Abstract
Since the advent of BAN logic, many logics have been proposed for verifying authentication protocols. In one line of research, scholars have presented logics that can be utilized in verifying timed requirements of the protocols. Although many temporal epistemic logics have been developed to this end, there is no complete logic of this kind to prevent logical omniscience. Thus, they may lead to misleading judgments about the properties of the protocol being analyzed. In this paper, we propose a complete and omniscience-free temporal epistemic logic for analyzing authentication protocols. The main challenging issue in devising this logic is formulating intuitive models that on one hand reflect what is naturally meant by a protocol execution and on the other hand make it possible to achieve properties such as completeness. We show that such models can build on interpreted systems and that the resulting logic is useful in analyzing authentication protocols.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For technical reasons, we need to force \(\tau \) to be finite using a finite set of atomic messages and restricting the number of interleaving concatenations and encryptions.
A message is fresh if it has not been sent in any message previously [9]. If a message is unfresh, it is subject to replay attacks.
References
Abadi, M., Rogaway, P.: Reconciling two views of cryptography (the computational soundness of formal encryption). J. Cryptol. 15(2), 103–127 (2002)
Abadi, M., Tuttle, M.R.: A semantics for a logic of authentication. In: Proceedings of the 10th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pp. 201–216 (1991)
Becker, M.Y., Russo, A., Sultana, N.: Foundations of logic-based trust management. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 161–175 (2012)
Belardinelli, F., Lomuscio, A: Interactions between time and knowledge in a first-order logic for multi-agent systems. In: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on the Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, pp. 38–48 (2010)
Bonakdarpour, B., Hajisheykhi, R., Kulkarni, S.S.: Knowledge-based automated repair of authentication protocols. In: Proceedings of the 19th International Symposium on Formal Methods, pp. 132–147 (2014)
Boureanu, I., Cohen, M., Lomuscio, A.: Automatic verification of temporal-epistemic properties of cryptographic protocols. J. Appl. Non-Class. Logics 19(4), 463–487 (2009)
Boureanu, I., Jones, A.V., Lomuscio, A.: Automatic verification of epistemic specifications under convergent equational theories. In: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp. 1141–1148 (2012)
Boureanu, I., Kouvaros, P., Lomuscio, A.: Verifying security properties in unbounded multiagent systems. In: Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp. 1209–1217 (2016)
Burrows, M., Abadi, M., Needham, R.M.: A logic of authentication. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. 8(1), 18–36 (1990)
Chao, L., Hui, L., Jianfeng, M.: Analysis the properties of TLS based on temporal logic of knowledge. In: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Assurance and Security, pp. 19–22 (2009)
Cohen, M.: Logics of Knowledge and Cryptography: Completeness and Expressiveness. PhD Thesis, KTH, Stockholm, Sweden (2007)
Cohen, M., Dam, M.: Logical omniscience in the semantics of BAN logic. In: Proceedings of the Foundations of Computer Security Workshop, pp. 121–132 (2005)
Cohen, M., Dam, M.: A complete axiomatization of knowledge and cryptography. In: Proceedings of the 22nd Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, pp. 77–88 (2007)
Davis, E.: A proof-based approach to formalizing protocols in linear epistemic logic. PhD Thesis, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh (2014)
Dechesne, F., Wang, Y.: To know or not to know: epistemic approaches to security protocol verification. Synthese 177(1), 51–76 (2010)
Fagin, R., Moses, Y., Halpern, J.Y., Vardi, M.Y.: Reasoning About Knowledge. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (2003)
Garcia, F.D., Hasuo, I., Pieters, W., Van Rossum, P.: Provable anonymity. In: Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering, pp. 63–72 (2005)
Gong, L., Needham, R., Yahalom, R.: Reasoning about belief in cryptographic protocols. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pp. 234–248 (1990)
Governatori, G., Orgun, A.M., Liu, C.: Modal tableaux for verifying stream authentication protocols. J. Autonom. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 19(1), 53–75 (2009)
J.Y. Halpern and R. Pucella, Modeling adversaries in a logic for security protocol analysis. In: Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Formal Aspects of Security, pp. 115–132 (2003)
Halpern, J.Y., Pucella, R.: Dealing with logical omniscience: expressiveness and pragmatics. Artif. Intell. 175(1), 220–235 (2011)
Hunter, A., Delgrande, J.P.: Belief change and cryptographic protocol verification. In: Proceedings of the 22th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 427–433 (2007)
Lewis, D.K.: Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic. J. Philos. 65(5), 113–126 (1968)
Liu, C.: Logical foundations for reasoning about trust in secure digital communication. In: Proceedings of the Australian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 333–344 (2001)
Lomuscio, A., Woźna, B.: A complete and decidable security-specialised logic and its application to the TESLA protocol. In: Proceedings of the 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp. 145–152 (2006)
Lowe, G.: A family of attacks upon authentication protocols. Technical Report, Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Leicester (1997)
Lowe, G.: A hierarchy of authentication specifications. In: Proceedings of 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 31–43 (1997)
Luo, X., Chen, Y., Gu, M., Wu, L.: Model checking Needham-Schroeder security protocol based on temporal logic of knowledge. In: Proceedings of the International Conference on Networks Security, Wireless Communications and Trusted Computing, pp. 551–554 (2009)
Ma, J., Orgun, M., Adi, K.: An analytic tableau calculus for a temporalised belief logic. J. Appl. Logic 9(4), 289–304 (2011)
Ma, J., Orgun, M.A.: Formalising theories of trust for authentication protocols. Inf. Syst. Front. 10(1), 19–32 (2008)
Ma, J., Orgun, M.A., Sattar, A.: Analysis of authentication protocols in agent-based systems using labeled tableaux. IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern. B Cybern. 39(4), 889–900 (2009)
Ma, J., Schewe, K.: A temporalised belief logic for reasoning about authentication protocols. In: Proceedings of the IEEE 11th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, pp. 1721–1728 (2012)
Masalagiu, C., Alaib, V.: Logic engineering with applications to security. In: Proceedings of the Romanian Academy Series A-mathematics Physics Technical Sciences Information Science, pp. 141–148 (2012)
Orgun, M.A., Ma, J., Liu, C., Governatori, G.: Analysing stream authentication protocols in autonomous agent-based systems. In: Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE International Symposium on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, pp. 325–332 (2006)
Perrig, A., Canetti, R., Tygar, J.D., Song, D.: Efficient authentication and signing of multicast streams over lossy channels. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 56–73 (2000)
Syverson, P.F., Van Oorschot, P.C.: On unifying some cryptographic protocol logics. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pp. 14–28 (1994)
van Eijck, J., Gattinger, M.: Elements of epistemic crypto logic. In: Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp. 1795–1796 (2015)
Yanjing, W.: Epistemic Modelling and Protocol Dynamics. PhD Thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam (2010)
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to take this opportunity to thank Prof. Massoud Pourmahdian for his valuable comments in this research.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Communicated by Ali Enayat.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Ahmadi, S., Fallah, M.S. An Omniscience-Free Temporal Logic of Knowledge for Verifying Authentication Protocols. Bull. Iran. Math. Soc. 44, 1243–1265 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41980-018-0087-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41980-018-0087-9