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Revisiting the Epistemics of Protocol Correctness

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Advances in Artificial Intelligence (Canadian AI 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 7884))

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Abstract

Formal logics of knowledge have been employed for the verification of cryptographic protocols. Intuitively, the idea is that a correct run of a protocol should lead the participating agents to “know” some facts, due to the structure of the protocol. While there has been a great deal of work in this area, fundamental questions remain regarding the foundations of the approach. In fact, it is not even clear if any intrinsic properties of knowledge are actually required; in most cases the relevant notion of knowledge reduces directly to universal quantification over protocol runs. Moreover, there is no consensus about the appropriate epistemic domain for protocol participants, the nature of epistemic change, or the significance of initial knowledge. In this paper, we address these fundamental questions by revisiting the epistemic foundations of protocol verification.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. British Columbia Institute of Technology, Burnaby, BC, Canada

    Aaron Hunter

Authors
  1. Aaron Hunter
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada

    Osmar R. Zaïane

  2. Department of Computer Science, University of Regina, Canada

    Sandra Zilles

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Hunter, A. (2013). Revisiting the Epistemics of Protocol Correctness. In: Zaïane, O.R., Zilles, S. (eds) Advances in Artificial Intelligence. Canadian AI 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 7884. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38457-8_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38457-8_24

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-38456-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-38457-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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