Abstract
Behavior analysis and behavioral economics represent different traditions, but with relevant points of intersection and complementarity. Recent studies point to convergences and divergences, often in a nonspecific way, and thus lack a careful analysis of some ontological, technical, and ethical aspects—particularly those involved in proposals of such sciences for the regulation of life in society. This article aims to elucidate points of contact and distancing between these sciences, focusing on the concept of nudge. A behavior-analytic view on the concept of nudge is provided with a focus on (a) its underlying view of the individual, (b) a sample of nudging techniques, and (c) some of the ethical arguments of its proponents. It is suggested that although interchanges between behavior analysis and behavioral economics are feasible and promising, there are significant differences between their theoretical foundations. Finally, how the dialogue between both could lead to a reconsideration of the centrality of some of B. F. Skinner’s propositions is discussed.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Data Availability
Not applicable.
Notes
Thaler (2015) resorts to Kuhn’s (1962) theory on scientific revolutions, using it as a lens to interpret the emergence of behavioral economics as an autonomous branch of study. Although based on the observation of “anomalies” (a term also used by Kuhn, 1962, in reference to signs of the emergence of a paradigmatic revolution), the findings of behavioral economics would represent add-ons and punctual corrections, instead of a shift of paradigm: “My goal was much more modest: just get a few more papers published and begin to establish the case that adding some psychology to economics was an activity worth pursuing” (Thaler, 2015, p. 60).
As narrated by Thaler (2015), the history of behavioral economics is characterized not only by the discovery of anomalies in relation to the hegemonic model, but also mainly by the identification of regularities in these anomalies. In reference to Prospect Theory, for example, Thaler (2015) noted that “Kahneman and Tversky were waving a big red flag that said these errors were not random. Ask people whether there are more gun deaths caused by homicide or suicide in the U.S., and most will guess homicide, but in fact there are almost twice as many gun deaths by suicide than homicides. This is a predictable error” (p. 13). In the words of Kahneman (2003), what Prospect Theory did was, in continuity with Simon’s work, detail the functioning of the so-called bounded rationality: “Our research attempted to obtain a map of bounded rationality, by exploring the systematic biases that separate the beliefs that people have and the choices they make from the optimal beliefs and choices assumed in rational-agent models” (p. 1449).
It is worth noting that nudge theorists’ perspective on the role of heuristics and biases in decision making is a matter of controversy among experimental psychologists. Led by Gerd Gigerenzer’s approach about “ecological rationality,” such psychologists pointed out that there seems to be an underlying claim in nudge theory according to which the so-called heuristics are always deemed disadvantageous. For an ecological rationality approach, in turn, heuristics are conceived as evolutionarily selected tools that are generally advantageous for an organism’s adaptability. As observed by Hortal (2019), “Gigerenzer and evolutionary psychologists accuse nudge theorists and those behind the heuristics and biases research program of describing our behavior as merely irrational. This irrationality, they claim, may represent some evolutionary advantage that had to be matched to a specific environment in order to be efficient. Biases do not separate us from effective decisions; they are rational shortcuts that we can apply to our decision processes in a specific environment to increase our efficiency” (p. 3). For further details about this perspective, see Gigerenzer (2015).
For a post-Skinnerian approach on this, see Tagliabue et al. (2019) interpretation about the dual system as different forms of relational responding. It is an analysis based on relational frame theory, which describes as distinctively human the ability to learn given kinds of symbolic relationships.
References
Ariely, D. (2008). Predictably irrational: The hidden forces that shape our decisions. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers.
Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and social pressure. Scientific American, 193(5), 31–35.
Critchfield, T. S. (2014). Skeptic’s corner: Punishment—destructive or valuable social “adhesive”? Behavior Analysis in Practice, 7, 36–44. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40617-014-0005-4
Dittrich, A. (2004). Behaviorismo radical, ética e política: Aspectos teóricos do compromisso social. [Radical behaviorism, ethics and politics: Theoretical aspects of social commitment] (Doctoral thesis, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Universidade Federal de São Carlos, São Paulo, Brazil). Retrieved from http://www.egov.ufsc.br/portal/sites/default/files/anexos/30266-31096-1-PB.pdf.
Fantino, E. (1996). The behavioral economics of addiction: A comprehensive alternative. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19(4), 578–579. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00043041.
Foxall, G. R. (2017). Behavioral economics in consumer behavior analysis. The Behavior Analyst, 40, 309–313. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40614-017-0127-4.
Gelfand, M. J., Harrington, J. R., & Jackson, J. C. (2017). The strength of social norms across human groups. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12(5), 800–809. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617708631.
Gigerenzer, G. (2015). On the supposed evidence for libertarian paternalism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 6, 361–383. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0248-1.
Herrnstein, R. J. (1970). On the law of effect. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 13(2), 243–266. https://doi.org/10.1901/jeab.1970.13-243.
Hortal, A. (2019). Nudging and educating: Bounded axiological rationality in behavioral insights. Behavioural Public Policy, 4(3), 292–315. https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2019.2.
Hunziker, M. H. L. (2017). Dogmas sobre controle aversivo [Dogmas on aversive control]. Acta Comportamentalia, 25, 85–100.
Johnson, E. J., & Goldstein, D. (2003). Do defaults save lives? Science, 302, 1338–1339.
Kahneman, D. (2003). Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics. The American Economic Review, 93(5), 1449–1475.
Michael, J. (1993). Establishing operations. The. Behavior Analyst, 16(2), 191–206. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03392623.
Nevin, J. A. (2002). Measuring behavioral momentum. Behavioral Processes, 57(2–3), 187–198. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0376-6357(02)00013-x.
Rachlin, H., & Green, L. (1972). Commitment, choice and self-control. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 17(1), 15–22. https://doi.org/10.1901/jeab.1972.17-15.
Rachlin, H. (1989). Judgment, decision, and choice: A cognitive/behavioral synthesis. New York, NY: W. H. Freeman.
Rachlin, H. (2015). Choice architecture: A review of why nudge: The politics of libertarian paternalism. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 104(2), 198–203.
Rakos, R. F. (2004). The belief in free will as a biological adaptation: Thinking inside and outside the behavior analytic box. European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 5(2), 95–103. https://doi.org/10.1080/15021149.2004.11434235.
Simon, C., & Tagliabue, M. (2018). Feeding the behavioral revolution: Contributions of behavior analysis to nudging and vice versa. Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, 2(1), 91–97.
Simon, H. A. (1957). Models of man: Social and rational; mathematical essays on rational human behavior in society setting. New York, NY: Wiley.
Skinner, B. F. (1969). Cumulative record (Enlarged ed.). New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Skinner, B. F. (1973a). Answers for my critics. In H. Wheeler (Ed.), Beyond the punitive society (pp. 256–266). San Francisco, CA: Freeman.
Skinner, B. F. (1973b). Beyond freedom and dignity. New York, NY: Pelican Books (Original work published 1971).
Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1980). Notebooks (R. Epstein, Ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Skinner, B. F. (1981). Selection by consequences. Science, 213(4507), 501–504. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7244649.
Skinner, B. F. (1986). What is wrong with daily life in the Western world? American Psychologist, 41(5), 568–574. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.41.5.568.
Skinner, B. F. (1989). Recent issues in the analysis of behavior. Columbus, OH: Merrill.
Skinner, B. F. (2005). Walden two. Indianapolis, In: Hackett. (Original work published in 1948).
Skinner, B. F. (2014). Science and human behavior. Cambridge, MA: The B. F. Skinner Foundation (Original work published 1953).
Soares, P. G., Costa, C. E., Aló, R. M., Luiz, A., & Cunha, T. R. L. (2017). Custo da resposta: Como tem sido definido e estudado?. [Response Cost: How has it been defined and studied?]. Perspectivas em análise do comportamento, 8(2), 258–268. https://doi.org/10.18761/PAC.2017.020
Staddon, J. E. R. (2018). Scientific method: How science works, fails to work and pretends to work. New York, NY: Routledge.
Sunstein, C. R. (2014). Why nudge? The politics of libertarian paternalism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Sunstein, C. R. (2016). Cambridge studies in economics, choice, and society: The ethics of influence: Government in the age of behavioral science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Szasz, T. (1974). Review of “About behaviorism,” by B. F. Skinner. Libertarian Review, 3, 6–7.
Tagliabue, M., & Sandaker, I. (2019). Societal well-being: Embedding nudges in sustainable cultural practices. Behavior and Social Issues, 28, 99–113. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42822-019-0002-x.
Tagliabue, M., Squatrito, V., & Presti, G. (2019). Models of cognition and their applications in behavioral economics: A conceptual framework for nudging derived from behavior analysis and RFT. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 2418. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02418.
Thaler, R. H. (2015). Misbehaving: The making of behavioral economics. New York: Norton & Co.
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124.
White, M. (2013). The manipulation of choice: Ethics and libertarian paternalism. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Zilio, D., & Carrara, K. (2009). B. F. Skinner: Teórico da ciência e teórico da moral? [B. F. Skinner: Science theorist or moral theorist?]. Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicologia, 61(2), 1–11.
Funding
Preparation of this work was funded by the São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP), via a postdoctoral scholarship granted to the first author (18/10699-5).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Contributions
César Antonio Alves da Rocha wrote the preliminary and final versions of the manuscript. Maria Helena Leite Hunziker corrected the preliminary versions and reviewed the final version of the manuscript.
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of Interest
On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.
Ethical Approval
Not applicable.
Informed Consent
Not applicable.
Consent for Publication
Not applicable.
Code Availability
Not applicable.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
da Rocha, C.A.A., Hunziker, M.H.L. A Behavior-Analytic View on Nudges: Individual, Technique, and Ethics. Behav. Soc. Iss. 29, 138–161 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42822-020-00037-9
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42822-020-00037-9