Abstract
The aim of this article is to offer a synthesis of what is termed here a power-analytical approach to global security regimes. The considered and prominent cases of prohibition/regulatory security regimes fall into three security clusters: a humanitarian cluster (small arms and light weapons, anti-personnel landmines, and cluster munitions), a WMD cluster (chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons), and an “unconventional” cluster (drugs and cyber weapons). Drawing on the thorough theoretical and empirical approach, the following synthesis is structured—and regimes compared—along four major categories. These four categories have been distilled from the power-analytical approach and empirical workings of the respective regimes. They are: perennial relevance of productive power; contingent systems of differentiation; real/imagined military/security centrality; and manipulation of categories. Importantly, they allow us to capture the most prominent features among the rich variety of cases. Therefore, they are reflective of both conceptual vocabulary and the multiple empirical realities of the examined regimes, thus greatly contributing not only to the existing, yet piecemeal regimes theorisation but also to empirical variability across the board.
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The research conducted for the purposes of this article was supported by the Czech Science Foundation Grant 13-26485S Global Prohibition Regimes: Theoretical Refinement and Empirical Analysis.
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Stritecky, V., Hynek, N. Comparing global security regimes: a power-analytical synthesis. Int Polit 55, 503–517 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0089-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0089-x