Abstract
The established two tracks of neuroenhancement, moral and cognitive enhancements, rest on the characterization of commonsense morality as a set of static psychological dispositions. In this paper, I challenge this way of describing commonsense morality. I draw a parallel between commonsense psychology and commonsense morality, and I propose that the right way to characterize commonsense morality is as an empirically evaluable theory, with a structure similar to a scientific theory. I argue further that psychological dispositions to react in certain ways require the tacit endorsement of a commonsense moral theory. By adopting this view, I argue that the way to change our psychological dispositions is by changing the background theory that produces them. I conclude that when commonsense morality is construed as an empirically evaluable theory, the cleft between the abilities that support scientific progress and the abilities that promote moral progress closes and it becomes evident that the way to promote both types of advancements is through cognitive enhancement.
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Notes
In this paper, I will rely on the conceivability of cognitive neuroenhancement, but not on the more controversial claim that there already are good means of achieving cognitive neuroenhancement. For a challenge to the latter claim, see Advokat (2010).
See, Gligorov (2016), especially chapter 2.
Eliminative materialists argue for the elimination of the entities posited by folk psychology because their view is that postulating mental states as part of FP gives rise to the mind-body problem. It is worth noting that the view I describe in this paper does not rest on the truth or even the adequacy of folk psychology. Elsewhere (Gligorov 2016), I argue that FP is in principle revisable, and that the tenets of folk psychology have changed over time. Specifically, I discuss the ways in which folk psychology has absorbed the influence of neuroscience and scientific psychology, and the ways in which this has reduced the incompatibility between commonsense psychology and neuroscience. In principle, I argue, this could lead to an FP that is very different from our current one; one that would not posit or characterize inner states, i.e., mental states, which are irreducible or distinct from physical states. In fact, I argue that this is already the case (Gligorov 2016 pp. 15–33). In other words, identifying a certain cluster of psychological explanations as 'folk psychology' does not commit one to mind and body dualism. (More generally, distinguishing between psychological and physical states does not always entail mind and body dualism; it all depends on the view on holds about the relationship between those two states.) As I propose in this paper, the way to identify the scope of a folk theory is by circumscribing a relevant part of our everyday parlance, but everyday parlance changes overtime, which in turn changes the tenets of our folk psychology. In Gligorov (2016), I argue that failure to countenance that FP changes and the commitment to a kind of essentialism about commonsense psychology is a shortcoming of eliminativist views.
Person and Savulescu refer to their being a “commonsensical theory or rights” (Person and Savulescu 2012 25), but they do not elaborate on what they mean by that or how this might relate to the rest of our commonsense morality.
Here, I would like to emphasize that the claim that neuroenhancers would be effective in promoting conceptual change is empirical and would require proof through research. It is conceivable, for example, that some concepts might be more entrenched than others, and that cognitive enhancers would be preferentially effective in promoting changes to scientific theories, and be ineffective on folk morality. (I wish to thank and anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possibility.) My argument, however, is that without such evidence, given the similarities I have described between FM and a scientific theory, there is no reason to assume that there would be a difference in effectiveness.
For more on the view that commonsense categories can depend on culture, see Stich (1998). Also see, Dennett (1987 54), who argues that folk psychology varies, not just across cultures, but even within countries, states, or neighborhoods. For a more radical rethinking of the problem of scope in commonsense theories, see Gligorov (2016).
In the ultimatum game, one individual, called the “proposer,” is usually provided with a divisible resource, such as money. The proposer is asked to offer a proportion of that resource to another person, called the “responder,” who has the choice to either accept or reject the offer from the responder. If the responder accepts, they receive the part of the resource offered by the proposer and the proposer receives the rest. If the responder rejects the offer, neither individual receives anything. Based on the conception of self-interested rational agent, the responder should accept any offer no matter how small because it is better than nothing, while the proposer should offer the smallest possible amount. (The players are usually anonymous to each other.)
An iteration of the public goods game used by Henrich et al. (2005) is the voluntary contribution game, where players are given a sum of money and then told that they can contribute to a public fund as much as they want. The money contributed by the players to the public fund is increased by 50% and then distributed equally among players.
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Gligorov, N. The Cognitive Basis of Commonsense Morality. J Cogn Enhanc 2, 369–376 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41465-018-0098-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41465-018-0098-8