently and frequently in government documents.²² Indeed, Finland’s WE efforts are linked to its Sustainable Growth Programme (Ministry of Finance, 2021a; Korhonen et al., 2022, p. 2). The idea of “inclusive growth” is also implied by emphasis on creating a “fair, equal, and inclusive Finland” (Finnish Government, 2019a, p. 151).

Post-growth and sufficiency elements in Finland

According to a Finnish proverb, “Happiness is a place between too little and too much” (Dorling and Koljonen, 2021). Those words concisely express the concept of sufficiency. Finland’s welfare state does a great deal to ensure that most people do not have too little—and limits “excessive” consumption at the high end, at least to some degree, by limiting income inequalities. However, Finland’s WE approach, with its drive for further economic growth, does not emphasize sufficiency when it comes to the macro-economy.

Some limited post-growth and sufficiency elements are nevertheless evident in Finland. Acknowledging the need to go beyond GDP to measure wellbeing is one limited step in a post-growth direction, as is elevating wellbeing to a central societal goal (without, however, displacing economic growth as a core objective). While not necessarily directly connected to the WE, sufficiency-oriented policies encourage less private automobile use and more walking, cycling, and public transit (Finnish Government, 2019a, p. 123; Ministry of Finance, 2021a). The government also committed to “climate-friendly food” programme that incorporates key sufficiency ideas regarding the food system: greater public procurement of plant-based foods; local sourcing of some items; and measures to reduce food waste (Finnish Government, 2019a, p. 47). One could likely point to other sufficiency-related policies in Finland, which may appear in sources other than those related to the WE that are the focus of this study.

One prominent idea in Finnish WE discussions is a preventative approach to social problems. Investments in wellbeing can help reduce demands on public services by preventing costly long-term problems (Ahokas and Rouvinen-Wilenius, 2019; Finnish Government, 2019a, p. 16; Demos Helsinki, 2023). Prevention is seen to be part of the “virtuous circle” of wellbeing and economic growth, discussed above, as wellbeing investments cut costs and boost productivity (e.g. Ahokas and Rouvinen-Wilenius, 2019). However, as noted above, it can also be linked to a post-growth vision. Curbing demand for public services by preventing problems from arising in the first place— e.g. avoiding the need for health care spending through a healthier work-life balance or less pollution—helps to reduce state revenue needs and related pressures for growth (Trebeck, 2020; Büchs, 2021; Chrysopoulou et al., 2021). From another angle, it can be a way to deliver high wellbeing even in a context of low or no growth.

Epilogue: a shift to the right

In 2023, a coalition of the conservative National Coalition Party, the right-wing populist Finns Party, the Swedish People’s Party, and Christian Democrats defeated Sanna Marin’s Social Democratic-led government. The shift to the right has led to changes, including social benefit cuts, business-friendly labour-market reforms, and plans to restrict immigration, while the term “economy of wellbeing” no longer appears in the new programme of government (Finnish Government, 2023). However, work has continued toward implementing the Economy of Wellbeing Action Plan (e.g. MSAH, 2023e). The degree to which Finland reformulates its approach to a WE and remains engaged in WEGo remains to be seen.

Wales

Wales, a country of only 3.1 million people, provides arguably the most significant example of WE institutions resulting in substantially different policy choices. Similar to fellow WEGo member Scotland, there has been strong support in Wales for left-of-centre politics that aims to break with the UK’s Thatcherite legacy and create a fairer society based on “social partnership” (Ferber, 2023; Miller, 2023). The Welsh Labour Party is the dominant political force, leading every government since devolution in 1997, including a minority government in cooperation with the nationalist Plaid Cymru from 2021 to 2024 (Welsh Government, 2021a).

Creating a WE in Wales is, in part, about addressing long-standing social problems and concentrated deprivation, as the “Welsh population is older, poorer, in worse health and has lower educational attainment and skills than the UK average” (WCPP, 2021, p. 4; see also Welsh Government, 2021b). Wales also has some strengths to build on, such as a higher sense of safety in one’s community and lower perceived discrimination and air pollution (Wallace, 2019; Wallace and Baker, 2023). WE efforts in Wales particularly stand out for their emphasis on sustainability and the wellbeing of future generations (Wallace, 2019), which has been institutionalized in a ground-breaking way and contributed to practices that veer, albeit inconsistently, into post-growth territory.

Wellbeing of future generations act

The foundations of Wales’s wellbeing architecture were set in the Wellbeing of Future Generations Act of 2015 (National Assembly for Wales, 2015). The Act established a range of legal duties for public bodies to take into account long-term wellbeing goals and move beyond short-term thinking (Ferber, 2023; Howe, 2023). It gave teeth to the idea of sustainable development as a “central organising principle” for the Welsh government, first established in 1999 when the government and Welsh parliament (Senedd) were created (Wallace, 2019). The Act requires public bodies to carry out sustainable development and work to achieve the nation’s seven wellbeing goals (Welsh Government, 2015): a prosperous, resilient, healthier, and more equal Wales, a Wales of cohesive communities, a Wales of vibrant culture and thriving Welsh language, and a globally responsible Wales. These long-term goals, which do not change with each election or budget cycle, grew out of a national conversation on the “Wales We Want” in 2014 (Howe, 2023). The government and other public bodies must also set their own wellbeing objectives outlining their contribution to the national wellbeing goals (Welsh Government, 2015; Howe, 2023).

The Act includes “Five Ways of Working”; public bodies must act in ways that are long-term, integrative, collaborative, preventative, and involve citizens in decision-making (Welsh Government, 2015; Wallace, 2019). A key goal is to break down traditional siloes between departments and agencies.

One particularly important outcome of the Act was the creation of the office of the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales (2023) to serve as a “guardian of the ability of future generations to meet their needs and encourage public bodies to take greater account of the long-term impact of the things they do.” The Commissioner also advises public bodies on obligations under the Act and how they can meet them and monitors whether wellbeing objectives are being met. As discussed below, the first commissioner, Sophie Howe, played an important role in groundbreaking decisions to curb some environmentally damaging growth.

The Act also requires ministers to publish national indicators to measure progress toward the wellbeing goals. At the time of writing, there were 50 national indicators (Welsh Government 2022a, b). Although GDP is not on the list, in Wales, the more commonly used proxy to measure the economy’s size is gross value added (GVA) and there is a national indicator for GVA per hour worked (productivity), as well as gross disposable household income (GDHI) per head. Environmental indicators include greenhouse gas emissions linked to Welsh consumption of global goods and services (alongside territorial emissions within Wales) and “global footprint” (i.e. ecological footprint). Wales thus goes further than other WEGo cases in measuring the global impacts of domestic consumption (and the economic growth it is associated with), which narrower indicators of national environmental conditions and territorial emissions can mask.

Under the Act, the government must also establish “national milestones” to assess progress toward wellbeing goals. Among the milestones established so far are those for disposable income (“Improve GDHI per head in Wales by 2035 and commit to setting a stretching growth target for 2050”) and Wales’s global footprint (“Wales will use only its fair share of the world’s resources by 2050”) (Welsh Government, 2022a). Together, these two milestones suggest that Wales is pursuing a sustainable growth project of decoupling economic/income growth from environmental impacts, a point returned to below. The Act can nevertheless be seen to challenge dominant economic thinking as it puts all aspects of wellbeing on equal footing (Wallace, 2019, p. 73, 86).

Post-growth and sufficiency elements in Wales

Besides using a “beyond GDP” national indicator set, Welsh WE efforts illustrate several elements consistent with a post-growth vision. The presence of such elements, alongside other signs of continued commitment to growth creates some ambiguity about the degree to which the Welsh WE project has moved into post-growth territory.

A post-growth language?

One area of such ambiguity is the language used to discuss government and societal priorities. The lack of discussion of economic growth—or GDP, GVA, or similar concepts—stands out in many key government documents (but not all, as discussed below).²³ A key indicator of the government’s priorities is its Programme for Government (Welsh Government, 2021c), which is structured around its 10 wellbeing objectives that include building “a stronger, greener economy” that is “based on the principles of fair work, sustainability and the industries and services of the future” (p. 8, 4), but there is no mention of economic growth per se as a main objective.²⁴ Nor—unlike in Canada and Finland—does one encounter the words growth, GDP, or GVA in annual statements and press releases from 2021 to 2023 announcing the government’s legislative programme; instead, such statements emphasize creating a “stronger, greener, and fairer country” consistent with the government’s wellbeing objectives (Antoniw, 2021; Welsh Government, 2021d; Drakeford, 2022; Welsh Government, 2022c; Drakeford, 2023; Welsh Government, 2023a). Similarly, the government’s Annual Reports outlining progress toward wellbeing objectives and programme commitments say little (Welsh Government, 2023b, p. 5) or nothing (Welsh Government, 2022d) about economic growth. Alongside language of a “stronger, greener economy,” the 2023 report avoids referring to growth as a goal by stating: “Our Economic Mission is clear—we want a more prosperous economy …” (p. 5)—in line with the national wellbeing goal of a “prosperous” but not necessarily growing Wales.

One might argue that distinctions between a “growing,” “prosperous,” or “stronger” economy are semantic hair-splitting, but the words are not synonymous—as Jackson (2017) made clear in Prosperity without Growth. Choosing words other than “growing” or “growth” suggests an effort to downplay economic growth as an overriding societal objective—a potentially significant conceptual shift in language if not necessarily in policy.

That said, ambiguities in such wording can allow for selective pro- and post-growth interpretations. For example, then—Future Generations Commissioner Howe (2021, 2:00) stated that the Future Generations Act “sets out a new definition of prosperity in Wales, which takes us completely away from this insatiable quest for growth and focus on GDP.” In contrast, pro-growth environmental writer Mark Lynas (2022) referred to the same prosperity definition²⁵ in the Act to support his case for “sustainable growth” over de-growth for Wales. He wrote: “as the Act recognizes, growth and prosperity are essential well-being goals which are critical to the welfare of future generations” (p. 4). The Act did not actually recognize growth as essential; in fact, it did not mention growth at all (National Assembly for Wales, 2015). However, many people undoubtedly shared Lynas’s interpretation that “prosperous” implies growth.

Prevention and equitable ownership

The emerging Welsh WE contains some elements that are not inherently connected to a post-growth economy but could contribute to it. These include efforts to promote alternative ownership forms for enterprises, which can distribute wealth more evenly (a key issue in a post-growth society that does not rely on expanding the economy to address or sidestep distributional questions) and may be less susceptible to pressures to grow than conventional capitalist businesses (Petschow et al., 2020, pp. 49–50, 54, 57; Hayden and Dasilva, 2022). The Welsh government’s vision of a fairer economy includes a commitment to expand employee ownership (Welsh Government, 2021c, p. 10, 11; Welsh Parliament, 2023a, par. 263–264).²⁶ Other ownership-related initiatives include: a new publicly-owned renewable energy company to accelerate a green-energy transition and retain more economic benefits in Welsh communities (Welsh Government, 2021c, p. 12; Howe, 2023; Nation.Cymru, 2023), work toward creating a Community Bank for Wales (Welsh Government, 2021c, p. 7; Senedd Research, 2023a), and support for cooperative housing and community land trusts (Welsh Government, 2021c, p. 7).

Similarly, the preventative approach mandated in the Future Generations Act is not necessarily a post-growth idea but has relevance to a post-growth vision, as noted above, by reducing the need for state revenue (and economic growth) to pay for costly problems. Prevention, which is relevant to many issues, is particularly evident in the Welsh Government’s (2021e) health and social care plan, which puts a “greater emphasis on preventing illness” (p.3) as part of a “whole system approach to health and social care” (p. 3) that addresses the broad social determinants of health and aims to create a “wellness system” (p. 4, see also Wallace, 2019; Howe and Nutbeam, 2023). Prevention is also prominent in other government documents, such as the latest Programme for Government (Welsh Government, 2021c, p. 3, f, p. 6) and Annual Reports (Welsh Government, 2022d, p. 3, 2023b, p. 3).

Prevention involves more “joined-up” thinking to move beyond policy siloes (Wallace, 2019; Howe and Nutbeam, 2023). For example, transport policies can serve preventative goals for health, such as investments to encourage active travel and the decision to make 20 mph the default urban speed limit as of September 2023. The latter is expected to reduce deaths and injuries from collisions—saving an estimated £92 million annually (Welsh Government, 2023c)—while safer roads may improve health by increasing cycling and walking (Musselwhite and Merriman, 2023).

Wide range of sufficiency policies

The 20-mph speed limit is not only a preventative policy but also one of many sufficiency-oriented policies being implemented or examined in Wales. These include: discouraging the ownership of second homes through higher council and land transaction taxes (BBC, 2021; Welsh Government, 2021c, p. 7; Senedd Research, 2023b); reducing transport needs through a remote working strategy aiming for 30 percent of employees to work at or near home regularly (Welsh Government, 2021c, pp. 4, 11, 2022d, p. 5, 2022e); and developing a “Wales Community Food Strategy to encourage the production and supply of locally-sourced food” that could potentially reduce transport and emissions (Welsh Government, 2021c, p. 5).

The government has also supported re-use, repair, and sharing of goods by funding repair cafes and “libraries of things” where people can borrow a wide range of goods, from tools to camping tents (Welsh Government, 2021c, p. 5, 11, 12, 2023b, p. 7; Benthyg Cymru, 2023). Such sufficiency-oriented initiatives integrate multiple objectives. As Howe (2023, p. 61) explained, the creation of such community sites—and other options, such as school uniform swap shops—that allow people to avoid buying new items “not only helps to reduce waste but also saves people money, it brings communities together, which in itself is a major determinant of health, and it tackles the inequalities which exist between the haves and the have nots.”

Wales has also explored some policies and proposals that are prominent in the post-growth literature, but which those with a pro-growth perspective might also support, such as work–time reduction. The Future Generations Commissioner (2022), the Senedd’s Petitions Committee (Senedd Research, 2023c), and a government-appointed working group (Welsh Government, 2024) endorsed a four-day workweek pilot, although no firm commitments existed at the time of writing. Meanwhile, following the Future Generations Commissioner’s (2021) recommendation of a universal basic income, the Welsh Government (2021f) launched a basic income pilot²⁷ in July 2022, focused on young people leaving the care system and entering adulthood. Although evaluation is ongoing,²⁸ due to concerns about cost, the government decided not to pursue the idea once the trial ended (Gwilym and Beck, 2023). Meanwhile, Wales has implemented a variation on a job guarantee—a prominent proposal both in degrowth and Green New Deal circles—through the Young Person’s Guarantee that, since November 2021, has provided “everyone under 25 the offer of work, education, training, or self-employment” (Welsh Government, 2021c, p. 4; Senedd Research, 2023a).

Arguably the most significant sufficiency-oriented policy in Wales—and, indeed, in any WEGo nation—is its U-turn on road building as part of a broader transport policy shift. An initial episode involved plans to build a 13 mile-long relief road through environmentally sensitive wetlands to relieve M4 motorway congestion at a cost exceeding £1.4 billion (Craig, 2019). The Future Generations Commissioner played a key role in stopping the plan (Balch, 2019; Ferber, 2023; Howe, 2023). In Howe’s (2021, 2:51) account, she told the government, “You need to be spending your money differently,” as it was not in line with the Future Generations Act and its definitions of prosperity, ecological resilience, a healthier Wales, or more equal Wales (Howe, 2023; see also Balch, 2019). Howe (2023, p. 60) explained that this was the first time the Act was used to require “a new way of doing things” that favoured communities and long-term environmental considerations rather than short-term economic goals.²⁹

Scrapping the M4 relief road was followed by a “new path” transport strategy acknowledging that “we need to change the way we travel” (Welsh Government, 2021g, p. 3). Reflecting a sufficiency approach, the strategy’s first priority is to “bring services to people … to reduce the need to travel” (p .3, 17), followed by enabling people to shift to more sustainable transport modes³⁰ (p. 3, 18) by shifting infrastructure investment to favour active travel and public transit (p. 4, 19). It also seeks to encourage the use of greener options (p. 4, 20), including shifting from individual vehicle ownership to shared solutions (e.g. car sharing, bike sharing).

In line with this strategy, in February 2023, Wales took the groundbreaking step of cancelling all major road-building projects, with only some smaller-scale projects going forward. Strict criteria were set for future road building, including not increasing speeds and emissions or the number of cars on the road (for details, see Welsh Government, 2023d; BBC, 2023). The deputy minister for climate change explained the new approach: “We will not get to net zero unless we stop doing the same thing over and over” (Welsh Government, 2023d).

But a continued commitment to economic growth

Although curbing road-network expansion was a notable sufficiency-oriented action, it did not mean abandoning pursuit of economic growth. Despite other elements, noted above, that suggested a shift away from growth-centred thinking, many indications of commitment to growth remained in Welsh leaders’ statements, government documents, and policies.

First Minister Drakeford told the Senedd, for example, that “we would certainly want to see, a growing economy—a cake that grows so that you can share out the proceeds of growth,” while acknowledging that “gross value added is an imperfect guide to the health of any economy” (Welsh Parliament, 2023b, par. 44, 51). Economy Minister Vaughan Gething—who later became the first minister in 2024—also expressed the government’s commitment to economic growth many times. For example, in the Senedd, he highlighted its “framework for future-focused inclusive economic growth, underpinned by our groundbreaking Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015” (Welsh Parliament, 2023a, par. 225). Gething described the “Government’s mission” as “economic growth in a sustainable manner, and a genuine fair-work nation” (Welsh Parliament, 2022a, par. 70).³¹ Meanwhile, Climate Change Minister Julie James put forward a green growth perspective, stating: “economic growth and action on climate are not opposing objectives” (Thomas, 2023).

Key economic development initiatives include “growth deals” involving the Welsh and UK governments, local authorities, and other partners in four economic regions. The deals aim to meet conventional growth goals while enhancing social, environmental, and economic wellbeing. The Mid Wales Growth Deal (Growing Mid Wales, 2022), for example, aims to address the region’s relatively low economic output (p. 5) through investments that generate an additional £570–700 million in GVA (p. 6, 18; see also Welsh Government, 2022g). The goal is “to promote growth in a scalable, inclusive, and sustainable way” in line with the Future Generations Act (p. 21). However, combining these objectives has created challenges and countervailing pressures (Beel et al., 2022; Lovelock, 2023). According to an analysis of the North Wales Growth Deal (NWGD), despite the Future Generations Act’s emphasis on giving equal weight to ecological sustainability, social equity, and economic goals, “the core spending objectives of the Growth Deal largely measure success on economic terms, namely job creation, GVA growth…, and capital investment” (Lovelock, 2023). Meanwhile, Beel et al. (2022, pp. 4, 10–11) found that NWGD stakeholders were very conscious of tensions between prioritizing GVA growth and building a WE within ecological limits; indeed, the most critical interviewees saw a fundamental conflict between the Growth Deal’s emphasis on economic growth and the Future Generations Act.

Other illustrations of economic growth’s continued importance include the Welsh Government’s (2023e) innovation strategy, which outlined an economic mission that begins with “an economy that innovates for growth…” (p. 19), as part of a broader “shared mission to secure greater wellbeing for the future generations of Wales” (p. 5). Meanwhile, in their analysis of progress toward a “prosperous Wales,” the Welsh Government’s (2022h, 2023f) annual Wellbeing of Wales reports give considerable weight to economic growth, output as measured by gross value added (GVA), and related indicators such as gross disposable household income (GDHI). These reports express concern, for example, over “sluggish” rates of “growth in the economy and in real incomes” resulting from “poor productivity growth” (Welsh Government, 2023f, p. 22).³²

Perhaps the clearest indication of the Welsh government’s continued commitment to economic growth occurred in October 2022 when British Prime Minister Liz Truss (2022) accused Welsh First Minister Drakeford—and fellow WEGo leader Nicola Sturgeon of Scotland, among others—of being “enemies of enterprise” and part of the “anti-growth coalition” (AGC). According to Truss, Drakeford earned these distinctions for “cancelling road-building projects and refusing to build the M4 relief road.” For one conservative columnist, Drakeford occupied a special place within this broad, imagined grouping: “if the AGC has a spiritual leader, it is without question Mark Drakeford, Wales’s First Minister, with his flirtation with four-day weeks, 20 mph speed limits, and a universal basic income” (Lynn, 2022).

Drakeford responded by highlighting his pro-growth credentials while attacking Truss’s own “disastrous” growth record. Drakeford boasted that the Welsh economy grew faster in the previous year than any other UK nation, adding: “By what possible yardstick the Prime Minister believes that we are opposed to growth I have no idea at all” (Welsh Parliament, 2022d). During her brief leadership, Truss cut taxes on the wealthy and increased government borrowing to fill the revenue gap, driving interest rates up and the British pound down. Drakeford argued that resulting mortgage rate increases took £26 billion in additional interest payments out of British families’ pockets—funds that “will now no longer be there to support the economy back into growth” (Welsh Parliament, 2022d). Responding to a Conservative Member of the Senedd, the Welsh climate minister added: “The anti-growth coalition … is absolutely on your benches and in your Government,” i.e. Truss’s government in London (Welsh Parliament, 2022e; see also Gething, 2022).

Discussion and conclusion

The cases examined in this article broadly confirm previous findings for WEGo founding members (Hayden and Dasilva, 2022) while allowing some refinement of the conclusions in light of the greater variation among cases and additional illustrations of how WEGo nations can move forward. Despite optimistic interpretations by some post-growth thinkers, WEGo nations (both members and non-member participant Canada) clearly have not moved beyond the pursuit of economic growth as a core priority and instead pursue versions of “sustainable and inclusive growth.” That said, some steps in a post-growth direction—i.e. actions that post-growth thinkers commonly call for (e.g. Alexander, 2016; Jackson, 2020)—are evident, albeit to different degrees in each country. These include going beyond GDP to measure wellbeing and prosperity, integrating those indicators into policymaking, and downplaying the centrality of economic growth (most evident in Wales)—although it is still pursued. The cases studied here confirm the conclusion that it is “an error to assume that governments that adopt a wellbeing economy language are also embracing the full range of post-growth ambitions that motivated those who first developed the concept” (Hayden and Dasilva, 2022, pp. 12–13). Overall, the practices of WEGo nations to date can be characterized, at most, as a “weak post growth” approach. That said, this article identifies greater variation among WE cases than in previous analyses (Hayden and Dasilva, 2022; Mason and Büchs, 2023), with one case showing more post-growth potential.

Canada is a minimalist case of action toward a WE. Its new Quality of Life framework is a significant step in measuring societal outcomes in more comprehensive ways than GDP alone, with the potential to inform better, evidence-based policymaking and some initial use in developing budgets. The framework is also a potentially useful tool (with some limitations noted above) for those demanding stronger social and environmental policies to address deficits or inequalities in the distribution of outcomes revealed by indicators. However, unlike core WEGo members, there has been no sign in Canada of high-level government commitment to a WE. While existing behind-the-scenes work may one day bear fruit, Canada has some way to go to be a WE leader of any kind—let alone a post-growth WE.

Finland has seen much more substantial government engagement with the WE concept. The country’s extensive Nordic welfare state and record in delivering “happiness” for its people provide a strong foundation for WE efforts, which can be seen as the next step in the welfare state’s evolution. Finland has yet to identify its WE indicators, but has committed to do so—and its policies already put considerable emphasis on social and ecological considerations. But its WE vision remains strongly growth-oriented. A prominent idea in Finland is that wellbeing and economic growth are mutually reinforcing—and wellbeing can even be seen as capital for future economic growth (and future wellbeing). A WE is part of the response to Finnish concerns over the projected slowing of economic growth, which—unless new sources of taxation and state revenue are found—would limit the state’s capacity to maintain an advanced welfare state.

From a post-growth perspective, Wales is the most intriguing WEGo case. Although continued commitment to economic growth is evident, the sidestepping of any mention of growth in some key documents outlining government priorities—and in the Wellbeing of Future Generations Act—suggests some effort to downplay the centrality of growth (arguably a step toward a-growth). The former Future Generations Commissioner characterized the country’s definition of prosperity as one that moves beyond the quest for growth (Howe, 2021, 2:00), although that interpretation is contested. Indeed, some tensions are evident between a post-growth reading of the Future Generations Act and conventional policy initiatives such as regional Growth Deals. While all three countries have introduced some sufficiency-oriented policies, Wales stands out for the range and significance of such initiatives, most notably regarding transport and limits on road building. Wales also goes further than other WEGos in measuring the global impacts of domestic consumption (Hayden and Dasilva, 2022, p. 15), which helps to shine a light on the full impacts of consumption-driven growth. While accusations that the Welsh first minister is part of an “anti-growth coalition” do not stand up to scrutiny, Wales does venture further into post-growth territory than other WEGo cases.

One key factor that distinguishes Wales is an understanding of wellbeing that puts future generations and sustainability at the very centre, rather than a focus on wellbeing that has a sustainability component added on. The difference may seem subtle, but it has been impactful. The commitment to future generations has been institutionalized through the Wellbeing of Future Generations Act and the office of the Future Generations Commissioner, both of which have had a substantial impact on policy, including the sufficiency-oriented shift in transport policy.

The cases in this article, as in the previous analysis, illustrate the challenge of contemporary states’ growth dependency to address core goals, including revenue generation to fund wellbeing-enhancing welfare-state programmes. The goal of accelerating growth to strengthen the welfare state’s financial sustainability is particularly evident in Finland, while other WEGo countries have similar concerns. Previous analysis found that such issues also stand out strongly in Iceland, where the then-prime minister’s statements about the desirability of a WE that is not growth- and consumption-centred contrast with her government’s efforts to accelerate economic growth to address long-term financial concerns (Hayden and Dasilva, 2022, p. 11).

Other obstacles to a more radical, post-growth WE identified in the literature include the dominant neo-classical economics training within government departments and agencies, and opposition from vested interests (Mason and Büchs, 2023), which can reinforce the overarching problem of growth dependency. Mason and Büchs (2023) also identify short-termist and siloed policymaking as obstacles; this study does not dispute that but finds efforts in all three countries to try to address those problems. Meanwhile, Wales illustrates an additional obstacle to post-growth ambitions: political attacks for being perceived as insufficiently pro-growth. In Wales, opponents attached the “anti-growth” label to the government despite its continued (albeit relatively muted) pursuit of growth; a government that clearly signals that is no longer pursuing GDP growth³³ can expect even harsher criticism from opponents.

Some options for moving in a post-growth direction

Obstacles to taking the WE further in a post-growth direction are substantial. Although the following points are not a full answer to these challenges, this article’s findings suggest some possible steps for WEGo nations and others to strengthen the WE’s post-growth character. First, building on the Welsh example and its limits on road building, they could be more ambitious in introducing sufficiency-oriented policies—particularly ones aimed at stopping the growth of the most environmentally damaging activities. There is, for example, a potential “sweet spot” of sufficiency-oriented and wellbeing-enhancing (although potentially still controversial) policies to reduce car dependency and speed limits and expand active travel in ways that improve health, environmental outcomes, and the quality of urban environments. Meanwhile, opportunities could be explored to reduce consumption in ways that strengthen a sense of community connection that enhances wellbeing—as seen, for example, in policies to create community sites to share and repair goods.

Second, WEGo nations and others should consider adopting nationally appropriate variations of the Welsh WE institutional framework, with legislation that identifies core goals related to sustainable/future-oriented wellbeing rather than GDP growth, supported by offices similar to the Future Generations Commissioner. Like a wider implementation of sufficiency policies, such institutions do not in themselves guarantee a move beyond the pursuit of growth, but they can enable steps in that direction and help expand practices consistent with a post-growth future.

As noted in the previous analysis, WEGo nations and others could also play a role in acknowledging, more fully understanding, and wrestling with the fundamental challenge of growth dependency that holds back post-growth ambitions (Petschow et al., 2020; EESC, 2020; Jackson, 2020). A full analysis of that issue is beyond the scope of this article (for a more detailed discussion, see Hayden and Dasilva (2022, pp. 13–14)), but some policies discussed above could be built on to partially address this daunting challenge.

Preventative approaches to avoiding costly social problems before they happen—which are prominent in Finland, Wales, and other WEGo members (Hayden and Dasilva, 2022)—could, as discussed, reduce state revenue needs and related pressures to expand economic activity. Meanwhile, efforts to promote alternatives to conventional capitalist forms of enterprise ownership could, if taken further, help ensure more equitable wealth distribution while giving states a revenue-generating ownership stake to help finance welfare-state programmes in a non-growing economy. Employee-, community-, state-, municipally-, or cooperatively owned enterprises may also be less susceptible to pressures to grow than conventional shareholder-owned capitalist enterprises that must prioritize investor returns (Petschow et al., 2020, pp. 49–50, 54, 57; Hayden and Dasilva, 2022). Aspiring wellbeing economies could also contribute to post-growth possibilities through further exploration of policies such as work-time reduction, a basic income (or universal basic services), or variations on a job guarantee—ideas that are prominent in post-growth thinking about maintaining employment and economic security without growth (e.g. Vogel et al., 2024).

Finally, anyone who actually is part of a “post-growth coalition” that no longer pursues economic growth will need to have a compelling message—and a sufficiently strong base of political support—to push back against inevitable attacks from powerful opponents for being “anti-growth.”