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Rethinking Russia’s Ukraine involvement 2013–2016: the domestic political imperatives of Putin’s operational code

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Abstract

This article explores the relationship between domestic concerns about regime survival in Russia and Vladimir Putin’s muscular policy toward the Ukraine since 2013. After critically examining claims that the Ukraine crisis was caused by NATO enlargement, American diplomatic weakness or strategic folly, the authors consider the operational code construct as an alternative explanation to better explain Putin’s decision-making. They attempt to show that Putin’s intervention in the Ukraine was shaped, above all, by the political ‘rules’ of an authoritarian regime, which viewed growing links between a significant ‘near abroad’ state and the EU as a potentially destabilizing at home. Putin’s political system assigns a prominent regime maintenance role to Russia’s intelligence services and is one characterized by widespread corruption, stark inequality, the suppression of independent media organizations, and the systematic harassment and intimidation of political opponents.

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Notes

  1. In comparison, international superstar Michael Jackson amassed a sum of more than 1 billion US dollars during his career, which skyrocketed to 2 billion US Dollars only after his death (“Wie Michael Jackson sein…” 2009).

  2. Professor Mark Galeotti shares this assessment and said in regard to the situation in Russia that “it’s not so much a mafia state as a nationalized mafia” (Whitmore 2015).

  3. Russia’s GINI coefficient for 2011 and 2012 was 41.0 and 41.6, respectively. In 2019, Russia’s GINI coefficient stood at 39.7. World Bank, Development Research Group data based on primary household survey information derived from government statistical agencies and World Bank country departments.

  4. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) defines the different categories of PEPs as follows:

    • “Foreign PEPs individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions by a foreign country, for example heads of state or heads of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state owned corporations and important political party officials.

    • Domestic PEPs individuals who are or have been entrusted domestically with prominent public functions, for example for example heads of state or heads of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state owned corporations and important political party officials.

    • Persons who are or have been entrusted with a prominent function by a state owned enterprise or an international organisation refers to members of senior management, i.e., directors, deputy directors and members of the boards or equivalent functions.” (Financial Action Task Force 2013).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Berlin, Germany

    Thees Pankow

  2. Department of Politics, University of Otago, Dunedin, 9054, New Zealand

    Robert G. Patman

Authors
  1. Thees Pankow
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  2. Robert G. Patman
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Correspondence to Robert G. Patman.

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Pankow, T., Patman, R.G. Rethinking Russia’s Ukraine involvement 2013–2016: the domestic political imperatives of Putin’s operational code. Int Polit 55, 537–556 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0093-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0093-1

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