Abstract
Having a European identity is expected to influence citizens’ attitudes and behaviour towards the EU community. European identity is indeed positively related to support for EU integration, but are citizens with a stronger European identity also willing to pay a price for this identification, and to what extent? The contribution provides an answer to these questions by performing multilevel analyses on the EES 2014 data. The analyses show that citizens with a stronger European identity are more supportive of financial solidarity with member states in economic crisis. This explanation for support for solidarity is stronger than explanations provided by self-interest and economic ideological position. Citizens are thus willing to pay a price for their European identity. However, one can only expect so much from European identity as significant interaction effects show that the positive relationship between European identity and support for solidarity is mitigated by experiencing economic hardship.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
This touches upon one of the pressing issues in the study of solidarity: Can helping community members based on rationality be regarded as solidarity (Smith and Sorrell 2014)? For instance, Archer (2013) argues that solidarity should entail ‘reciprocity, not exchange, coercion, or strategic concession of one to the other’ (Archer 2013: 5). This view excludes solidarity based on self-interest. Other scholars do leave room for rational motives to showing solidarity. Hechter (1988), for instance, argues that the more individuals have invested in the group, the more they have to gain from showing solidarity to the group to safeguard their own interests. In his view, even investments in the group that are inspired by self-interest can be regarded as solidarity. However, in both cases it is recognized that self-interest can lead to behaviour that serves the group’s interest and maintains the group’s welfare, as studied in this contribution, so I leave it to the reader to take a stance in this debate.
It should be noted that having received help from other EU member states could also induce a sense of reciprocity. This mechanism opposes the logic of economic self-interest, as this would strengthen citizens’ sense of solidarity when they have particularly suffered from an economic crisis. Such a sense of reciprocity could be the result of feelings of indebtedness towards those who reached out in difficult times, but it could also be linked to the understanding of solidarity in the context of a shared feeling of belonging to a community whose members look out for one another.
Apart from this self-interest mechanism, citizens living in the Eurozone are also expected to be more likely to support solidarity because they experience deeper integration than other EU member states. First, this results in a stronger habit of cooperation. Second, in this context citizens are more likely to be socialized into identifying as part of the EU community (Verhaegen et al. 2014). Third, Eurozone members bear more responsibility to contribute to financial help. While in the past also non-Eurozone member states contributed to bailouts, a European bailout fund has been created that only includes Eurozone members and the risk of losing money for non-Eurozone members got covered by the ECB. These expectations could influence what citizens think is appropriate for their member state to do.
As all respondents that were 16 or 17 years old lived in the same country, the analyses were rerun without these respondents. This did not substantively alter the results of the analyses.
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus.
The effect of perceiving banks as responsible for the economic situation has been included in an additional model that can be retrieved from the author. The analysis shows no significant relationship with support for EU solidarity in the full model (Table 1). As including this variable led to a considerable decrease in the sample due to missing values on this item, it is excluded from the final analyses.
In this contribution, citizens’ perceptions about political institutions are defined as their interpretation of these institutions. This interpretation might differ from a more objective account of the functioning of political institutions (although it is highly doubtable whether true objectivity can be established in this area) (Gabel and Whitten 1997). The used measures for external efficacy can be categorized as perceptions. Attitudes are the evaluation of political institutions, which can also be described as a tendency (favourable/unfavourable) towards an object (Gawronski 2007). Hence, it is a subjective assessment about political institutions, which builds upon how one perceives these institutions. The measures for trust in political institutions reflect respondents’ attitudes about these institutions.
To support this claim, an additional analysis has been carried out with categories of combinations of national and European identity. This shows that even when citizens have a strong national identity, they are still more in favour of intra-European solidarity when they also have a European identity. Combining national and European identity thus does not imply that European identity is only superficial and does not affect citizens’ attitudes and behaviour.
Alternative indicators for the extent to which a country has been affected by the euro crisis are change in GDP and unemployment rate compared to before the crisis. Analyses with these measures are presented in Appendix F. Additionally, the absolute level of economic performance of a member state, and compared to the others, could influence citizens’ attitudes about EU solidarity. Hence, absolute unemployment levels (in 2014) and GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (PPS) have been included in the supplementary analyses as well. The results of these analyses (including the interactions calculated as in Table 2) are nearly identical to the main analyses where a dummy for ‘debtor states’ is included.
Kleider and Stoeckel (2016) also use the EES 2014 data, but they use a different set of explanatory and control variables. Therefore, the observed interaction effects have also been tested in the current study using the operationalizations for economic situation and economic ideological position of Kleider and Stoeckel. Similar results as in their working paper are observed, even though the authors include different covariates in their study. As this did not alter the conclusions of this contribution and as this is not the focus of the paper, this test is not included in the main analyses presented in this article, but can be retrieved from the authors upon request.
Even though there are no clear reasons to expect that strength of European identity would interact with the effect of ideological attitudes, for reasons of comprehensiveness this has been tested as well. However, no significant interaction effect is observed between European identity and economic ideological position.
Daniele and Geys (2015) and Kuhn et al. (forthcoming) are notable exceptions, but still the theoretical and empirical focuses of these studies differ from the current contribution.
References
Archer, M. 2013. Solidarity and governance, Extra Series 14. Vatican City: Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences.
Arnold, C., E.V. Sapir, and G. Zapryanova. 2012. Trust in the institutions of the European Union: A cross-country examination. European Integration online Papers 16(2).
Ashford, B.E., and F. Mael. 1989. Social identity theory and the organization. The Academy of Management Review 14(1): 20–39.
Auer, S. 2014. The limits of transnational solidarity and the Eurozone crisis in Germany, Ireland and Slovakia. Perspectives 15(3): 322–334.
Baden, C., and N. Springer. 2014. Complementing the news on the financial crisis: The contribution of news users’ commentary to the diversity of viewpoints in the public debate. European Journal of Communication 29(5): 529–548.
Balch, G.I. 1974. Multiple indicators in survey research: The concept “sense of political efficacy”. Political Methodology 1(2): 1–43.
Bansak, K., M.M. Bechtel, J. Hainmueller, and Y. Margalit. 2016. The ideological basis of the Grexit debate. Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 16-9.
Bechtel, M.M., J. Hainmueller, and Y. Margalit. 2014. Preferences for international redistribution: The divide over the Eurozone bailouts. American Journal of Political Science 58(4): 835–856.
Beetham, D., and C. Lord. 1998. Legitimacy and the European Union. London: Longman.
Beramendi, P., and D. Stegmueller. 2016. The political geography of the Eurocrisis. Paper prepared for the workshop ‘Preferences over Redistribution’, Duke University.
Bruter, M. 2008. Identity in the European union—Problems of measurement, modelling & paradoxical patterns of influence. Journal of Contemporary European Research 4(4): 273–285.
Bundesregierung. 2011. Regierungserklärung: Merkel: Europa muss Stabilitätsunion werden’, Berlin, 26 October. Available at https://www.bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Artikel/2011/10/2011-10-26-merkel-regierungserklaerung-er-euro.html?nn=392660.
Cinnirella, M. 1996. A social identity perspective on european integration. In Changing European identities: Social psychological analyses of social change, ed. G.M. Breakwell and E. Lyons, 253–274. Oxford: Butterworth-Heimann.
Ciornei, I., and E. Recchi. 2017. At the source of European solidarity: Assessing the effects of cross-border practices and political attitudes. Journal of Common Market Studies 55(3): 468–485.
Cramme, O., and S.B. Hobolt. 2015. Democratic politics in a European union under stress. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Daniele, G., and B. Geys. 2015. Public support for European fiscal integration in times of crisis. Journal of European Public Policy 22(5): 650–670.
de Beer, P. 2009. Sticking together or falling apart? Solidarity in an era of individualization and globalization. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Drury, J., R. Brow, R. González, and D. Miranda. 2016. Emergent social identity and observing social support predict social support provided by survivors in disaster: Solidarity in the 2010 Chile earthquake. European Journal of Social Psychology 46(2): 209–223.
Duchesne, S., and A.-P. Frognier. 2008. National and European identifications: A dual relationship. Comparative European Politics 6(2): 143–168.
Eurostat. 2017a. GDP per capita in purchasing power standards. Retrieved from http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/setupDownloads.do.
Eurostat. 2017b. Unemployment rates. Retrieved from http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_a&lang=en.
Fligstein, N. 2008. Euroclash: The EU, European identity and the future of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gabel, M., and G.D. Whitten. 1997. Economic conditions, economic perceptions, and public support for european integration. Political Behavior 19(1): 81–96.
Garry, J., and J. Tilley. 2009. The macroeconomic factors conditioning the impact of identity on attitudes towards the EU. European Union Politics 10(3): 361–379.
Garry, J., and J. Tilley. 2015. Inequality, state ownership and the European Union: How economic context and economic ideology shape support for the European Union. European Union Politics 16(1): 139–154.
Gawronski, B. 2007. Editorial: Attitudes can be measured! But what is an attitude? Social Cognition 25(5): 573–581.
Grande, E., and S. Hutter. 2016. Introduction: European integration and the challenge of politicisation. In Politicising Europe: Integration and mass politics, ed. S. Hutter, E. Grande, and H. Kriesi, 3–31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grande, E., and H. Kriesi. 2015. The restructuring of political conflict in Europe and the politicization of European integration. In European public spheres. Politics is back, ed. T. Risse, 190–223. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hechter, M. 1988. Principles of group solidarity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Hennessy, A. 2013. Informal governance and the Eurozone crisis. Journal of Contemporary European Studies 21(3): 429–446.
Herrmann, R.K., and M.B. Brewer. 2004. Identities and institutions: Becoming European in the EU. In Transnational identities: Becoming European in the EU, ed. R.K. Herrmann, T. Risse, and M.B. Brewer, 1–22. Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Hetherington, M. 2005. Why trust matters: Declining political trust and the demise of American liberalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hix, S. 2008. What’s wrong with the European union and how to fix it. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hobolt, S.B. 2015. Public attitudes towards the Euro crisis. In Democratic politics in a European union under stress, ed. O. Cramme and S.B. Hobolt, 48–66. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hobolt, S.B., and C. Wratil. 2015. Public opinion and the crisis: The dynamics of support for the euro. Journal of European Public Policy 22(2): 238–256.
Hooghe, L., and G. Marks. 2005. Calculation, community and cues: Public opinion on European integration. European Union Politics 6(4): 419–443.
Hooghe, L., and G. Marks. 2009. A postfunctionalist Theory of European integration: From permissive consensus to constraining dissensus. British Journal of Political Science 39(1): 1–23.
Hox, J.J. 2010. Multilevel analysis: Techniques and applications. London: Routledge.
Huddy, L., and N. Khatib. 2007. American patriotism, national identity, and political involvement. American Journal of Political Science 51(1): 63–77.
Joris, W., L. d’Haenens, and B. Van Gorp. 2014. The euro crisis in metaphors and frames: Focus on the press in the Low Countries. European Journal of Communication 29(5): 608–617.
Kaina, V., and I.P. Karolewski. 2009. EU governance and European identity. Living Reviews in European Governance 4(2): 5–41.
Klandermans, P.G. 2014. Identity politics and politicized identities: Identity processes and the dynamics of protest. Political Psychology 35(1): 1–22.
Kleider, H., and F. Stoeckel. 2016. Left-wing but unwilling to support international redistribution? Explaining public support for fiscal transfers in the EU. EUI working papers MWP2016/17.
Knutsen, O. 1997. The partisan and the value-based components on left-right self-placement: A comparative study. International Political Science Review 18(2): 191–225.
Kuhn, T., H. Solaz, and E. van Elsas. forthcoming. Practicing what you preach: How cosmopolitanism promotes willingness to redistribute transnationally. Journal of European Public Policy.
Kuhn, T., and F. Stoeckel. 2014. When European integration becomes costly: The Euro crisis and public support for European economic governance. Journal of European Public Policy 21(4): 624–641.
Kymlicka, W. 2001. Politics in the vernacular: Nationalism, multiculturalism and citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Long, S.J. 1997. Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables. London: Sage.
Loveless, M. 2013. The deterioration of democratic political culture: Consequences of the perception of inequality. Social Justice Research 26(4): 471–491.
Mcevoy, C. 2016. The role of political efficacy on public opinion in the European union. Journal of Common Market Studies 54(5): 1159–1174.
Mood, C. 2010. Logistic regression: Why we cannot do what we think we can do, and what we can do about it. European Sociological Review 26(1): 67–82.
Muñoz, J., M. Torcal, and E. Bonet. 2011. Institutional trust and multilevel government in the European union: Congruence or compensation? European Union Politics 12(4): 551–574.
Norman, G. 2010. Likert scales, levels of measurement and the “laws” of statistics. Advances in Health Sciences Education 15(5): 625–632.
O’Brien, R.M. 2007. A caution regarding rules of thumb for variance inflation factors. Quality & Quantity 41(5): 673–690.
Popa, S.A., H. Schmitt, S.B. Hobolt, and E. Teperoglou. 2015. EES 2014 Voter Study Advance Release Notes. Mannheim: MZES, University of Mannheim.
Quintelier, E., S. Verhaegen, and M. Hooghe. 2014. The intergenerational transmission of European identity: The role of gender and discussion within families. Journal of Common Market Studies 52(5): 1103–1119.
Rabe-Hesketh, S., and A. Skrondal. 2005. Multilevel and longitudinal modelling using Stata. College Station: Stata Press.
Reese, G., and O. Lauenstein. 2014. The Eurozone crisis: Psychological mechanisms undermining and supporting European solidarity. Social Sciences 3(1): 160–171.
Risse, T. 2010. A community of Europeans? Transnational identities and public spheres. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Risse, T. 2014. No demos? Identities and public spheres in the Euro crisis. Journal of Common Market Studies 52(6): 1207–1215.
Rohrschneider, R. 2002. The democracy deficit and mass support for an EU-wide government. American Journal of Political Science 46(2): 463–475.
Scharpf, F.W. 2015. Political legitimacy in a non-optimal currency area. In Democratic politics in a European union under stress, ed. O. Cramme and S.B. Hobolt, 19–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schmitt, H., S.A. Popa, S.B. Hobolt, and E. Teperoglou. 2015. European Parliament Election Study 2014, Voter Study. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5160 Data file Version 2.0.0.
Smith, C., and K. Sorrell. 2014. On social solidarity. In The palgrave handbook of altruism, morality, and social solidarity: Formulating a field of study, ed. V. Jeffries, 219–248. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Simpson, K., and M. Loveless. 2016. Another chance? Concerns about inequality, support for the European Union and further European integration. Journal of European Public Policy 24(7): 1069–1089.
Stoeckel, F., and T. Kuhn. 2017. Mobilizing citizens for costly policies: the conditional effect of party cues on support for international bailouts in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies.
Tajfel, H. 1981. Human groups and social categories. Studies in social psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Turner, J.C. 1982. Towards a cognitive redefinition of the social group. In Social identity and intergroup relations, ed. H. Tajfel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
van Spanje, J., and C.H. de Vreese. 2011. So what’s wrong with the EU? Motivations underlying the Eurosceptic vote in the 2009 European elections. European Union Politics 12(3): 405–429.
Verhaegen, S., and M. Hooghe. 2015. Does more knowledge about the European union lead to a stronger European identity? A comparative analysis among adolescents in 21 European member states. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 28(2): 127–146.
Verhaegen, S., M. Hooghe, and E. Quintelier. 2014. European identity and support for European integration: A matter of perceived economic benefits? Kyklos: International Review of Social Sciences 67(2): 317–336.
Weßels, B. 2007. Discontent and European identity: Three types of Euroscepticism. Acta Politica 42(2): 287–306.
Zürn, M. 2000. Democratic governance beyond the Nation-State: The EU and other international institutions. European Journal of International Relations 6(2): 183–221.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the researchers of the European Election Study 2014 for the data gathering and for making the data available for use, two anonymous reviewers and Joost de Moor for their valuable comments and the KU Leuven Research Council and Riksbankens Jubileumfond for research funding.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendices
Appendix 1
Question wording and descriptive information used variables
Variable | Question wording | Mean (SD) | Min. | Max. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
European identity | For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion: | |||
You feel you are a citizen of the EU | 2.914 (0.935) | 1 | 4 | |
You feel attached to Europe | 2.917 (0.918) | 1 | 4 | |
Negative perception economic evolution | What do you think about the economy? Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general economic situation in (our country) is… | 3.134 (1.005) | 1 (a lot better) | 5 (a lot worse) |
And over the next 12 months, how do you think the general economic situation in (our country) will be? Will it… | 2.939 (0.924) | 1 (a lot better) | 5 (a lot worse) | |
Now I would like you to tell me your views on various issues. For each issue, we will present you with two opposite statements and we will ask your opinion about these two statements. We would like to ask you to position yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where ‘0’ means that you ‘fully agree with the statement at the top’ and ‘10’ means that you ‘fully agree with the statement at the bottom’. Then if your views are somewhere in between, you can choose any number that describes your position best. | ||||
Support redistribution within own country | (1) You are fully opposed to the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor in (our country) - | 7.130 (2.886) | 1 | 11 |
(11) You are fully in favour of the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor in (our country) | ||||
Support increased tax for public services | (1) You are fully in favour of cutting public services to cut taxes - | 5.063 (2.753) | 1 | 11 |
(11) You are fully in favour of raising taxes to increase public services | ||||
National identity | For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion: | |||
You feel attached to (our country) | 3.625 (0.663) | 1 | 4 | |
Attitudes and perceptions EU institutions | For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion: | |||
You trust the institutions of the EU | 2.528 (0.860) | 1 | 4 | |
The European Parliament takes into consideration the concerns of European citizens | 2.456 (0.848) | 1 | 4 | |
Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: | ||||
My voice counts in the European Union | 2.466 (1.006) | 1 | 4 | |
Attitudes and perceptions national institutions | For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion: | |||
You trust the (national parliament) | 2.423 (0.915) | 1 | 4 | |
The (national parliament) takes the concerns of (country) citizens into consideration | 2.363 (0.877) | 1 | 4 | |
Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: | ||||
My voice counts in (our country) | 2.716 (0.998) | 1 | 4 | |
Country is responsible for economy | Now I would like to ask you some questions about how much responsibility the different institutions have in the current economic situation in (our country) | |||
The (our country) government | 8.751 (2.504) | 1 | 11 | |
EU is responsible for economy | The European Union | 7.565 (2.519) | 1 | 11 |
Age | How old are you? | 51.456 (17.292) | 16 | 99 |
Variable | Question wording | Proportion | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
Decreased income | Please tell me whether or not each of the following situations has happened to you or someone in your household during the last two years? | 51.12% Yes | ||
Your household experienced a decrease in income | 48.88% No | |||
Education | How old were you when you stopped full-time education? | 14.93% 15– 40.94% 16–19 38.58% 20+ 4.78% Still studying 0.76% No full-time education | ||
Female | 48.94% Male 51.06% Female | |||
Support for EU membership | Generally speaking, do you think that (our country) membership of the EU is…? | 59.36% A good thing 13.66% A bad thing 26.97% Neither a good thing nor a bad thing |
Appendix 2
Explaining support for solidarity between EU member states with ordered logit random intercept models
Full model | |
|---|---|
Individual level | |
European identity | 0.289 (0.024)*** |
National identity | −0.194 (0.024)*** |
Decreased income | −0.097 (0.030)*** |
Negative perception economic evolution | −0.179 (0.020)*** |
Support redistribution in own country | 0.012 (0.005)*** |
Support increased tax for public services | 0.064 (0.006)*** |
Attitudes and perceptions EU institutions | 0.366 (0.032)*** |
Attitudes and perceptions national institutions | 0.312 (0.029)*** |
EU is responsible for economy | 0.009 (0.006) |
Country is responsible for economy | 0.009 (0.006) |
Education level (ref. education till age 16–19) | |
No education | 0.235 (0.165) |
Education till age 15 | −0.190 (0.047)*** |
Education till over age 20 | 0.226 (0.034)*** |
Still student | 0.094 (0.073) |
Age | 0.001 (0.001) |
Female | −0.101 (0.028)*** |
Support for EU membership (ref. neither good nor bad) | |
Good | 0.369 (0.037)*** |
Bad | −0.424 (0.049)*** |
Country level | |
Eurozone | −0.172 (0.174) |
Debtor states | −0.052 (0.201) |
Cut-off 1 | −0.076 (0.201) |
Cut-off 2 | 1.651 (0.201)*** |
Cut-off 3 | 4.210 (0.204)*** |
VarianceCountry level | 0.160 (0.043)*** |
Interaction effects between European identity and self-interest with ordered logit random intercept models
European identity in interaction with | Interaction coefficient |
|---|---|
Individual-level interactions | |
Decreased income | −0.101 (0.035)** |
Negative perception economic evolution | −0.057 (0.019)** |
Cross-level interactions | |
Eurozone | 0.127 (0.038)*** |
Debtor states | −0.269 (0.045)*** |
Appendix 3
Step-wise set-up main analyses
European identity only | + self-interest | + ideology | + control variables | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Individual level | ||||
European identity | 0.334 (0.008)*** | 0.295 (0.008)*** | 0.289 (0.008)*** | 0.117 (0.010)*** |
National identity | −0.079 (0.010)*** | |||
Decreased income | −0.084 (0.013)*** | −0.078 (0.013)*** | −0.049 (0.013)*** | |
Negative perception economic evolution | −0.150 (0.008)*** | −0.147 (0/008)*** | −0.073 (0.009)*** | |
Support redistribution within own country | −0.000 (0.002) | 0.005 (0.002)* | ||
Support increased tax for public services | 0.035 (0.002)*** | 0.027 (0.002)*** | ||
Perceptions EU institutions | 0.150 (0.013)*** | |||
Perceptions national institutions | 0.129 (0.012)*** | |||
EU is responsible for economy | 0.004 (0.003) | |||
Country is responsible for economy | 0. 004 (0.003) | |||
Education level (ref. education till age 16–19) | ||||
No education | 0.123 (0.071) | |||
Education till age 15 | −0.083 (0.020)*** | |||
Education till over age 20 | 0.098 (0.015)*** | |||
Still student | 0.041 (0.032) | |||
Age | 0.000 (0.000) | |||
Female | −0.041 (0.012)** | |||
Support for EU membership (ref. neither good nor bad) | ||||
Good | 0.167 (0.016)*** | |||
Bad | −0.187 (0.021)*** | |||
Country level | ||||
Eurozone | −0.071 (0.075) | |||
Debtor states | −0.025 (0.086) | |||
Intercept | 1.522 (0.048)*** | 2.135 (0.055)*** | 1.969 (0.058)*** | 1.726 (0.085)*** |
VarianceCountry level | 0.050 (0.014)*** | 0.043 (0.012)*** | 0.040 (0.011)*** | 0.029 (0.008)*** |
VarianceResidual | 0.727 (0.007)*** | 0.711 (0.007)*** | 0.698 (0.007)*** | 0.656 (0.007)*** |
Appendix 4
Predicted values of EU solidarity at different levels of the main explanatory variables
At minimum value | At maximum value | |
|---|---|---|
European identity | 2.285 (0.038) | 2.635 (0.035) |
National identity | 2.717 (0.042) | 2.480 (0.033) |
Decreased income | 2.534 (0.033) | 2.485 (0.033) |
Negative perception economic evolution | 2.657 (0.037) | 2.366 (0.037) |
Support redistribution within own country | 2.481 (0.035) | 2.527 (0.034) |
Support increased tax for public services | 2.400 (0.034) | 2.668 (0.036) |
Appendix 5
Relationship between living in a debtor state or in the Eurozone and support for solidarity between EU member states
Bivariate debtor state | Bivariate Eurozone | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Debtor state | −0.287 (0.116)* | −0.161 (0.100) | −0.198 (0.105) | −0.275 (0.108)* | |
Eurozone | −0.116 (0.110) | ||||
European identity | 0.334 (0.008)*** | ||||
Decreased income | −0.103 (0.014)*** | ||||
Negative perception economic evolution | −0.222 (0.008)*** | ||||
Support redistribution within own country | −0.012 (0.002)*** | ||||
Support increased tax for public services | 0.045 (0.003)*** | ||||
VarianceCountry-level | 0.062 (0.017) | 0.045 (0.012) | 0.051 (0.014) | 0.061 (0.017) | 0.073 (0.020) |
VarianceResidual | 0.799 (0.008) | 0.727 (0.007) | 0.764 (0.008) | 0.798 (0.008) | 0.799 (0.008) |
Differences between debtor states and non-debtor states in strength of European identity and individual-level measures of self-interest
Debtor state | Non-debtor state | Significance | |
|---|---|---|---|
Mean European identity | 2.636 (0.014) | 2.986 (0.007) | T = 51.812 (p < 0.001) |
Mean negative perception economic evolution | 3.275 (0.015) | 2.976 (0.007) | T = −43.757 (p < 0.001) |
Proportion decreased income | 75.12% | 45.02% | p < 0.001 (χ 2-test) |
Appendix 6
Alternative measures for the economic situation of EU member states and the degree to which they are affected by the euro crisis
GDP change | GDP per capita in PPS (2014) | Unemployment change | Unemployment 2014 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Individual level | ||||
European identity | 0.116 (0.010)*** | 0.116 (0.010)*** | 0.117 (0.010)*** | 0.117 (0.010)*** |
National identity | −0.079 (0.010)*** | −0.079 (0.010)*** | −0.079 (0.010)*** | −0.079 (0.010)*** |
Decreased income | −0.050 (0.013)*** | −0.048 (0.013)*** | −0.049 (0.013)*** | −0.049 (0.013)*** |
Negative perception economic evolution | −0.073 (0.009)*** | −0.073 (0.009)*** | −0.073 (0.009)*** | −0.073 (0.009)*** |
Support redistribution within own country | 0.005 (0.002)* | 0.005 (0.002)* | 0.005 (0.002)* | 0.005 (0.002)* |
Support increased tax for public services | 0.027 (0.002)*** | 0.027 (0.002)*** | 0.027 (0.002)*** | 0.027 (0.002)*** |
Perceptions EU institutions | 0.150 (0.013)*** | 0.151 (0.013)*** | 0.150 (0.013)*** | 0.150 (0.013)*** |
Perceptions national institutions | 0.130 (0.012)*** | 0.128 (0.012)*** | 0.129 (0.012)*** | 0.130 (0.012)*** |
EU is responsible for economy | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) |
Country is responsible for economy | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) |
Education level (ref. education till age 16–19) | ||||
No education | 0.122 (0.071) | 0.122 (0.071) | 0.123 (0.071) | 0.123 (0.071) |
Education till age 15 | −0.083 (0.020)*** | −0.083 (0.020)*** | −0.083 (0.020)*** | −0.083 (0.020)*** |
Education till over age 20 | 0.098 (0.015)*** | 0.098 (0.015)*** | 0.098 (0.015)*** | 0.098 (0.015)*** |
Still student | 0.041 (0.032) | 0.041 (0.031) | 0.041 (0.032) | 0.041 (0.032) |
Age | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) |
Female | −0.041 (0.012)** | −0.041 (0.012)** | −0.041 (0.012)** | −0.041 (0.012)** |
Support for EU membership (ref. neither good nor bad) | ||||
Good | 0.167 (0.016)*** | 0.167 (0.016)*** | 0.167 (0.016)*** | 0.167 (0.016)*** |
Bad | −0.187 (0.021)*** | −0.188 (0.021)*** | −0.187 (0.021)*** | −0.187 (0.021)*** |
Country level | ||||
Eurozone | −0.092 (0.074) | −0.116 (0.068) | −0.080 (0.072) | −0.078 (0.072) |
GDP change (2014–2008) | −0.114 (0.253) | |||
GDP per capita in PPS (2014) | 0.002 (0.000)* | |||
Unemployment change (% of active population 2014–2008) | 0.059 (0.764) | |||
Unemployment 2014 (% of active population) | −0.000 (0.006) | |||
Intercept | 1.748 (0.094)*** | 1.590 (0.103)*** | 1.723 (0.088)*** | 1.729 (0.102)*** |
VarianceCountry level | 0.029 (0.008)*** | 0.025 (0.007)*** | 0.029 (0.008)*** | 0.029 (0.008)*** |
VarianceResidual | 0.656 (0.007)*** | 0.656 (0.007)*** | 0.656 (0.007)*** | 0.656 (0.007)*** |
European identity in interaction with | |
|---|---|
GDP change (2014–2008) | 0.363 (0.060)*** |
GDP per capita in PPS (2014) | 0.002 (0.000)*** |
Unemployment change (% of active population 2014–2008) | −1.138 (0.157)*** |
Unemployment 2014 (% of active population) | −0.010 (0.001)*** |
Appendix 7
Main analyses including left–right self-placement as a measure for economic ideological position
Full model | |
|---|---|
Individual level | |
European identity | 0.100 (0.009)*** |
National identity | −0.055 (0.024)*** |
Decreased income | −0.055 (0.013)*** |
Negative perception economic evolution | −0.062 (0.007)*** |
Left–right self-placement (ref. centre) | |
Extreme left | 0.086 (0.021)*** |
Left | 0.112 (0.018)*** |
Right | −0.042 (0.017)* |
Extreme right | −0.053 (0.021)* |
Attitudes and perceptions EU institutions | 0.117 (0.010)*** |
Attitudes and perceptions national institutions | 0.105 (0.009)*** |
EU is responsible for economy | 0.012 (0.007) |
Country is responsible for economy | 0.005 (0.007) |
Education level (ref. education till age 16–19) | |
No education | 0.129 (0.169) |
Education till age 15 | −0.082 (0.019)*** |
Education till over age 20 | 0.101 (0.014)*** |
Still student | 0.042 (0.031) |
Age | 0.000 (0.000) |
Female | −0.041 (0.012)** |
Support for EU membership (ref. neither good nor bad) | |
Good | 0.174 (0.016)*** |
Bad | −0.202 (0.021)*** |
Country level | |
Eurozone | −0.076 (0.077) |
Debtor states | −0.024 (0.088) |
Intercept | 2.441 (0.063)*** |
VarianceCountry level | 0.030 (0.008)*** |
VarianceResidual | 0.662 (0.007)*** |
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Verhaegen, S. What to expect from European identity? Explaining support for solidarity in times of crisis. Comp Eur Polit 16, 871–904 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-017-0106-x
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-017-0106-x